Essays in Poverty, Inequality and Political Economy by Lahoti, Rahul
 
 








in order to acquire the doctoral degree 
from the Faculty of Economic Sciences 






































First academic advisor : Prof. Stephan Klasen 
Second academic advisor : Prof. Sanjay G. Reddy 






I am extremely lucky, blessed and privileged to be able to easily access opportunities and 
resources that are denied to so many. I have been fortunate to win the lottery of birth, gone to 
good schools, taught and guided by great teachers at various stages of my life, and have the 
support of amazing family, group of friends and colleagues. I have enjoyed opportunities without 
the various economic and social concerns a majority of the population have to face. I am highly 
appreciative of all this to the universe and to all the hard working people, only few of those are 
mentioned below, who have had an important role to play in my life both directly and indirectly.  
 
The thesis was written under the supervision of Stephan Klasen. His advice and guidance have 
proven indispensable over time. He has also been an inspiration and role model to me for the 
hard work and dedication he has for his work. I also appreciate the impressive and cordial 
environment for research he has created in Goettingen, which has played an important role in my 
meeting several interesting colleagues. Above all he gave me the flexibility to work on topics of 
my interest without any restrictions on location of work, all of which helped me manage my 
work and life and helped me grow.  
 
I owe a great deal of debt to my second supervisor and long-time collaborator Sanjay Reddy for 
his guidance and support. His strong grasp of wide-ranging issues in philosophy and economics 
and frank opinions have been an invaluable source of knowledge to me on countless occasions. 
Working with him on several topics has taught me importance of being detail-oriented, taking 
alternate viewpoints into account and looking at the big picture. I would also like to thank my co-
supervisor Sebastian Vollmer for agreeing to be on my committee. He has been very supportive. 
I would like to acknowledge German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for the generous 
financial support which enabled me to pursue PhD.  
 
My colleagues in Goettingen have been exceptional; they have made my life as a doctoral 
student very enjoyable. Special thanks go to Soham Sahoo, co-author of the fifth chapter of this 
thesis. I have benefited in many ways from working with him and have very much enjoyed and 
appreciated our discussions. 
 
Finally, I am grateful to my parents who have been extremely supportive of all my choices and 
have been an inspiration to me. Most of all I would like to thank my wife Tulika for her love, 
emotional support and for always being beside me in this roller-coaster of life. Without her my 

































2.	 The Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP): An Overview	.......................................................................	11	
2.1.	 Introduction: Aims of the Project	.........................................................................................................................	11	
2.1.1.	 Comparison with Existing Databases	........................................................................................................	13	
2.1.2.	 How does the GCIP compare to more recent efforts?	..........................................................................	14	
2.2.	 Construction of Global Consumption and Income Datasets	........................................................................	17	
2.2.1.	 Creating the Universe of Surveys	...............................................................................................................	18	
2.2.2.	 Standardizing the Distributions	...................................................................................................................	23	
2.2.3.	 Standardizing the means	................................................................................................................................	28	
2.2.4.	 Generating a Lorenz Curve and Consumption/Income Profile	.........................................................	31	
2.3.	 Coverage of the Surveys	..........................................................................................................................................	35	
2.4.	 Aggregation Module	.................................................................................................................................................	38	
2.5.	 Comparability of Survey Data	...............................................................................................................................	40	
2.6.	 Results	............................................................................................................................................................................	41	
2.6.1.	 Evolution of World Consumption Distribution	......................................................................................	42	
2.6.2.	 Poverty Headcount Ratios	.............................................................................................................................	44	
2.7.	 Conclusion	....................................................................................................................................................................	46	
2. Appendix: Country Splits and Unifications	................................................................................................................	48	




3.4.	 Aggregate Analysis: Fast Growing Countries	..................................................................................................	70	
3.5.	 Aggregate ‘Social Welfare’	....................................................................................................................................	74	
3.6.	 Sensitivity of the Global Distribution to Alternate Methodological Choices	........................................	79	
3.7.	 Conclusion	....................................................................................................................................................................	85	






4.3.	 Data and Methodology	.............................................................................................................................................	98	
4.3.1.	 Dimensions and Indicators	............................................................................................................................	98	
4.3.2.	 Weighting	..........................................................................................................................................................	103	
4.3.3.	 Limitations	........................................................................................................................................................	104	
4.4.	 Poverty and Inequality Measures	........................................................................................................................	105	
4.5.	 Results	..........................................................................................................................................................................	107	
4.5.1.	 Intrahousehold measures	..............................................................................................................................	116	
4.5.2.	 Determinants of MPI	.....................................................................................................................................	118	
4.6.	 Robustness Analysis	...............................................................................................................................................	125	
4.7.	 Conclusion	..................................................................................................................................................................	129	
5. Are Educated Leaders good for Education in India?: Evidence from India……....................131 
5.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………..132 
5.2. Background ………………………………………………………………………………..136 
   5.2.1. Identity of Political Leader ……………………………………………………………136 
   5.2.2. Conceptual Framework ………………………………………………………………..137 
   5.2.3. State leaders and Education Policy ……………………………………………………141 
5.3. Data and Summary Statistics ……………………………………………………………...142 
5.4. Empirical Stratergy ………………………………………………………………………..148 
5.5. Results …………………………………………………………………………………….152 
  5.5.1. Main Results: Impact of Educated Leaders …………………………………………....162 
  5.5.2. Robustness Analysis …………………………………………………………………...167 
  5.5.3. Heterogeneity Analysis ………………………………………………………………..172 







List of Tables  
 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Various Global Datasets ..................................................................... 16 
Table 2.2: Welfare Concepts in GCIP Datasets ............................................................................ 20 
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Surveys used in Standardization ............................................ 24 
Table 2.4a: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for converting Income distribution into 
equivalent consumption distribution for Global Consumption Database ..................................... 26 
Table 2.4b: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for converting Consumption distribution 
into equivalent income distribution for Global Income Database ................................................ 27 
Table 2.5: In-Sample Predictions of Income to Consumption Regressions ................................. 28 
Table 2.6: Conversion of Income Survey Distribution for Brazil, 1996 to Equivalent 
Consumption Distribution ............................................................................................................. 29 
Table 2.7a: Summary Statistics for Surveys included in Global Consumption Database (GCD) 35 
Table 2.7b: Summary Statistics for Surveys included in Global Income Database (GID) ........... 36 
Table 2.8a: Summary Statistics on Countries included in Global Consumption Database (GCD)
....................................................................................................................................................... 37 
Table 2.8b: Summary Statistics on Countries Included in Global Income Database (GID) ........ 38 
Table 2.9: Density of Surveys in Global Consumption Database (GCD) by Decade, Region and 
Income Group (% of all country-years that have survey information) ......................................... 39 
Table 2.A1: List of countries that split between 1960 and 2015 .................................................. 49 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Surveys in Global Consumption Database (GCD) ................ 55 
Table 3.2: Global Consumption and Income Levels .................................................................... 59 
Table 3.3: Global Relative Income Inequality Measures .............................................................. 63 
Table 3.4: Average Within Country Income Inequality by Region .............................................. 64 
Table 3.5: Regional Interpersonal Inequality Measures ............................................................... 69 
Table 3.6: Comparison of Global Inequality Estimates from Different Studies ........................... 71 
To focus on countries that might have a non-negligible effect on world economic dynamics or on 
the structure of the world-distribution, we isolate ones with a population of ten million or 
more.  As a rough-and-ready criterion, we initially identify among these the top fifteen countries 
by per-capita income growth rate (see Table 3.7) according to surveys or national accounts.  As 
can be seen, the countries that emerge from these two exercises are rather different.  In 
particular, the survey based classification leads to some surprising results as it leads to the ...... 71 
Table 3.7: Fastest Growing Countries .......................................................................................... 72 




Table 3.9: Within-country Inequality for Various Global Distributions (Gini, population 
weighted Average) ........................................................................................................................ 83 
Table 3.10: Between-country Inequality for Various Global Distributions (% of Total Inequality, 
MLD) ............................................................................................................................................ 83 
Table 4.1: Dimensions, Indicators and Weights for various MPI measures ................................. 99 
Table 4.2: Proportion of individuals deprived in various indicators .......................................... 109 
Table 4.3: Comparison of various multi-dimensional poverty indicators constructed using dual-
cutoff approach (k=33%) by age-sex categories ......................................................................... 110 
Table 4.4: Comparison of various multi-dimensional poverty indicators and measures 
constructed using union approach by age-sex categories ........................................................... 111 
Table 4.5: Inequality (variance based measure) across the population and among the poor ...... 112 
Table 4.6: MPI measure for household and individual indicators by sex and various household 
and individual characteristics ...................................................................................................... 113 
Table 4.7: MPI measure for major states in India by gender ...................................................... 114 
Table 4.8: Classification of individuals by household and individual MPI ................................ 116 
Table 4.9: Contribution of each dimension to MPI measure (%) (Dual cutoff method with 
k=0.33) ........................................................................................................................................ 116 
Table 4.10: Intra-household inequality measures ....................................................................... 117 
Table 4.11: Intra-household inequality measures for various socio-economic groupings ......... 118 
Table 4.12: Determinants of Household MPI deprivation score ................................................ 119 
Table 4.13: Determinants of Individual MPI deprivation score ................................................. 122 
Table 4.14: Robustness Analysis ................................................................................................ 128	
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics from Child Level Data ……………………………………...…145  
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of District Level Variables from DISE Data…………………..146 
Table 5.3: Education Qualification of Candidates in Elections………………………………...147  
Table 5.4: Summary Statistics of District Level Variables from Election Data………………..148  
Table 5.5: First Stage of the 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's Reading Score……...155  
Table 5.6: Comparing Candidate and Constituency Characteristics across Close Elections with 
Educated and Non-Educated Winners………………………………………………………… 157 
Table 5.7: Probability that College-Educated Candidate Wins in Close Elections…………….160  
Table 5.8: Comparing District Specific Characteristics across Districts-Election Years with 
Different Number of Educated Politician Winners in Close Elections………………………... 161 
Table 5.9: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's Reading Score……………………….. 163 
Table 5.10: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's Mathematics Score…………………. 164 
Table 5.11: 2SLS Estimates of the Impact on Proportion Out of School (NSS Data)…………165 




Table 5.13: Robustness: Alternative Cutoff of Leader's Education…………………………… 168  
Table 5.14: Robustness: Different Lag Periods……………………………………………….. 170 
Table 5.15: Robustness: Alternative Definitions of Close Election Margin………………….. 171 
Table 5.16: Robustness: Binary Indicators for Different Levels of Learning as Outcome 
Variable………………………………………………………………………………………... 173  
Table 5.17: Heterogeneity in Impact - Poverty Level in Districts…………………………….  175 
Table 5.18: Heterogeneity in Impact - Urbanization and Level of Education in District……    176 
Table 5.19: Heterogeneity in Impact - Type of Residence……………………………………. 177 
Table 5.20: Heterogeneity in Impact - Gender and Mothers Education…………………   ….. 178 
Table A1: OLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's Reading Score………………………... 182 
Table A2: OLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's Mathematics Score…………………… 183 
Table A3: OLS Estimates for Impact on Proportion Out of School (NSS Data)……………... 184 
Table A4: First Stage Results for Impact on Proportion Out of School (NSS Data)…………. 184 
Table A5: OLS Estimates for Impact on Schools (DISE data)……………………………….. 185 
Table A6: First Stage Results for Impact on Schools (DISE data)…………………………… 185 
Table A7: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's Enrollment in Rural Areas (ASER)…. 186 
Table A8: OLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's Grade Progression (ASER data)……… 187 
Table A9: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's Grade Progression (ASER data)…….. 188 
Table A10: OLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's English Score……………………….. 189 
Table A11: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children's English Score………………………. 190 
Table A12: Descriptive Statistics for Schooling Outcomes (ASER data)……………………. 191 
Table A13: Impact on School Attendance (ASER data)……………………………………… 191 






Figure 2.1: Superposition Graphs for World Consumption Distribution for 1980 and 2010 ....... 42 
Figure 2.2: Kernel Density for World Consumption Distribution with a Non-log Scale ............. 43 
Figure 2.3: Inequality for World with and without China ............................................................ 44 
Figure 2.4 Poverty rates using various poverty lines .................................................................... 45 
Figure 3.1: Survey Means and GDP Per Capita for Survey Years from 1960 to 2013 ................ 57 
Figure 3.2: Global Income Distribution ........................................................................................ 60 
Figure 3.3: Regional Superposition Consumption Density for 1990 ............................................ 62 
Figure 3.4: Regional Superposition Consumption Density for 2013 ............................................ 62 
Figure 3.5: Change in within-country inequality in the period 1980-2013 .................................. 63 
Figure 3.6: Income Share of the Top 10% in 2013 (based on surveys, 2005 PPP) ...................... 65 
Figure 3.7: Decomposition of Global Income Inequality into within and between country 
components (2005 PPP) ................................................................................................................ 66 
Figure 3.8: Regional Relative Interpersonal Income Inequality (Gini, 2005 PPP) ...................... 67 
Figure 3.9: Global Absolute Income Inequality (2005 PPP) ........................................................ 68 
Figure 3.10: Change in Gini Coefficient between 1990 and 2013 for the Fastest Growing 
Countries ....................................................................................................................................... 73 
Figure 3.11: Change in Income Distribution for Fast Growing Countries (2005 PPP) ................ 74 
Figure 3.12: Global Generalized Lorenz Curve (2005 PPP) ........................................................ 76 
Figure 3.13: Global Consumption Growth Incidence Curve (2005 PPP) ..................................... 77 
Figure 3.14: Global Income Growth Incidence Curve (2005 PPP) .............................................. 77 
Figure 3.15: Relative Position of Select Countries in 1990 based on Income (2005 PPP) .......... 78 
Figure 3.16: Relative Position of Countries in 2013 based on Income (2005 PPP) ..................... 79 
Figure 3.17: Kernel Density Graphs for Various Global Distributions for 2013 ......................... 80 
Figure 3.18: Global Generalized Lorenz Curve for World Excluding China (2005 PPP) ........... 81 
Figure 3.19: Global Growth Incidence Curves for Various Global Distributions for 1990-2013 84 
Figure 4.2: Regression results for state fixed effects for Household and Individual MPI .......... 125 
Figure 4.3: Multidimensional poverty headcount for various values of deprivation score cutoff by 
gender .......................................................................................................................................... 129	
Figure 5.1: First Stage Illustration: Sample of all Districts with Close Elections…………….. 154 
Figure 5.2: First Stage Illustration: Sample of all Districts with at least one Election between 
Graduate and Non-Graduate Candidates……………………………………………………… 156 






How to define development and measure it are strongly interlinked and have been discussed for 
several decades now. The conceptualization of development has evolved over time from a 
narrower understanding of the term and focusing on uni-dimensional measures to a broader 
understanding and using multi-dimensional measures. For a long time levels of Gross National 
Product (GNP) and growth in GNP were considered the best and sole measures of development. 
Sen (1988) argued that economic growth though an important contributor of development is 
insufficient as a measure and also that its distribution not just level needs to be considered before 
assessing its impact on welfare. Sen (1999) defined development as “removal of various 
unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned 
agency”.  This view of development as freedom was theorized by Sen with the Capability 
Approach. The Human Development Index developed jointly by Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya 
Sen (United Nations, 1990) was among the first broad-based measure to gain recognition that 
used the capability approach.  
  
Individual welfare and its distribution across the society have garnered renewed interest recently 
in both academic and popular writings. This has been driven by moral concerns about increasing 
unequal distribution of resources and also by the need to understand the recent shifts across the 
world in opinion on global economic integration and its impact on inequality. Debates about the 
evolution of poverty, inequality and the extent to which the benefits of growth and development 
have been shared both within and across countries have all drawn attention. Increased 
availability of data and processing power have helped enhance our knowledge on level of 
inequities in the world. In the last decade, several researchers (Milanovic in particular) have used 
survey data from countries across the world to better understand global interpersonal inequality 
(see for e.g. Milanovic, 2012; Lakner & Milanovic 2015; Anand & Segal 2014; Edward & 
Sumner 2015). In the last few years the World Wealth and Income Database (WID) has amassed 
administrative data to discern distribution of income and wealth taking into account incomes of 
indiviudals at the top end of the distribution. The first two chapters of this thesis build upon this 
research to introduce the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP). GCIP is an effort to 
provide a deeper understanding of the evolution of material wellbeing both within and across 
countries, for regions and the world as a whole, extending from description to interpretation and 
explanation. GCIP provides a high standard of transparency and documentation, allowing for 




treatment of data from the underlying universe, unlike current databases. GCIP also brings into 
focus several methodological issues with measuring distribution of income and consumption in a 
global context. The first chapter discusses the  construction of the databases in the GCIP and the 
second chapter uses GCIP to study evolution of inequality and material well-being within and 
across 161 countries around the world from 1960 to 2015.  
 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) developed by Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative (OPHI) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2010 (Alkire and 
Santos, 2010) is among the latest attempts to use capability approach to measure indiviudal 
welfare. MPI measures poverty at the household level by counting the number of deprivations 
that the household suffers. If the number of deprivations suffered by the household is above a 
cutoff (poverty line), then all individuals in the household are deemed poor. MPI measures 
deprivations in three dimensions, namely health, education and standard of living. The global 
MPI measures poverty in over 100 developing countries using household survey data. One of the 
drawbacks of the Global MPI is that it does not account for unequal distribution of resouces 
within the household as the measure is based on household-based analysis. The third chapter of 
this thesis uses data on individuals to define poverty measures that account for within household 
distribution of resources. 
 
In addition to measuring development, it is critical to analyze how these outcomes can be 
improved. Political leaders play an important role in prioritizing sectors to focus government and 
policy attention on, framing policies and monitoring implementation of policies. Recent 
literature on India has shown that gender, religion, caste and other characteristics of the political 
leader play an important role in determining policy outcomes in the fields of education, health, 
economic growth and public infrastructure (Asher and Novosad, 2013; Bhalotra and Clots-
Figueras, 2014; Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, and Iyer, 2013). But the role of formal education of the 
politician in delivering development outcomes has not been investigated. In the final chapter of 
this thesis we study linkages between formal education of political leaders and development 
outcomes.  
 
This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the literature on measuring welfare and how 
characteristics of political leaders impacts development outcomes. The main ideas, arguments 





Essay 1: The Global Consumption and Income Project 
(GCIP): An Overview 
 
Growing concerns about unequal distribution of resources in the society and increased access to 
better quality data across countries have led to renewed interest in questions of absolute levels, 
gains and relative distribution of income and consumption across the world. Though there are 
several existing datasets that could be used to investigate these issues, most of them are severely 
limited. Almost all datasets combine the concepts of consumption/expenditure and income into 
one leading to incorrect conclusions on inequality comparisons across countries. Consumption 
and income not only have different levels for individuals but different distributions for the 
populations. These concepts are of independent interest as they represent concepts of advantage 
that are of evaluative concern for distinct reasons and because they provide different bases for 
empirical inference concerning material living standards. The level and distribution of the 
difference between the two (i.e. of savings or dissavings) may also be informative. Also several 
datasets that currently exist lack the transparency and flexibility to evaluate the impact of various 
assumptions that go into building any such databases.  
 
In the first essay in this thesis (chapter 2), joint work with Sanjay Reddy and Arjun Jayadev, we 
introduce the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP), which has as its foundation the 
creation of two separate datasets (The Global Consumption Dataset (GCD) and The Global 
Income Dataset (GID)) containing a portrait of consumption and income of persons over time, 
within and across countries, around the world. The datasets present estimates of monthly real 
consumption and income of various quantiles of the population (a ‘consumption/income profile’) 
for the vast majority of countries in the world (161) for every year for more than half a century 
(1960-2015).  The methodology of construction of the dataset allows for comparable data to be 
presented for an arbitrary number of quantiles (e.g. percentiles, ventiles, deciles, quintiles or 
other choices). The benchmark versions that are available for public use in beta versions report 
data in terms of mean levels of income and consumption by decile and in terms of 2005 and 2011 
PPP dollars. 
 
Construction of the dataset involves making various decisions and assumptions and can be 
broken down into four steps. In the first step, we collect data on relative distributions and mean 
levels for each country from various existing sources.  In this step we are all inclusive, utilizing 




national statistical agencies. Where there is more than one survey for a country-year we select 
one based on a lexicographic ordering of various preferences that are clearly enunciated. In the 
second step, we standardize the distributions by converting all distributions that are not already 
in the required format (consumption or income distributions depending on the database) into 
estimated equivalents. The selected surveys for country-years consist of both consumption and 
income surveys. Where surveys of both kinds are available they differ, as the share of income 
tends to be higher for lower quantiles and the share of income lower for higher quantiles for 
income as compared to consumption distributions.  Hence to make any meaningful comparison 
among distributions across and within countries and over time, we must transform the 
distributions. We derive a relationship between consumption and income distributions from 
country-years for which we have both kinds of surveys using a regression-based methodology 
and use this for the transformation. In the third step, where necessary we estimate a consumption 
mean for the GCD (Global Consumption Database) for survey-years where we have only an 
income mean and we estimate an income mean for the GID (Global Income Database) for 
survey-years where we have only a consumption mean so as to place the means too in more 
comparable units. We also attempt to detect means that are extreme outliers so as to enhance data 
reliability. Also we convert all means into common currency units in PPP terms so that levels are 
comparable over time and space. In the final step, using the mean and distributional data 
previously generated, we estimate a Lorenz curve for the survey years (using standard parametric 
methods). For the non-survey years we estimate the consumption/income profile by interpolation 
or extrapolation by using the appropriate per capita growth rate figures from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI)1 to create a time-weighted average of the ‘perspectives’ on the 
estimation year that are associated with the nearest survey-years. This set of procedures gives 
rise to a complete time-space tableau covering the world between 1960 and 2015. We discuss 
details of each of these steps in the first essay. 
 
The resulting nearly continuous portrait of the evolution of the world consumption and income 
pattern is unique in several ways. To avoid the potentially misleading effects of pooling 
consumption and income surveys together as exchangeable, we standardize the welfare concepts 
used.  GCIP provides a considerably more comprehensive portrait by covering a larger group of 
countries (161), a longer time period (1960 to the present as opposed to the mid- or late 1980s to 
the present) and annual portraits of the world distribution, drawing on the nearest available 
surveys.  In addition, in the GCIP, we employ purpose-built tools for aggregation that allow us to 
analyze evolution of material well-being for sets of individuals belonging to user-defined country 
                                                




groups (e.g. regions of the world or countries sharing other specified traits) in a manner that is 
not possible with other existing databases.  GCIP can be used to estimate mean and consumption 
and income profile for any given year and country or aggregate of countries. Synthetic 
populations2 generated by GCIP can be used to estimate any poverty measure (headcount ratio, 
poverty gap ratio, FGT measure etc.), inequality measure (Gini coefficient, ratio of mean to 
median, Palma ratio, Theil index etc.) or measure of inclusiveness in growth and development 
(for example measures of how widely shared growth or pro-poor growth has been). We have also 
developed, and intend to provide publicly, in-built tools for filling in missing data, enhancing 
data reliability. GCIP also meets a high standard of transparency, which upon final release of the 
dataset would allow for third-party replication, modification and updating and the adoption of 
alternate assumptions for the selection and treatment of data from the underlying universe, unlike 
any of the current databases. All documentation and beta version of the data is available online at 
www.gcip.info.  
 
Essay 2: Who Got What, When and How? A Fifty 
Year Overview from the Global Consumption and 
Income Project (GCIP) 
 
In the second essay in this thesis (chapter 3), co-authored with Sanjay Reddy and Arjun Jayadev, 
we use the GCIP datasets, methods and the tools described in the first essay to undertake two 
separate but interlinked tasks. First, we provide a portrait of the global distribution of income and 
its constituent regional and national distributions and describe their evolution over time. Second, 
we describe the degree to which income or consumption levels of individuals have increased at 
various points in the distribution both within and across countries. We investigate the changes in 
distribution of income for the top 15 fastest growing countries in the world over the period of 
1990-2013 both within country and also as a group using the aggregation module. This also helps 
us characterize their contribution to the overall change in the global distribution. 
 
We have several important findings. First, global incomes have increased across the board over 
the last three decades. Median income doubled from 2005 PPP $73 to 2005 PPP $154 per month 
from 2000 to 2015 after much slower growth in the previous decade. Second, the global income 
                                                
2 For the GCIP we create synthetic populations that consists of 100 ‘persons’, each representing a percentile in the distribution, but we can 
generate such a population of any size.  Indeed, a separate concept that we employ is that of a ‘model population’ in which each representative 




distribution has become substantially more relatively equal in the last three decades. Most of 
these improvements came in the period after 2000 and can be attributed to inter-country rather 
than intra-country effects: the very rapid growth of China. China’s population has experienced an 
enormous advance that has shaped the world distribution as a whole and others’ relative 
positions. The rest of the world excluding China has witnessed increase in median incomes of 
only twenty six percent between 1980 and 2013 while China’s median has increased by 1188 
percent in the same period; and the income distribution for the rest of the world is still twin 
peaked. After 2005 developing countries other than China have seen higher growth rates and 
impacted the global distribution, but the sustainability of this growth is uncertain. Third, country 
experiences vary widely, and there is some evidence of ‘inequality convergence’ with previously 
more unequal countries becoming more equal over time and vice versa, although the majority of 
the world’s population lived in countries with rising inequality. Also countries from Sub-Saharan 
Africa have the highest income inequality in the world upending the `stylized fact’ that Latin 
American countries are among the most unequal in the world. Fourth, we find that despite 
significantly high growth in the fifteen fastest growing countries, the impact of Chinese growth 
dominates in changing the world income distribution and increase in inequality with fast growth 
is not the norm.  Finally, we undertake a welfare analysis and find that while global ‘welfare’ 
estimated by any standard income-focused aggregative welfare function has increased 
substantially over the last fifty years most of the change has happened in the period since 2000. 
The rest of the world excluding China has seen no Pareto-improvements in the period 1970 to 
2000.   
 
Our results come with several important caveats. Global estimates are prone to several sources of 
uncertainty both intrinsic to the methods used and arising from the plausible use of different 
methods.  Areas in which such uncertainties arise include survey design and sampling, PPP 
estimation, standardization methods used to compare income and consumption and others.  
Although they are known to exist, not all of the resulting probable errors can be quantified. 
Given the various assumptions that go into the estimates, we have done extensive sensitivity 
analysis to test robustness of our results. We provide estimates for various PPP base years, with 
and without standardization for consumption and income surveys, and by excluding certain 
countries from the estimates.  
 
Essay 3: How Serious is the Neglect of Intra-household 





Most gendered analysis of poverty compare either proportion of men and women who are 
deemed poor based on household based poverty measures or compare poverty rates by gender of 
the head of the household. Both of these approaches are incorrect and deeply misleading. Though 
the ultimate goal of poverty and inequality measures is to track welfare of individuals, most of 
these measures use the household as the unit of analysis. The poverty status of the household is 
determined based on a poverty line and uni or multi-dimensions indicators. All individuals in the 
household are assigned the same status as that of the household. This assumes equal or needs-
based distribution within the household, which is inconsistent with the theoretical literature and 
empirical findings on intra-household bargaining.  
 
A poor household might have individuals who are not deprived in any or most dimensions to be 
actually deemed as non-poor, and vice versa. The bias this generates in household-based 
multidimensional poverty assessments depends on how the thresholds for household poverty in a 
dimension are set, or how the individual-level data is used to create a household-level indicator. 
The deprivation thresholds can be defined in a restrictive way where the achievement of the 
worst-off member of the household has to be above the threshold for the household to be non-
deprived. In these cases the deprivation rates among individuals are estimated to be higher by 
household measures as long as not all households are indeed equally deprived in that dimension. 
But deprivation thresholds could also be defined in an expansive way, where only the 
achievement of the best-off individual has to be above the threshold for the household to be non-
deprived. In such cases, the deprivation rates among individuals are estimated to be lower by 
household measures if not all are as well off as the best-off. UNDP and OPHI's MPI use a mix of 
indicator threshold definitions – restrictive and expansive – so that the net bias of their neglect of 
intra-household inequality is not clear a priori.    
 
In the third essay (chapter 4), coauthored with Stephan Klasen, we present a multi-dimensional 
poverty measure at the individual level that accounts for intra-household inequality across the 
entire population. Using data from India, we use this measure to estimate individual poverty and 
inequality as well as the size of the bias of household-based analyses.  
 
Women and older individuals in India are far more deprived and poor than men and younger 
individuals. This simple fact is obscured and gender and generational differences are absent 
when measuring poverty and inequality using the standard household-based approach. In 
particular, the poverty rate of females is higher by 14 percentage points than men in our 
individual MPI measure but only 2 percentage points higher when using the household-based 




points than among children aged between 7 and 18 years of age in the individual measure, 
compared to only 2 percentage points when using the household-based measure. Using a 
decomposable inequality measure, we find the contribution of intrahousehold inequality to the 
total inequality in the individual deprivation score inequality to be 30% and total inequality is 
also some 30% higher using the individual-based measure, while inequality among the poor is 
found to be 5% smaller using the individual measure. We also find that in over 60 percent of 
households the average deprivation level of women in the household is greater than the average 
deprivation level of men.  
 
Our approach to individualize poverty measurement is only a first attempt in this direction and is 
hampered by insufficient data on individual well-being in standard household surveys; improved 
data would likely lead to even larger differentials in poverty by age and gender, at least in a 
country such as India. 
 
Essay 4: Are Educated Leaders Better for Education? 
Evidence from India 
 
Education of a leader has been used as a proxy for quality of the leader. The belief that formal 
education instills in political leaders the ability to be more competent and honest has motivated 
new laws in two states in India disqualifying anyone without minimum education requirements 
from contesting local elections. But there is almost no research investigating the link between 
formal education of the leader and competence in India. The few studies at the national level 
provide only inconclusive evidence.  
 
In the final essay of this thesis (chapter 5), co-authored with Soham Sahoo, we test the 
hypothesis that educated politicians are more competent and deliver better development 
outcomes. In particular, we analyze if state level political leaders with a college degree are able 
to provide better education outcomes than leaders who have not completed college. Data on 
schooling outcomes (learning outcomes in reading, mathematics and English, school enrollment 
and attendance rates, school infrastructure and various grants for schools) from various data 
sources are combined with education information on state leaders who could influence education 
policy to analyze the impact of educated leaders. We create a dataset that combines data on 
learning outcomes for rural areas from the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) from 
2006 to 2014, enrollment outcome data from various National Sample Survey (NSS) rounds 




– DISE - from 2010 to 2014 and data on leader’s education level from Association of 
Democratic Reform (ADR) from 2004 to 2014. This dataset allows us to analyze impact of 
political leaders education on education outcomes for 10 years, the entire span of time for which 
data on formal education of the leader is available. Our district-level analysis along with child 
level data enables us to hold a range of institutional and cultural factors constant, and yields 
statistical power to detect even small effects on education outcomes. To identify the causal 
impact of educated politicians, we use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design where the 
proportion of leaders who have completed college is instrumented with the proportion of college 
graduate leaders who won in close elections against a non-college graduate leader. This design is 
based on the assumption that winners in close elections are quasi-random. We extensively test 
the validity of this assumption.  
 
In our analysis we find that educated politicians do not perform any better than less educated 
politicians. Education outcomes of districts which elect educated politicians is no better than in 
districts where less educated politicians are elected. The null result is precisely estimated and is 
consistent across OLS and 2SLS specifications. Our results are robust to a range of checks – 
different outcomes, specifications, different definitions of key parameters in the analysis. We 
also repeat our analysis for different groupings defined by district and individual characteristics – 
poverty, urbanization, education levels, and family characteristics – and in most cases we find no 
impact of political leaders on education outcomes. 
There are several important caveats with our analysis; and it should be interpreted as a first step 
in understanding linkages between formal education of the leader and development outcomes in 
India. It might be the case that educated leaders focus on outcomes in other sectors; or national 
and local leaders whom we don’t study have a positive impact; or influencing outcomes in 
education sector is difficult. In future research we plan to analyze relationship between educated 
leaders at various levels and other development outcomes.  
 
Even with the various limitations, our findings suggest that educated leaders are not more 
competent than less educated leaders. This has implications on policy of disqualifying candidates 












2. The Global Consumption and 






We introduce two separate datasets (The Global Consumption Dataset (GCD) and The Global 
Income Dataset (GID)) making possible an unprecedented portrait of consumption and income of 
persons over time, within and across countries, around the world. The current benchmark version 
of the dataset presents estimates of monthly real consumption and income for every percentile of 
the population (a ‘consumption/income profile’) for more than 160 countries and more than half 
a century (1960-2015). We describe the construction of the datasets and demonstrate possible 
uses by presenting some sample results concerning the distribution of consumption, poverty and 
inequality in the world.  
 
2.1. Introduction: Aims of the Project 
 
Increases in mean per capita income are often used as an index of a society’s economic 
development. However, it is a metric that is widely recognized to be quite insufficient. In recent 
years, public debate has been concerned with whether growth experiences are ‘delivering’ by 
enhancing well-being.  Some recent work has focused on broadening the indicators which are 
used to assess social progress (see for example Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2010) while other work 
has been concerned with the highly unequal distribution of gains, whether accompanied by 
sizable improvements in the level of income and reductions in poverty (as in China) or by 
relative stagnation in the incomes of a considerable portion of the population (as in the United 
States).  In the last two decades the increased availability of high-quality data has enabled 
researchers to provide an integrated portrait of inequalities within and between countries. Such 
                                                
3 The chapter is based on joint work with Sanjay Reddy and Arjun Jayadev. A similar version of this essay is published in Journal of 
Globalization and Development https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jgd.2016.7.issue-1/jgd-2016-0025/jgd-2016-0025.xml?format=INT. We are 
thankful for the important contribution to this project made by Michalis Nikiforos, who among other things, executed much of the work required 
to construct an earlier version of the database. We are also most grateful to Ingrid Kvangraven, Gibran Mian, Ibrahim Shikaki, Shenuque Tissera 
and Brandt Weathers for helpful research assistance. We thank participants in seminars at the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs and University of Goettingen for their suggestions.   We acknowledge support for this project from Azim Premji University, the CUNY 
Graduate Center Advanced Research Collaborative, the T.A.J. Residency (SKE Projects, Bangalore) and the New School for Social Research.  
We appreciate the help of many individuals, in their personal or official capacities, for their responses to queries concerning data and methods. 
We have also benefitted from indirect support from various other institutions with which we have been associated over the last years, which we 




studies of inequality have, however, not generally been integrated with analyses of income 
growth.  
 
We describe below an effort to create resources that can help address a range of questions, 
related to absolute levels, gains and relative distribution, by offering plausible estimates of the 
income and consumption enjoyed by different portions of the population within countries and in 
the world as a whole over a reasonably long time period.  Specifically, we introduce the Global 
Consumption and Income Project (GCIP), which has as its foundation the creation of two 
separate datasets (The Global Consumption Dataset (GCD) and The Global Income Dataset 
(GID)) containing a portrait of consumption and income of persons over time, within and across 
countries, around the world. The project aims not only to construct but also to analyze these data 
in future work.  The datasets present estimates of monthly real consumption and income of 
various quantiles of the population (a ‘consumption/income profile’) for the vast majority of 
countries in the world (more than 150) for every year for more than half a century (1960-2015).  
The methodology of construction of the dataset allows for comparable data to be presented for an 
arbitrary number of quantiles (e.g. percentiles, ventiles, deciles, quintiles or other choices). The 
benchmark versions that we intend to make initially available for public use will report data in 
terms of mean levels of income and consumption by decile and in terms of 2005 and 2011 PPP 
dollars.4  
 
Using the GCIP one can estimate a Lorenz curve, mean and consumption and income profile for 
any given year and country or aggregate of countries. This enables us to create a synthetic 
population5 from which any poverty measure (headcount ratio, poverty gap ratio, FGT measure 
etc.), inequality measure (Gini coefficient, ratio of mean to median, Palma ratio, Theil index etc.) 
or measure of inclusiveness in growth and development (for example measures of how widely 
shared growth or pro-poor growth has been) can be calculated.  
 
The resulting nearly continuous portrait of the evolution of the world consumption and income 
pattern is unique. It goes beyond the Penn World Tables in presenting estimates of the 
distribution within countries and it goes beyond recent analyses of the world distribution both in 
greatly extending the period covered and in presenting estimates for every year as well as for 
both income and consumption. Whereas with rare exceptions (for example Lakner & Milanovic, 
                                                
4 The summary statistics and the methods for the databases (Version 0.1) that we report here reflect their versions as of March 14th, 2015 and the 
secondary data for this version was downloaded on or before that date,  The databases are, however, being continuously updated.     
5 For the GCIP we create synthetic populations that consists of 100 ‘persons’, each representing a percentile in the distribution, but we can 
generate such a population of any size.  Indeed, a separate concept that we employ is that of a ‘model population’ in which each representative 




2013) such databases and studies based upon them have focused on relative inequalities alone, 
we provide data on levels of consumption and income so as to enable assessment of level and 
distribution together, as is required for analyses of topics such as the inclusivity of growth and 
development. We have also developed, and intend to provide publicly, in-built tools for filling in 
missing data, enhancing data reliability, and creating portraits of aggregates of countries.  Our 
intent is that the GCIP should meet a high standard of transparency, allowing for third-party 
replication, modification and updating and the adoption of alternate assumptions for the selection 
and treatment of data from the underlying universe, unlike any of the current databases.   Among 
the benefits of such an approach is likely to be that the database can eventually be kept up-to-
date through the involvement of multiple users, ensuring that it remains current.  The fact that 
inferences often depend greatly on very detailed data choices makes such transparency 
indispensable6.  
 
Constructing the data set involves undertaking several decisions with regard to the selection of 
data as well as with regard to the manner in which estimates are generated for country-years in 
which no household survey was undertaken. Here we document the process of construction and 
specific choices concerning data in greater detail.  Some of the other methods we have developed 
(e.g. for Lorenz curve estimation and aggregation) and software programs will be provided 
online at the project website (www.gcip.info).  We briefly describe the methods we have 
employed in the construction of the benchmark version of the database and presents results for a 
few countries and aggregates. Extensions of the primary database (for instance involving 
quintiles or ventiles rather than deciles or different PPP concepts and base years) are created 
using analogous methods. 
 
2.1.1. Comparison with Existing Databases 
 
Estimates based on per-capita income of countries have been present since the 1950s and have 
been used to estimate global inequality (see for example Nurkse (1953) for an early estimate of 
the world income distribution on this basis, drawing on data collected by the League of Nations 
and the still nascent United Nations).  Since the mid-1990s, when the Deininger and Squire 
dataset (Deininger & Squire, 1996) was released, economists have had data on the distribution of 
income across many countries, if often in summary form. This availability in turn has led to 
greater efforts to try and extend the data (for example, through the World Income Inequality 
                                                





Database (WIID)7 developed by WIDER, to ‘harmonize’ it by taking measures to ensure its 
greater comparability, as for example with the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(Solt 2009) and to extend the data backwards in time (see e.g. Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2009, 
which forms estimates for as early as 1970).  The World Bank has been developing global 
poverty estimates on the basis of its own collection of data since the late 1970s, and the World 
Bank’s Povcalnet database has been available to the general public since 2001 as a result of 
demands for greater data access and transparency.  This institutional collection of data has also 
been the basis for the influential work of Milanovic (2002, 2005). 8 
 
Our work seeks to go beyond these earlier efforts in at least four ways.  First, we construct 
estimates of both consumption and of income. It is well-known that consumption and income not 
only have different levels for individuals but different distributions for populations.  They are 
moreover of independent interest, both because they represent concepts of advantage which are 
of evaluative concern for distinct reasons and because they provide different bases for empirical 
inference concerning material living standards. The level and distribution of the difference 
between the two (i.e. of savings or dissavings) may also be informative. We therefore create 
separate income and consumption estimates for each country-year observation and quantile in the 
database.  Second, we aim to create a complete time-space tableau, interpolating where necessary 
in order to estimate mean level of income or consumption for every country and year as well as 
for distinct quantiles of the population. Third, we allow for the aggregation of estimates of the 
level and distribution of income for user-defined regions and groups of countries.  This 
capability relies on our having previously created estimates that are aligned in time in a given 
year, through interpolation where necessary.  This aspect of our effort therefore builds on the 
preceding one. We have developed our own software and methods to merge distributions for 
these user-defined aggregates, providing a flexible capability for researchers and policy analysts.  
Fourth, we aim to provide documentation of our methods and tools that is as complete as 
practicable so as to permit the adoption of alternate assumptions in order to construct other 
versions of the databases and to promote ongoing improvement of methods, tools and data 
through suitable engagement of specialists and the general public. 
 
2.1.2. How does the GCIP compare to more recent efforts?   
 
                                                
7 World Income Inequality Database Version 3.3:  https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid-%E2%80%93-world-income-inequality-database  
8 Recently, the World Bank has made available a Global Consumption Database, which provides a detailed household-survey based picture of 





Lakner & Milanovic (2013) build upon Milanovic (2005) and seek to describe the global income 
distribution between 1988 and 2008. They analyze the evolutions of levels of income as well as 
the distribution of income over time.  They choose a few benchmark years and describe the 
change in the global distribution over the period using surveys based on observations at or near 
to those years. Whereas they pool income and consumption data without adjustment we employ 
a ‘standardized’ income concept (drawing on a broader universe of both consumption and 
income surveys and estimating income from consumption surveys or vice versa), and employ a 
much longer time series, in addition to the features of the project that allow for additional 
dimensions of flexibility, as mentioned above.  Although we adopt this standardized approach 
because we believe it to enhance comparability, our data can also be used in ‘pooled’ fashion if 
desired, in keeping with their procedure and that adopted more recently by the World Bank.9  
  
In another recent exercise Dykstra, Dykstra and Sandefur (2014) queried the Povcalnet database 
using automated methods to create a cumulative distribution of income or consumption (pooled 
together in that database) for a large number of survey-years (from each of 942 surveys spanning 
127 countries over the period 1977 to 2012). The resulting database can (as with the GCIP) be 
used for diverse purposes, some of which would have been very difficult without downloading 
the data in this comprehensive way. The exercise highlights the difficulty in accessing even 
nominally public data for research and replication in view of the restrictive format in which it is 
often presented, the prevalence of poor documentation and the contrasting value of fully publicly 
accessible datasets.  In creating an earlier version of the GCIP we undertook a very similar 
exercise. However, we abandoned that effort because (a) the computational effort for the 
exercise was very high and the cumulative distribution could simply be replicated for the entire 
distribution for as many points as desired, and more flexibly and transparently, by replicating the 
reported parametric regressions that underlay the data, (b) the Povcalnet database is largely 
confined to developing countries and to years from the early 1980s onwards and (c) there was no 
reason to privilege Povcalnet as a source of survey data even for developing countries, for which 
there are other sources of data too.  The GCIP has been constructed to differ in key respects. The 
GCIP has wider area and time coverage (due to inclusion of surveys from other sources, largely 
secondary but sometimes primary), it incorporates a standardized welfare concept (consumption 
or income, with one estimated from the other where necessary) making within and cross-country 
comparisons more meaningful, it allows for the estimation of all measures for every year (not 
just the survey year or a reference year around which surveys are grouped), it provides tools for 
                                                
9 See Ferreira et al (2015) for details on the pooling method. There are questions however as to whether such pooling is sensible (Reddy and 





creating user-defined composites of countries in any given year, it provides flexibility in choices 
as to how to construct and update the dataset, and in choosing specific estimation methods for 
the Lorenz curve (as opposed to accepting the version which happens to be chosen by Povcalnet,  
 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Various Global Datasets  
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which may reflect not only variable methods but sometimes generate invalid estimates of Lorenz 
curves).  One of the key goals of GCIP is transparency, realized by providing documentation that 
is as complete as possible and access to all data and code to the extent feasible, in order to 
facilitate application of alternative assumptions in database creation or analysis.  goals of GCIP 
is transparency, realized by providing documentation that is as complete as possible and access 
to all data and code to the extent feasible, in order to facilitate application of alternative 
assumptions in database creation or analysis.   
 
Edward and Sumner (2013) have created a database closest in spirit and construction to ours. The 
Edward and Sumner GrIP (‘Gr’owth, ‘I’nequality and ‘P’overty) model (version 1.0) takes 
distribution (quintile and decile) data and combines this with data on national population and on 
the mean consumption per capita in internationally comparable PPP $ to develop a database with 
similar aims to ours. However, the GCIP includes information before 1990, provides both 
consumption and income levels for each decile and allows for different PPP concepts as well as 
for market exchange rates. In this outline, we focus, however, on the present benchmark version 
which provides data in 2005 PPP dollars. 
 
We do not attempt to discuss comprehensively the merits and demerits of previous efforts but 
instead seek to focus on the distinguishing features of the GCIP dataset. It is nevertheless useful 
to attempt to summarize the differences between our approach and existing efforts (see Table 
2.1). We believe that the GCIP provides data for a wider set of countries, aggregates of countries, 
years and concepts, as well as tools for their analysis, than do other existing databases.  
2.2. Construction of Global Consumption and Income 
Datasets 
 
Constructing a consumption (or income) profile for a given country-year requires two distinct 




to create a unique profile of actual consumption (or income) levels of each decile in the country-
year. We thus divide the process of creating the database into four distinct steps.  
 
In the first step, we collect data on relative distributions and mean levels for each country from 
various existing sources.  Where there is more than one survey for a country-year we select one, 
preferring consumption data sources for the consumption database and income data sources for 
the income database (Other choices are of course also possible, including to pool the income and 
consumption data without preferring one concept of advantage). Second, we standardize the 
distributions by converting all distributions that are not already in the required format 
(consumption or income distributions depending on the database) into estimated equivalents. The 
selected surveys for country-years consist of both consumption and income surveys. Where 
surveys of both kinds are available they differ, as the share of income tends to be higher for 
lower quantiles and the share of income lower for higher quantiles for income as compared to 
consumption distributions.  Hence to make any meaningful comparison among distributions 
across and within countries and over time, we must transform the distributions.  Although the 
conceptual case for doing so is strong this is rarely if ever done in international comparisons.  In 
the third step, where necessary we estimate a consumption mean for the GCD (Global 
Consumption Database) for survey-years where we have only an income mean and we estimate 
an income mean for the GID (Global Income Database) for survey-years where we have only a 
consumption mean so as to place the means too in more comparable units. We also attempt to 
detect means that are extreme outliers so as to enhance data reliability. Fourthly, using the mean 
and distributional data previously generated, we estimate a Lorenz curve for the survey years 
(using standard parametric methods that have been found to perform acceptably in recovering 
underlying true distributions, although other methods are available in case these fail). Finally for 
non-survey years we estimate the consumption/income profile by interpolation or extrapolation 
by using the appropriate per capita growth rate figures from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI)10 to create a time-weighted average of the ‘perspectives’ on the estimation year that are 
associated with the nearest survey-years. This set of procedures gives rise to a complete time-
space tableau covering the world between 1960 and as near as we can come to the present. We 
describe each step in detail below. 
 
2.2.1. Creating the Universe of Surveys 
 
The GCIP draws data on relative distributions from diverse sources, such as the EU-SILC 
                                                




database (for European countries), the LIS (previously the Luxembourg Income Study), the 
SEDLAC database (for Latin American countries), UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality 
Database (henceforth WIID), the World Bank’s Povcalnet database, and Branko Milanovic’s 
WYD database11.  We are committed in principle to an ecumenical approach that integrates 
historical and contemporary data from all relevant sources, including country statistical offices, 
UN agencies, academic studies and private sector sources.12.  Povcalnet is a collection of surveys 
starting from the early 1980s.  Until recently, it covered only developing countries but now 
incorporates surveys for a number of developed countries, largely building on data from LIS.  
WIID is a collection of surveys from various secondary sources, covers both developed and 
developing countries and spans the period 1960-2012. Our third major source, the LIS, has 
harmonized data according to its chosen protocols from primary surveys for over 40 countries 
mostly from upper and middle-income countries. Although it provides data in household 
equivalence-scale adjusted form we extract the data we use from the underlying databases in per 
capita form. 
 
Our first step is to generate a ‘union’ of all available distributional and level data for all the 
country-years of interest.  The initial database thus constructed sometimes contains more than 
one observation for a country-year since multiple household surveys were undertaken in certain 
country-years and the same survey (in several instances with conflicting mean or distribution 
information) might be reported in multiple sources. The first task is therefore to refine the 
observations so as to arrive at one observation for each country and year. Surveys contained in 
GCIP may be reported as having a certain source, coverage of geographical area (national, or 
only urban areas), population and age, a certain assigned quality rating as stated in the 
underlying secondary source, concept of advantage (income vs. consumption, and specific 
income definition) and unit of analysis (household, individual, etc.). To choose one observation 
for country-years for which there are multiple we apply a lexicographic ordering to a set of 
selection criteria, which we discuss further below. The criteria and their sequence in the ordering 
are based on what we consider important considerations for common usage scenarios for the 
database. These can be altered if other usage scenarios are envisioned or indeed if users’ 
judgments as to the relevance and importance of specific selection criteria differ from our own. 
 
Before applying the various criteria, we restrict the universe of surveys to per capita surveys. 
                                                
11 www.lisdatacenter.org (accessed June 2015).  
12 GCIP also includes surveys for Cyprus, Hong Kong, Singapore and New Zealand from Branko Milanovic’s World Income Database (WYD) as 
surveys for these countries were not available in the other secondary sources. We have also employed our own country research on specific 
individual cases to supplement our major sources, through correspondence with statistical agencies, identification of relevant historical 




This has the disadvantage of causing some loss of surveys and thus a reduction in the number of 
observations in our dataset, although much less than if we had chosen any other specific 
equivalence scale concept.  For example, we are in the process of including the European Union 
Survey of Living conditions (EU-SILC) data. As this distributional data is reported an OECD-
based equivalence scale we must recalculate the distributions in per-capita terms before 
including it.  We prefer per-capita distributions for a number of reasons, and in keeping with the 
practice of other researchers (including the World Bank’s Povcalnet, Milanovic and Lakner and 
others). Per capita surveys are simpler to analyze and to understand and correspond more directly 
to concepts in the national accounts. They are also the most common form of survey in the  
 
Table 2.2: Welfare Concepts in GCIP Datasets 
Global Consumption Database (GCD) 
Welfare concept measured   Number of Surveys   Percentage 
Consumption 830 42.7 
Earnings, Gross 20 1 
Earnings, Net 18 0.9 
Factor Income 1 0.1 
Income 285 14.6 
Income, Disposable 588 30.2 
Income, Gross 162 8.3 
Monetary Income, Disposable 32 1.6 
Monetary Income, Gross 8 0.4 
Taxable Income, Gross 2 0.1 
Total 1946 100 
Global Income Database (GID) 
Consumption 575 29.5 
Earnings, Gross 20 1 
Earnings, Net 18 0.9 
Factor Income 1 0.1 
Income 307 15.8 
Income, Disposable 758 38.9 
Income, Gross 217 11.1 
Monetary Income 1 0.1 
Monetary Income, Disposable 35 1.8 
Monetary Income, Gross 12 0.6 
Taxable Income, Gross 2 0.1 
Total 1946 100 
  
 
secondary data sources. The drawback of using only per-capita information is that differences in 
the real value of resources arising from variations in household size and composition are not 
taken registered.  On the other hand, limiting our focus to per capita surveys greatly aids 




consumption behavior and other facts greatly depend on the equivalence scale chosen.13  There is 
moreover reason to believe that even if the same equivalence-scales are being compared the 
extent and character of this dependence would vary greatly between country-years due to 
differences between country-years in the demographic composition of households belonging to 
different parts of the distribution. Whereas the exact nature of the dependence can be explored 
when the household level data is available, that is not possible when only summary results using 
a specific equivalence scale are reported, as is generally the case in the collections of data that 
we use. Rather than making our conclusions dependent in an unknown but very likely substantial 
way on the specific equivalence scales used we think it more sensible to use per-capita surveys. 
When it is reported that a survey uses an equivalence scale, typically insufficient detail is 
presented about the method that was used, making it difficult or impossible to compare distinct 
surveys meaningfully.  As noted above, for LIS surveys, which report data using an equivalence 
scale, we obtain data in per capita terms using micro-data14.   
 
The lexicographic ordering of various criteria which we employ is as follows:  whether a survey 
mean is reported, type of survey (consumption/income), the nature of the income/consumption 
definition, database source (e.g. EU-SILC, LIS, Povcalnet, SEDLAC, WIID, WYD, or primary 
source), area coverage, population coverage, quality as defined in the source database, source of 
the data as reported in the secondary database (e.g. source of a WIID observation) currency unit 
and survey series (as defined by statistical authority, e.g. German Socio-Economic Panel).  As 
we are interested in both levels and distributions we prefer surveys with mean information over 
ones for which means are not reported. For the GCD, which focuses on consumption estimates, 
we prefer consumption surveys to income surveys (and vice-versa for the GID).  Among income 
definition concepts we prefer concepts that are closer to arriving at total income net of taxes and 
transfers. The order of preference of income definition concepts appearing in the underlying 
databases (for which we draw upon the classification scheme and related definitions presented in 
the WIID) is as follows, from most preferred to least preferred: disposable income, disposable 
monetary income, gross income, gross monetary income, taxable disposable income, primary 
income, net earnings, gross earnings and finally a residual category for concepts that are not fully 
specified, i.e., we don’t know if the reported data refers to net, gross or disposable income. 
Although it would be desirable in principle to make adjustments to the data based on 
relationships between the estimates corresponding to these distinct categories, in order to make 
them more comparable, we do not do so as we not have sufficient data corresponding to the 
                                                
13 See e.g. Buhmann et al (1988), Blaylock (1991), Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992a and 1992b), Banks and Johnson (1994), Anand and 
Morduch (1996), Aaberg and Melby (1998), Cowell and Mercader-Prats (1999) or Sefil (2015) and the more recent literature cited therein.     




distinct concepts but the same countries or survey-years to establish these relationships. 
 
Our order of preference of data by source employs the following ordering (earlier preferred to 
later): LIS, SEDLAC, EU-SILC, Povcalnet, WYD, WIID, primary source.  This ordering reflects 
a number of judgments.  Reported Povcalnet and LIS survey results are often compiled from 
primary data, while WIID is a collection of secondary data.  We judge that Povcalnet and LIS 
may be more rigorously scrutinized and have a smaller probability of transcription or other errors 
as compared to WIID surveys and hence among global sources we prefer these two to the WIID.  
We view SEDLAC and the EU-SILC as being high quality sources of regional data (for Latin 
America and Europe respectively) and thus give high preference to them.  Since LIS surveys 
have until recently included few if any developing countries and Povcalnet (as of recently) 
includes only select developed countries (corresponding to LIS countries) the overlap in terms of 
country-years covered by these is in proportional terms small.  However, when there is an 
overlap we prefer LIS to Povcalnet for the reasons that LIS makes unit-level data available to us, 
and that LIS aims at achieving a higher degree of internal comparability among its surveys 
through specific effort at harmonization. The availability of unit-level data allows direct 
verification of the per-capita distributions calculated (which do in fact appear to coincide with 
the Povcalnet distributions for developed countries calculated from the same source). Due to this 
preference ordering, the external comparability of our estimates with Povcalnet based estimates 
for developing countries that derive to a larger extent from other sources, in particular, World 
Bank poverty estimates, is diminished (although we are to a large degree able to replicate these).  
The WYD overlaps heavily with Povcalnet but includes a few additional sources. To ensure 
greater comparability of GCIP with Povcalnet we place WYD after Povcalnet in our ordering.  
 
We prefer surveys with broader area and population coverage and surveys deemed higher quality 
by the source database to others. WIID surveys report a quality rating but Povcalnet and LIS 
surveys do not report any quality rating. Given that Povcalnet and LIS are constructed using 
primary data and have stricter inclusion requirements we assign them the highest quality rating 
(but it must be remembered that this is only an ordinal characterization). Among sources in 
WIID (or in principle any other secondary source) survey data reported as originally from LIS or 
from the Deininger and Squire database are preferred over other sources.15 We prefer surveys 
that report means in local currency units over those which are reported in other units because the 
method of conversion into international units by the source can often be non-transparent. We 
also prefer surveys in which the survey series is known over those for which it is missing. Even 
                                                




after applying all of these criteria we find that some country-years have multiple surveys. At this 
stage we choose among these that survey which leads to the survey source being more 
compatible with the portrait presented by other years’ observations for the same country 
(especially the nearest survey years for which data are available) or apply other criteria16.  In 
certain instances, we exercise our judgment and drop certain surveys or prefer a survey to which 
the lexicographic ordering would not have led17.  
2.2.2. Standardizing the Distributions 
 
Surveys vary widely by their focus (e.g. type of advantage, such as consumption or income), as 
well as details of their method (e.g. length of recall period, level of detail in surveys, whether 
unobserved costs and benefits are imputed (such as the value of rent for self-owned residences) 
and survey frame as well as timing) making comparability between countries difficult (For a 
discussion of this point see Smith, Dupriez and Troubat (2014)).   Of particular interest to us is 
that the definition of income varies widely between surveys.  Some report gross income, others 
after-tax income and others still wider or narrower categories, often with somewhat obscure 
definitions. Table 2.2 reports the various income/consumption concepts used in surveys included 
in the GCD and GID, along with their frequencies, adopting the classification used in the WIID.  
 
As is well known, the distribution of consumption is expected to be less unequal than the 
distribution of income. Those concerned with estimating global inequality or poverty almost 
universally recognize this concern but do not generally correct for it18 (Ferreira et al (2015); 
Lakner and Milanovic (2013)). Comparing measures of inequality or poverty across countries 
can therefore be highly misleading. Similarly, aggregating information for groups of countries to 
obtain, a measure of poverty or inequality, for say, Sub-Saharan Africa becomes difficult and 
results obtained from combining income and consumption based surveys may lead to misleading 
results. 
                                                
16 After applying the lexicographic ordering we observe multiple surveys for same country-year in four instances in the present version of the 
GCIP, which we resolve as follows. In the case of Barbados (1970) we use the survey that refers to the economically active population over one 
which covers only ‘income recipients’. For China 1995, Brazil 1970 and Colombia 1964 we keep the survey that allows for a more consistent 
data series across the years for the country. This is an exercise of judgment and users might prefer the dropped surveys to be part of the database 
in which case they can make that choice.   
17 We modify our lexicographic ordering in the rare instances where there are known issues of comparability of the survey with other surveys for 
that country. One example of this is Indian consumption survey for 1999. The Indian consumption survey in 1999 used a shorter recall period of 7 
days as opposed to usual practice of using a thirty-day recall period in other survey years for India making comparisons with other surveys 
difficult. Similarly, in the universe of surveys in the GCIP, Russia has consumption survey data reported by Povcalnet and income survey data 
from the LIS. The surveys from these sources for Russia exhibit vast differences in means information. Applying our lexicographic ordering we 
might have picked the LIS reported surveys in the instances when the both are present for the same survey-year. But in this case to maintain 
consistency of information across the time series and to keep as large a number of compatible observations as possible we choose to use 
Povcalnet surveys over those from LIS. We provide a list in our online appendix of country assumptions (see gcip.info) of all the cases in which 
we exercise our judgment over and above applying the rules described earlier. 
18 Deininger and Squire (1996), in the context of their dataset, suggest adding 6.6 Gini points to Gini coefficients based on consumption to obtain 






Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Surveys used in Standardization 
 
LIS WIID Total 
# Surveys 87 117 204 
# of Surveys by Regions 
   Africa & Middle East 10 32 42 
East Asia & Pacific 12 21 33 
Europe 45 20 65 
Latin America & Caribbean 18 19 37 
Post Soviet 1 17 18 
South Asia 1 8 9 
# of Countries from each region 
 Africa & Middle East 2 19 21 
East Asia & Pacific 3 5 8 
Europe 12 7 19 
Latin America & Caribbean 4 6 10 
Post Soviet 1 8 9 
South Asia 1 3 4 
# of Surveys before and after 1995 
 1995 or Later 65 65 130 
Before 1995 22 52 74 
# Types of Income Surveys 
 Income, Disposable 87 36 123 
Income, Gross 0 81 81 
# of Surveys by Income Grouping 
 Low income 0 20 20 
Lower middle income 4 44 48 
Upper middle income 42 39 81 
High income 41 14 55 
 
 
One effort to address this issue is the work of Solt (2009) who makes the assumption (plausible 
at least for developed countries) that the LIS may be treated a ‘gold standard’ and then tries to 
adjust other surveys using a regression based method to estimate a ‘standardized’ summary 
measure of the distribution of income (the Gini coefficient that would be expected to result from 
counterfactual and missing LIS surveys) in other countries.  His database is confined to measures 
of inequality.  Niño-Zarazúa, Roope, and Tarp (2014) also estimate standardized consumption 
distributions, by adjusting the share of each consumption decile by the average difference 
between income and consumption decile shares for a set of country-years which had both type of 
surveys. 
 




204 instances across 71 countries in which there is both consumption and an income survey 
reported by the same statistical agency for the same country-year. For most of these (more than 
ninety percent) information on consumption and income for the survey year was collected from 
the same survey. These survey countries are spread across all geographical regions of the world 
and across various country income groupings (Table 2.3).  
 
We use this information to estimate the expected relationship between income and consumption. 
Our purpose was to identify a regression relationship between consumption and income for each 
quintile19. (We use quintiles rather than deciles in order to maximize the number of observations, 
as in earlier years often only quintile data is reported) Given that the errors across the five 
regressions might be correlated (and indeed, the Breusch-Pagan test suggested so), we employed 
a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions approach to estimate the relationship20. When we wish to 
estimate consumption shares from income shares the regression formula we use is: 
 
SCij = αi + βiSIij + γiX + ε  (1) 
Where SC is the share of consumption of quintile i, SI is the share of income of quintile i, X 
refers to a set of controls for country income level, region, income concept used in the survey 
and time.  Finally i and j are subscripts for country and quintile respectively. 
When we wish to obtain the income share, we redo this exercise and reverse the regressor and 
regressand to obtain 
 
SIij = αi + βiSCij + γiX + ε  (2) 
Table 2.4a and 2.4b provides the results of these regressions. In both sets of regressions the r-
squared is moderately high, ranging from 0.47 to 0.76.  
 
Table 2.5 provides an indication of the performance of this regression by reporting the results of 
an in-sample prediction analysis. The ability to predict consumption shares with a degree of 
reliability gives us confidence as to its general applicability. 
                                                
19 As noted earlier there are various income concepts collected by surveys and the choice to employ them might have affected estimates of mean 
levels and distributions. We do not standardize among these various income concepts in GCIP.  
20 We experimented with several different specifications and also used a (more theoretically appropriate) Dirichlet regression to estimate our 
equation .The Dirichlet distribution is the multivariate generalization of the beta distribution. Thanks to its properties, it is a convenient 
parameterization for compositional data. First, the dependent variables are restricted to the [0,1] interval. Second, it ensures that the shares sum 
up to unity. Hence, it is a valid distribution for estimating quantile shares, i.e. SCij ∼ D(αi). However, the results do not differ significantly 
between the two estimations. Moreover, the Dirichlet regression assumption that all shares are negatively correlated is violated in our data.  We 







Table 2.4a: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for converting Income distribution into 
equivalent consumption distribution for Global Consumption Database 
 
Quintile 
                          1 2 3 4 5 
Income Quintile Share 0.363*** 0.334*** 0.342*** 0.317*** 0.340*** 
                          0.031 0.029 0.028 0.032 0.027 
Income Grouping (Base: Low Income) 
     Lower Middle Income -0.661* -0.481 -0.183 0.436 0.894 
                          0.353 0.403 0.402 0.38 1.381 
Upper Middle Income  0.099 0.493 0.628 1.071** -2.196 
                          0.396 0.453 0.452 0.426 1.553 
High Income  0.144 0.513 0.723 1.180** -2.817 
                          0.44 0.505 0.505 0.478 1.733 
Region Grouping (Base: Africa & Middle East)     
East Asia & Pacific  2.276*** 1.954*** 1.371*** 0.276 -5.929*** 
                          0.316 0.363 0.363 0.348 1.25 
Europe & Central Asia  1.219*** 1.527*** 1.422*** 0.887** -4.814*** 
                          0.328 0.382 0.38 0.353 1.297 
Latin America & Caribbean -0.009 -0.13 -0.011 0.057 -0.015 
                          0.331 0.378 0.377 0.358 1.293 
Post Soviet  0.710* 1.370*** 1.496*** 1.258*** -4.894*** 
                          0.389 0.447 0.447 0.425 1.534 
South Asia  2.511*** 2.460*** 1.981*** 0.922* -7.896*** 
                          0.473 0.545 0.542 0.509 1.86 
Welfare Concept (Base: Income Disposable)     
Income, Gross  0.227 0.406 0.533* 0.767*** -2.054** 
                          0.253 0.288 0.287 0.271 0.987 
Time (Base: 1995 or Later)       
Pre 1995  -0.131 0.075 0.312 0.413** -0.58 
                          0.191 0.218 0.217 0.205 0.747 
Constant 3.773*** 6.230*** 8.739*** 13.164*** 34.561*** 
                          0.408 0.492 0.539 0.706 2.277 
R2 0.663 0.649 0.621 0.47 0.634 
N                         204 
 
We use these regression formulae to obtain a derived implied consumption distribution when one 
has only an income distribution available for a country and a derived implied income distribution 
when one only has information on the consumption distribution. We undertake this exercise for 
the whole dataset so that every country can be assigned an income and consumption distribution 
(at least one original and at most one derived) for every survey year.  
However, prior to the final assignment we must make an adjustment for the adding-up constraint 




one is left with income or consumption that is unaccounted for by the simple application of the 
regression coefficients, for the reason that the regressions were undertaken independently. The 
sum of shares might be above or below 100.  We think it reasonable that the unaccounted for 
income may be added or subtracted (depending on the direction of the error in the total) 
proportionally equally across quintiles. This is admittedly only one possible choice: we could  
 
Table 2.4b: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for converting Consumption 
distribution into equivalent income distribution for Global Income Database 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Consumption Quintile Share 0.325*** 0.318*** 0.345*** 0.293*** 0.324*** 
                          0.034 0.032 0.031 0.034 0.031 
Income Grouping (Base: Low Income)      
Lower Middle Income  0.197 0.273 0.486 0.557 -1.491 
                          0.392 0.436 0.431 0.456 1.499 
Upper Middle Income  1.430*** 1.668*** 1.684*** 1.206** -5.990*** 
                          0.421 0.47 0.465 0.492 1.616 
High Income  2.112*** 2.836*** 3.114*** 2.921*** -10.873*** 
                          0.455 0.508 0.503 0.533 1.75 
Region Grouping (Base: Africa & Middle East)     
East Asia & Pacific  1.002*** 1.821*** 2.219*** 2.810*** -7.846*** 
                          0.361 0.396 0.389 0.405 1.359 
Europe                    2.286*** 3.602*** 3.556*** 2.616*** -12.140*** 
                          0.352 0.395 0.389 0.405 1.349 
Latin America & Caribbean -0.485 0.294 0.899** 1.539*** -2.197 
                          0.364 0.406 0.401 0.424 1.395 
Post Soviet  1.830*** 2.452*** 2.733*** 2.887*** -9.879*** 
                          0.418 0.469 0.464 0.489 1.611 
South Asia 1.965*** 3.243*** 3.308*** 2.758*** -11.272*** 
                          0.532 0.591 0.581 0.606 2.023 
Time (Base: 1995 or Later)      
Pre 1995  0.32 -0.177 -0.484** -0.583** 0.895 
                          0.209 0.233 0.231 0.244 0.801 
Constant 0.475 2.553*** 4.988*** 11.068*** 48.899*** 
                          0.392 0.48 0.551 0.779 2.192 
R-square 0.686 0.753 0.761 0.631 0.755 
N                         204 
 
apply another rule of apportionment.  However, in the absence of compelling reasons to do 
otherwise, we think this a sound choice. Because of the independence of the quintile-specific 
regressions it is also possible that the derived implied consumption or income distribution might 
break the monotonicity restriction i.e. that the share assigned to a lower quantile might be greater 
than the share assigned to a higher quantile for the same country-year’s estimated distribution. 




issue21.  However, if non-monotonicity were encountered there would be ways of addressing 
this.22 An example of the application of this method is provided by Brazil in 1996. The GCIP has 
an income survey for Brazil for 1996, which we convert to an estimated “equivalent” 
consumption distribution based on our cross-country regression procedure. After application of 
the regression coefficients the sum of the shares of quintiles is 99.95. The deficit of 0.05 points is 
assigned proportionally to all the quintiles so that each quintile’s share is increased by the same 
percentage. The shares at various stages of the process are shown in Table 2.6.  
2.2.3. Standardizing the means 
 
While there has been substantial interest among researchers in the variance between survey and 
national accounts means (see for example Deaton 2005), there has been little or no examination 
to the best of our knowledge of the variance between means from surveys carried out in the same 
year for a given country. Our initial examination suggests that the differences can be extremely 
wide.  For example, Bolivia has two surveys in WIID for 1997 which report monetary income 
means that differ by 30 percentage points (414 vs. 538 Bolivianos per month).  This in turn 
means that although our lexicographic ordering gives us a particular mean, a slightly different 
ordering might have led us to choose a dataset with a very different level of income or 
consumption. This problem will plague any attempt to choose surveys. The mean number of 
surveys per country-year is 2.95 and the country-years with more than one survey have on 
average 3.78 surveys, and only thirty percent of country-years have only one survey (although as 
we noted at the outset this can be due to the same survey being reported by multiple secondary 
sources).  
 























1st Quintile 4.93 6.45 6.45 0.005 1.53 
2nd Quintile 9.26 10.73 10.74 0.007 1.4 
3rd Quintile 13.67 15.02 15.03 0.01 1.36 
4th Quintile 20.49 21.43 21.45 0.014 0.95 
5th Quintile 51.69 46.36 46.39 0.027 -5.32 
 
                                                
21 Users who would prefer not to do this standardization or replace our method with their own could, once the GCIP code is released, easily turn 
off or replace the standardization method.  
22 In particular, we would propose to apply a second regression to the independently estimated shares and assign estimates based on this 




In future work, we hope to provide a more comprehensive examination of the issue of disparate 
survey means and their implication for such concerns as the global income or consumption 
distribution. For now, we simply note the problem and attempt to standardize the means for the 
surveys that our ordering leads us to. As noted before, the universe of surveys provides various 
definitions of income and consumption. Furthermore, these are often reported in non-comparable 
units (for example by providing the information in real or nominal terms, in local currency or 
international currency units, and for different time periods).  
 




Our next task is therefore to construct a consumption and income mean for every country-year in 
comparable units. In order to do this, we seek to generate an estimate of the consumption or 
income mean for each country-year for which we have an observation.  Whenever an estimate of 
the mean was available from the survey with which we obtained the relative distribution, this 
was the preferred source of data23. This mean, usually expressed in local currency units (LCUs) 
of the survey year24, was then converted to 2005 LCUs using local consumer price indices25 
wherever available (and in rare cases, where unavailable, the GDP deflator)26.  
                                                
23 Lakner and Milanovic (2013) and World Bank’s Povcalnet database also prefer survey means over national account means (see Anand and 
Segal (2008) for a discussion on the choice of means). Though we use survey means for our estimations, we will aim also to provide data on 
national account based means (GDP per capita and Household Final Consumption Expenditure (HFCE)) in the released version of GCIP.  
Mongolia is the only case for which we do not have any means from surveys and as a result we use means from national accounts as an 
alternative.   
24 We also attempt to adjust the means for any currency redenomination or change in currency that the country might have experienced.  This is a 
non-trivial task as detailed historical knowledge of the country and its data sources is sometimes needed to do this. 
25 All our survey data is at national level and hence we use national CPI’s unlike Povcalnet, which uses separate rural and urban survey 
components and inflation rates for India and China (Ferreira et al, 2015).  It is not obvious whether using sector-specific data is superior because 
of the lack of uncontroversial inter-sectoral and sector-specific price indices, as discussed in Reddy and Lahoti (2015).  
26 Our source for inflation data is World Development Indicators (WDI). This contrasts with Povcalnet, which for some countries uses alternate 







Difference in Equivalent Consumption 





Q1 2.5 4.67 4.67 2.17 
Q2 5.8 8.04 8.04 2.24 
Q3 10.1 12.18 12.19 2.09 
Q4 18.2 18.98  18.99 .80 
Q5 63.4 56.07 56.10 -7.30 
Total   99.95 100   
Gini 57.7   48.7   
Poverty Rate 
($1.25 2005 





In order to make the estimates comparable across countries, we then converted them into 
common units by applying 2005 PPP exchange rates27 and converting all data into monthly per 
capita units (for example if the survey estimate of consumption is for a weekly amount, we 
multiply it by 30/7). GCIP also includes country-specific conversion factors for other ICP PPP 
base years and other PPP concepts (e.g. PPPs for food) which could be used to obtain data in 
alternate PPP units and market exchange rates for all country-years. Note that in all cases we use 
the unitary country-wide PPP. This contrasts with, for example, the World Bank approach, which 
uses sectoral PPPs for urban and rural areas for India, Indonesia and China, based on back-of-
the-envelope assumptions about likely inter-sectoral differences. A fuller discussion on the issues 
involved in deciding to use unitary or sectoral PPPs for these major countries and the impact of 
specific assumptions in the case of poverty estimates can be found in Reddy and Lahoti (2015)28.   
 
 Outlier Detection 
 
Despite our best attempts at selecting the data carefully, the survey mean data that we are left 
with contain outliers. These are means that are implausible prima facie given other existing data. 
In many cases we are unsure of the source of the discrepancies, especially in light of the fact that 
we draw extensively on secondary data. We identify outliers using two criteria described below. 
A survey mean that is identified as an outlier by both the criteria is marked as an outlier and 
adjusted according to a procedure we will describe.   
 
To identify outliers, we first run a separate regression for each country to identify the time trend 
in survey means for that country. In this step, we regress the survey mean with respect to time 
(years elapsed since 1960). If the survey mean is above or below two studentized residuals from 
the regression line we mark it as a potential outlier. We find that about 8% of our observations 
are marked as potential outliers using this criterion. Applying this ‘internal’ criterion in isolation 
would mark cases in which a country’s economy actually experienced sudden growth spurts or 
severe and sharp declines as outliers since a linear time trend may not be able to account for 
sudden transitions. To avoid this we impose a second ‘external’ condition, namely that the 
annualized survey mean growth rate is within certain bounds of the national accounts based 
                                                
27 We use 2005 EKS PPPs for `individual consumption expenditure household’ concept obtained from the International Comparison Program 
(ICP) website. Even though we use 2005 PPP exchange rate for the benchmark version of the database, this is not because we necessarily prefer it 
to other exchange rates. The choice of exchange rate depends on the research question. We are aware that exchange rates used have a substantial 
impact on the levels and also on global and regional inequality and have presented some alternate estimates using 2011 PPPs and market 
exchange rates in Jayadev, Lahoti and Reddy (2015). In Reddy and Lahoti (2015) GCIP is used to calculate poverty estimates using 2011 PPPs 
and in Jayadev, Lahoti and Reddy (2015c) estimates of the evolution of the global middle class based on distinct concepts are explored using 
alternate exchange rates.  





growth rate in per capita gross domestic product. The acceptable band for the survey mean 
growth rate is defined by the growth rate of GDP per capita plus or minus twice the growth rate.  
(For instance, if the GDP per capita growth rate is 10% then the band is -10% to +30%). This 
criterion, while hardly restrictive, helps us to anchor the outlier detection criteria to a measure of 
validation external to the survey data, provided by the economy’s growth rate. About sixty 
observations (5% of surveys with means data) are marked as outliers using both the criteria. 
Instead of completing discarding the outliers we view them as still providing relevant 
information and therefore instead adjust and retain them. The outlier means are adjusted 
(decreased or increased) up to the acceptable outer bounds of the time trend line. For example, 
outliers that are higher than the trend line are adjusted so that they have a value equal to the 
trend-line plus two studentized residuals. Our reasoning for doing so is that if we were to adjust 
the means to a higher level they would remain outliers according to our criteria, which would not 
serve the purpose of adjustment. At the same time, adjusting them to a level lower than the 
bounds would lead to treating outliers as requiring adjustment to a level lower than for reported 
survey means which are above the adjusted value of the mean but below the outlier detection 
bounds.  It is hard to understand what would be the rationale for such a difference in treatment.  
2.2.4. Generating a Lorenz Curve and Consumption/Income Profile  
 
Having obtained or constructed means and distributional data for every survey year chosen, we 
estimate a Lorenz curve in parametric form using a widely employed regression framework (see 
Datt (1998); Miniou & Reddy (2009) for some discussion of the methods, also employed by 
Povcalnet). We prefer the generalized quadratic Lorenz curve estimation of Villasenor and 
Arnold (1989) for its theoretical properties but when the procedure fails to generate a valid 
estimated Lorenz curve we utilize the Beta Lorenz curve estimation due to Kakwani (1980) 
applied to quintiles29. When both of these methods fail to generate a valid Lorenz curve, which 
happens occasionally, we move to a third parametric approach due to Rasche et al (1980)30. If 
this were to fail (which it does not for any of the current distributions in the GCIP database) we 
would use a fourth parametric method due to Chotikapanich, D. (1993).  Finally, in case all of 
these fail we create a piecewise linear consumption profile based upon ‘connecting the dots’ 
defined by the quantile means, following a method we have developed and tested (after which 
we can also calculate the associated Lorenz curve, which is strictly convex, as required for its 
                                                
29 In practice, when generating a valid Lorenz Curve, both procedures typically provide a reasonably good and similar fit to the data as captured 
by the sum of squared errors or other criteria. The Beta Lorenz curve fails the test of giving rise to a valid Lorenz Curve more often. The 
conditions of validity of these LC’s are discussed in Datt (1998). 
30 To test the accuracy of Lorenz curves derived from the various parametric methods, we have compared income/consumption shares of various 
quintiles of the distribution obtained from parametric methods and that from unit-level data for a few LIS countries. Our initial findings indicate 
that all three methods perform very well in predicting the actual shares (within 1 percentage point in most cases). We hope to expand this analysis 




validity). We chose to use the generalized quadratic Lorenz curve and the beta Lorenz curve in 
part because these are the parametric estimation methods used by the World Bank, and this 
would facilitate comparison of estimates, but one could equally use the Rasche method, which 
provides very similar results, based on our comparative examination of the methods for subsets 
of the data. 
 
Once we arrive at an estimated Lorenz curve, we use it in combination with the estimate of the 
mean to generate a consumption profile consisting of an estimated mean income or consumption 
level for each decile of the country-year31. Specifically, the mean income of each decile is 
calculated by taking the share of total income accounted for by that decile, and multiplying it by 
the survey mean times the number of deciles (10). For example if the Lorenz ordinates for the 
first 2 deciles are 0.02 and 0.05 respectively and the mean income is $15, then the mean income 
of the first decile is $15*10*.02=$3, while the mean income of the second decile is $15*10*(.05-
.02)=$4.5. We estimate decile means for the survey years in order to generate a lattice that can 
serve as a basis for interpolation and extrapolation of decile means to non-survey years.  There 
are no deep-seated reasons for the use of decile means specifically for this purpose and we could 
have made a different choice. 
 
Our goal is to estimate the consumption/income profile or set of quantile means for every 
country-year for the entire period covered by our database in order to obtain a complete 
‘consumption/income profile tableau’. In order to attempt to fill in the consumption/income 
profile tableau, we estimate the profile for intermediate years using growth rate figures from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) or other sources where necessary, such as the Economist 
Intelligence Unit for most recent years, in order to interpolate or extrapolate consumption or 
income profiles for non-survey years.  As noted below, the survey coverage is very limited 
before 1980. This is one reason why several researchers may have preferred to begin their 
empirical efforts after that date. Moreover, whether before or after that date they typically 
confine themselves to survey-year estimates, which may not be temporally aligned across 
countries, thus limiting the possibilities for comparison and aggregation across countries. We are 
contrastingly interested in trying to extend coverage as fully as possible in order to facilitate 
these tasks, not only by increasing the span of time covered but by filling in missing years.   We 
fully recognize the concerns that such extension may raise, and accordingly try to do so 
according to carefully chosen assumptions. A larger amount of the data before 1980 is 
interpolated or extrapolated due to sparse survey information and thus has to be treated with 
                                                




greater caution. Users who would prefer to not use the interpolation/extrapolation techniques 
below we employ can always chose to restrict their analysis to only survey years32, which are 
clearly marked in the GCIP.  
 
There are two methods used to estimate a consumption/income profile for the non-survey year, 
viz.: 
 
Extrapolation   
 
If the non-survey year lies before or after the first/last survey year for which we have a 
consumption or income profile, then the consumption or income profile of that year is 
extrapolated (forward or backward) based on the survey year and the relevant per-capita growth 
rates. For example, if we want to estimate the consumption or income profile for a country and 
the last survey-year happens to be in a given prior year, then for the subsequent years, we 
extrapolate the consumption profile using the following formula iteratively:  
 
Mt = Mt-1* (1 + g)     (3) 
 
where M is the estimated mean consumption/income of a decile, t is the year and g is the growth 




If the non-survey year lies between two survey years for which we have a consumption or 
income profile, the consumption or income profile for this non-survey year is treated as a time-
weighted average of the growth-adjusted consumption or income profiles (arrived at by 
extrapolating respectively backwards and forwards through applying the observed growth rates 
of mean per capita consumption or income) of the two survey years. This procedure is the same 
as described in Chen and Ravallion (2004) to impute means for non-survey years except that we 
extend the procedure to the overall distribution and estimate decile means in an analogous 
manner.  Ferreira et al (2015) describe a procedure adopted by the World Bank more recently, in 
which the growth rates used in this process are adjusted by a ratio reflecting a presumed 
relationship between the growth rates from surveys and from national accounts in developing 
                                                
32 The estimates for survey years are not affected in any way by the interpolation/extrapolation. However, restricting the analysis to survey years 
would constrain cross-country comparison for a particular year as surveys are not generally lined up across countries.  It would also limit the 
possibilities for aggregation if surveys for the countries being aggregated are missing for the year in question.  Interpolation or extrapolation and 




countries, and are thus lower than those in the national accounts.  Specifically, they employ a 
multiplier of 0.87 to growth rates in all countries, except China and India where multiplier is 
0.72 and 0.51 respectively, to make this adjustment33.  This is unlikely to make very much 
difference for interpolation insofar as the adjustment applies to projections from both of the 
nearest survey years but it may make some difference to extrapolation.  We do not employ such a 
further adjustment but it is would be a straightforward matter to construct a variant of GCIP that 
does so, either using the Bank’s adjustment factors or another set of assumption (which for 
instance, distinguishes between the ratio applicable to countries of different kinds). 
 
Since the consumption/income profiles for survey years are already expressed in comparable 
units ($2005 PPP in the benchmark version of the database) we therefore use the growth rates of 
real (inflation adjusted) per capita consumption to arrive at an estimated consumption or income 
profile for each non-survey year.  Since growth rate information is available from different 
sources, we must establish a preference ordering for the growth rate data type and source, which 
is as follows, from most preferred to least: growth rate of household final per capita  expenditure 
from the WDI, growth rate of ‘per capita final consumption expenditure etc.’ from the WDI, 
GDP per capita growth rate from the WDI, consumption per capita growth rate from the Penn 
World Tables, GDP per capita growth rate from the Penn World Tables, GDP per capita growth 
rate from the Total Economy Database (TED) (The Conference Board Total Economy Database 
201034) and finally GDP per capita growth rates from Angus Maddison ‘s historical statistics35.  
 
The earliest year to which we extrapolate our data backwards is 1960. This is because annual 
growth rates of mean consumption from national accounts for a wide variety of countries are 
available only starting then. There are some instances in which the growth rate data for the very 
earliest years is missing and we restrict the extrapolation to the first year when the data is 
available for these countries.   The result in all of these cases is that there are gaps in the tableau.  
This not only affects the ability to define trends over the entire period but also to construct 
regional or global aggregates which are fully comparable over time.  We hope to fill these gaps 
over time, in part by drawing on broad expert and public participation, or adopting other 
assumptions (such as extending trend growth rates backward or forward).  In the meantime, one 
option is to discard from consideration those entities for which we do not have data over a 
sufficient period and another is to restrict the temporal scope of the analysis.  For certain 
purposes, it may be tenable to compare alternatives which both do and do not contain certain  
                                                
33 Refer to footnote 48 in Ferreira et al. (2015) for more details on the adjustment factors used. 
34 Available at http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/  
35 The World Bank’s Povcalnet also uses consumption per capita growth rates and GDP per capita growth rate data for 





Table 2.7a: Summary Statistics for Surveys included in Global Consumption Database 
(GCD) 
 
1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-13 Total 
Number of Surveys 79 82 288 496 716 285 1946 
% Consumption Surveys 14 12 24 48 54 41 43 
% Surveys Covering Complete 
Population 56 68 78 98 100 100 93 
% Surveys Covering all Areas in 
the Country 95 94 93 96 98 98 96 
% Surveys with Mean Levels 
Information 41 49 65 90 96 100 86 
Source of Surveys (%)        
EU-SILC 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 
LIS 3 15 13 13 13 18 13 
Povcalnet 0 0 15 35 61 59 42 
Data from Statistical Office 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0.1 
SEDLAC 0 1 6 15 17 11 13 
WYD 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 
WIID 97 84 65 34 8 3 29 
Regions (%)        
East Asia & Pacific 5 13 12 10 9 8 10 
Europe & Central Asia 38 44 53 40 52 57 49 
Latin America & Caribbean 23 20 19 28 22 20 23 
Middle East & North Africa 5 6 3 4 3 2 3 
North America 0 5 1 1 1 1 1 
South Asia 19 7 4 3 3 2 4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 10 5 8 14 11 9 11 
Income Grouping (%)        
Low income 9 5 4 8 15 13 8 
Lower middle income 31 16 23 23 13 7 22 
Upper middle income 39 44 44 36 37 53 40 
High income 21 34 28 33 35 27 30 
 
countries, but one must be aware of the potential distortions that could arise as a result of specific 
countries dropping in or dropping out of the portraits of aggregates over time.  The empirical 
examples of aggregates we provide in this paper do not include any adjustments for such non-
comparability over time but that could be done in more careful subsequent work. 
2.3. Coverage of the Surveys 
 
Tables 2.7a, 2.7b, 2.8a and 2.8b present summary statistics for the surveys in the GCD and GID. 




data, decade, region, income group), Tables 2.8a and 2.8b describe the number of countries in 
the databases according to these same criteria. Table 2.9 provides information on the density of 
the surveys36 by decades, region and  
income group, i.e. the percentage of the total potential surveys (defined as the total number of 
country-years in the decade and region).  
 
Table 2.7b: Summary Statistics for Surveys included in Global Income Database (GID) 
 
1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-13 Total 
Number of Surveys 79 82 288 496 716 285 1946 
% Consumption Surveys 13 7 15 27 41 31 30 
% Surveys Covering Complete 
Population 55 68 77 98 100 100 93 
% Surveys Covering all Areas in 
the Country 95 94 93 95 97 98 96 
% Surveys with Mean Levels 
Information 41 49 65 90 96 100 86 
Source of Data (%) 
       EU-SILC 0 0 0 0 0 10 2 
LIS 2 15 13 14 14 18 14 
Povcalnet 0 0 12 23 56 59 37 
Data from Statistical Office 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0.1 
SEDLAC 0 1 6 17 18 10 13 
WYD 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 
WIID 97 84 67 44 12 4 34 
Regions (%) 
       East Asia & Pacific 5 13 12 10 9 8 10 
Europe & Central Asia 38 44 53 40 52 57 49 
Latin America & Caribbean 23 20 19 28 22 20 23 
Middle East & North Africa 5 6 3 4 3 2 3 
North America 0 5 1 1 1 1 1 
South Asia 19 7 4 3 3 2 4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 10 5 8 14 11 9 11 
Income Grouping (%) 
       Low income 9 5 4 8 15 13 8 
Lower middle income 31 16 23 23 13 7 22 
Upper middle income 39 44 44 36 37 53 40 
High income 21 34 28 33 35 27 30 
 
                                                
36 The density of surveys is very similar in GCD and GID. This is because for a given country-year if there is only one survey available it will be 
used by both databases, and where there is more than one survey available a single survey will be chosen by each database (and hence the 
country-year coverage will be the same, even if the specific surveys selected are different).  In Table 9 we therefore report the results for the GCD 




There are a total of 1946 surveys in GCD over the fifty-five year period (1960-2015), from 161 
countries. About forty three percent of the surveys are consumption surveys and more than 
ninety percent are nationally representative and cover the entire population. The coverage of 
surveys is sparse in the 1960s and 1970s with just over forty countries with surveys in each of 
these decades. The number of countries with at least one survey and the number of surveys with 
information on means both increase steadily in each decade, with rapid growth from the 1970s 
through the 1990s. Povcalnet is our biggest source of survey information, accounting for forty 
two percent of surveys in the GCD, followed by WIID (twenty nine percent), SEDLAC (thirteen 
percent) and LIS (thirteen percent).  However, Povcalnet has almost no surveys in the first two 
decades, for which we instead rely heavily on WIID and to a lesser extent on LIS. As can be seen 
from Table 2.9, there are very few actual surveys available for earlier decades. For example, 
coverage is between zero and twenty five percent in the 1960s depending on the region. As a 
result, many estimates for years before 1980 in our databases are based on backwards 
extrapolation. When that is the case, users are cautioned to exercise judgment in their analyses.  
 
Table 2.8a: Summary Statistics on Countries included in Global Consumption Database 
(GCD) 
 
1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-13 Total 
Number of Countries 44 44 98 133 151 111 161 
Source of Data       
EU-SILC 0 0 0 0 0 9 29 
LIS 2 6 18 22 17 17 45 
Povcalnet 0 0 22 62 106 73 140 
Primary Data 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
SEDLAC 0 0 5 12 14 7 23 
WYD 0 0 3 4 2 0 5 
WIID 42 38 50 33 10 5 116 
Region         
East Asia & Pacific 2 6 11 17 20 11 21 
Europe & Central Asia 16 14 44 48 49 44 50 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 12 10 18 24 20 18 27 
Middle East & North 
Africa 3 4 6 8 9 6 10 
North America 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 
South Asia 4 4 5 6 8 7 8 
Sub-Saharan Africa 7 4 12 28 43 23 43 
 
 




countries for which the only distributional data we have are interpolated backward from later 
surveys. There are several examples of countries for which we do not have any or sufficiently 
reliable data for prior years.  For a number of cases, e.g. Bahamas, Cuba, Germany37, Israel, 
Kosovo, Puerto Rico, Somalia, former Soviet Republics, former Yugoslavia, Malta, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, West Bank and Gaza, etc. we have had to make specialized assumptions after 
undertaking research on the country’s available data from historical records as well as economics 
analyses, to address issues related to splits and unifications, data gaps, or conflicting 
observations from distinct sources that are not otherwise resolved.   The procedure we adopt to 
deal with cases of country splits and unifications is described in the appendix to this paper. The 
special assumptions made in the case of specific countries and years are identified in the online 
appendix of country assumptions (see gcip.info).   We hope to try and acquire such information 
in future versions of the database, by eliciting the engagement of specialists and the general 
public.  Although we have until now restricted ourselves to survey-based information, we intend 
in the future to explore the use of census data where feasible, although issues of comparability 
will have to be considered carefully. 
 
Table 2.8b: Summary Statistics on Countries Included in Global Income Database (GID) 
 
1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-13 Total 
Number of Countries 44 44 98 133 151 111 161 
Source of Data       
EU-SILC 0 0 0 0 0 1 29 
LIS 1 5 17 21 26 34 45 
Povcalnet 0 0 17 45 76 60 136 
SEDLAC 0 0 3 11 16 9 22 
WYD 0 0 2 4 3 0 5 
WIID 42 39 59 51 27 6 119 
Region        
East Asia & Pacific 2 6 11 17 19 11 20 
Europe & Central Asia 16 14 44 48 48 44 50 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 11 10 18 23 19 17 26 
Middle East & North 
Africa 3 4 6 8 9 6 10 
North America 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 
South Asia 4 4 5 6 8 7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 7 4 12 28 43 23 43 
 
2.4. Aggregation Module 
 
                                                
37 For example, for Germany prior to unification (1990), West Germany’s distribution, mean and population information are used for Germany. 




We have developed a module that can be used to obtain readily a consumption or income profile 
for an arbitrary grouping of countries. This can help to determine trends in poverty, inequality, 
growth in median consumption or income or other statistics of interest for any set of countries 
defined by region, income level, association membership or indeed any other criteria of 
interest38. These patterns can be juxtaposed with individual country experiences to understand 
how the set of countries is performing. We can perform various analytical exercises with data 
aggregated in this way such as decomposing contributions to levels (or changes in) inequality, 
poverty or other statistics into within-country and between-country components.  The evolution  
 
Table 2.9: Density of Surveys in Global Consumption Database (GCD) by Decade, Region 
and Income Group (% of all country-years that have survey information) 
Region 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-13 1960-2013 
 
East Asia & Pacific 2 6 19 25 29 23 17  
Europe & Central Asia 7 9 18 36 55 29 29  
Latin America & 
Caribbean 7 5 20 52 58 40 30 
 
Middle East & North 
Africa 3 4 8 19 18 13 11 
 
North America 0 20 15 35 30 38 21  
South Asia 25 8 14 21 25 22 19  
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 1 5 16 17 13 8  
Income Group in 2010                
Low income 2 1 4 16 20 17 10  
Lower middle income 6 3 11 29 38 23 18  
Upper middle income 7 7 20 37 48 29 26  
High income 5 8 18 33 39 26 22  
Overall 5 5 14 30 37 24 19  
 
of a group of countries can be surprising as it necessarily reflects the relative growth 
performance of different countries as well as their internal distributional dynamics.  For instance, 
the evolution of inequality within a region (such as Latin America in recent years) may for this 
reason be different from what might be suggested by the evolution of inequality within 
individual countries. Several Latin American countries have experienced a dramatic decline in 
inequality in recent years: between 2000 and 2010 according to our estimates, the income Gini 
coefficient for Brazil has dropped 8 points (from 58 to 46). Chile’s income Gini coefficient has 
dropped by 7 points (from 57 to 50).  Despite the dramatic developments within a number of 
countries, our estimates indicate that in the same period the overall income Gini coefficient for 
Latin America and Caribbean has dropped too, but only by 4 points (from 55 to 51).  This is 
because of the contribution of differential growth rates of different countries, which might not be 
                                                
38 Existing global datasets are not generally accompanied by an aggregation tool. In Povcalnet, users can obtain poverty headcounts for any 
arbitrary set of countries examined as a group but it does not provide a single aggregate distribution and hence cannot be used for inequality or 




apparent at first.  This is an insight only made possible by looking at the composite of countries, 
as we are able to do.  A few illustrative examples of applications of the aggregation module are 
discussed in Jayadev, Lahoti and Reddy (2015).  
 
We confine ourselves here to briefly describing the method used to combine countries and to 
obtain a single consumption/income profile for the set of countries.  We first obtain a 
consumption or income profile for all the individual countries within the grouping of countries 
and for a given year using the procedure described in previous sections.  Next, employing a 
`poverty-line sweep’ method, we obtain consumption levels for the 0.5 and 1.5 percentiles of the 
group. Specifically, we start at an arbitrary but low income/consumption level and calculate the 
percentage of population of each country that has income/consumption below this level. Then, 
using the population share of each country in the aggregate grouping we obtain the percentage of 
the group population at this level of the poverty line. We then iteratively adjust the level of the 
poverty line until we obtain the income/consumption level under which the desired percentage of 
the group population (i.e. 0.5 or 1.5) lies almost exactly, to a specified level of tolerance. Using 
these 0.5 and 1.5 percentile income/consumption levels for the group as starting points, we then 
raise the income/consumption level progressively in steps so as to obtain income/consumption 
levels at just over 100 points along the distribution, using continuous error corrections to adjust 
the size of the steps as we proceed so as to arrive at points within every or nearly every 
percentile interval.  The resulting set of percentile points and the corresponding 
income/consumption levels are then connected linearly to obtain a consumption profile and to 
create a ‘synthetic population’, i.e. a representative population with the requisite profile, 
ordinarily consisting of one ‘synthetic person’ to represent the income or consumption level of 
each percentile. Using the synthetic population we can calculate any poverty or inequality 
measure, measure of inclusivity of growth etc. that we may wish to calculate for the group with 
complete flexibility39.  
  
2.5. Comparability of Survey Data  
 
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001, 2009) provide an account of problems of comparability of 
surveys across countries and discuss issues with existing databases. They emphasize the need for 
better documentation of the existing datasets, in order that there may be understanding of the 
methods used in constructing the datasets and greater clarity as to what kinds of comparisons are 
                                                





meaningful and to what degree.  However, they also place a considerable burden of 
responsibility on the researcher for understanding the data and for determining the extent of 
comparability. Some recent reviews of existing databases (e.g. Jenkins (2015); Smeeding and 
Latner (2015)) highlight the need for accessibility, replicability, transparency, quality of 
documentation and user-friendliness.  One of the major motivations for developing GCIP was 
indeed to be able to provide transparent and replicable data. We plan to release the data, the 
underlying code and documentation of both methods used and of the various choices made (in 
particular through our websites www.gcip.info or 
www.globalconsumptionandincomeproject.org)   
 
In addition, as already pointed out, GCIP is intended to provide a platform that is flexible. 
Researchers may choose to make different choices in data selection or processing and to generate 
their own version of the database (with suitable acknowledgment). Researchers could for 
instance easily change the exchange rate used for converting levels of income or consumption 
within countries to common currency units using the alternate conversion factors provided with 
the data or chose to use National Account means over survey means (both are also included). 
They could also easily modify the code we provide to turn off or even replace the procedure we 
employ to ‘standardize’ distributions or means, choosing to work only with income data, only 
with consumption data, or by pooling both.  They may choose to change the order of priority we 
employ when selecting distributional or mean data for a given country-year or not to make such a 
selection at all and to work with the entire universe of data that we have collected.  They may 
choose to work with survey year data alone, avoiding any interpolation or extrapolation to non-
survey years.  
 
In GCIP we at present select only per-capita data, standardize the welfare concept (by focusing 
on either consumption or income) and select surveys where multiple are available in order to 
improve quality and comparability according to our best judgment. We do not, and in several 
cases cannot, address other comparability issues due to a host of other reasons such as the use of 
diverse income concepts in different income surveys, varying survey designs across countries 
etc. However, in all instances we intend to provide the user with all the relevant details in 
accessible format to make the right decision for the purpose at hand.   
2.6. Results40  
 
                                                




In this section, by way of conclusion we provide a few figures and tables that offer more specific 
indications of the kinds of analysis that are possible with the dataset. These are only illustrative 
examples.  GCIP has been used to investigate poverty, inequality, inclusive growth, the profile of 
the middle class in Jayadev, Lahoti and Reddy (2015), Reddy and Lahoti (2015) and Jayadev, 
Lahoti and Reddy (2015b) and is being used to investigate these and other topics in a number of 
working papers under preparation.  For the particular examples that follow we choose to focus on 
the global consumption distribution. 
Figure 2.1: Superposition Graphs for World Consumption Distribution for 1980 and 2010 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using GCD 
2.6.1. Evolution of World Consumption Distribution 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of world consumption distribution from 1980 to 2010 with the 
contribution of China and the rest of the world. It shows “twin peaks” in the 1980s (perhaps first 
identified by Quah (1996)). However, the period since then has seen the transformation of world 
consumption from a bimodal to a unimodal distribution and one in which the overall distribution 
has narrowed (also observed by Milanovic, 2005, Weisbrod et al, 2007 and noted in our own 
recent work, e.g. Jayadev, Lahoti and Reddy (2015a); see also Jayadev Lahoti, and Reddy 
(2015b) which use GCIP to describe the evolution of the global middle class for various 




extent the recent rapid growth in some other developing countries, especially after 2000. The 
Chinese consumption median increased by 644 percent between 1980-2010 while the rest of 
world experienced only a slight increase in the consumption median (nine percent). The 
corresponding change in means for the two groups is higher but a vast differential is here too 
apparent (885 percent vs. 26 percent). The world consumption distribution for 2010 might give a 
false impression of a symmetrical distribution of consumption across the world with little 
inequality but that is partly a result of using a log-scale for consumption expenditure. If we plot 
consumption instead of log-consumption the distribution seems highly skewed, as shown in 
Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.2: Kernel Density for World Consumption Distribution with a Non-log Scale 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using GCD 
 
The factors underlining the changing world distribution are underlined rather dramatically if one 
looks at the evolution of the global consumption Gini coefficient and the Theil index when 
including and excluding China, as in Figure 3. (This sort of analysis is straightforward when 
using the GCIP due its flexible aggregation feature). Rapid Chinese growth and its large 
population have meant that the global consumption Gini coefficient has fallen monotonically 
from its peak of .71 in the 1970s and 1980, to a low of 0.64 in 2013.  However, excluding China 




without China was increasing from 1970 to 2000 and has since declined slightly. Over the period 
of 1970 to 2013 it has increased slightly from .64 in 1970 to .66 in 2013. Given the multitude of 
sources of uncertainty affecting these aggregate estimates – sampling, measurement and 
coverage errors in surveys, widely varying and inconsistent survey concepts and methods, 
difficulties with estimating and interpreting PPPs, poorly measured growth rates and other 
sources – it’s not clear if these modest changes should be viewed as statistically or economically 
significant (see more on the sources of errors in global inequality estimates in Anand and Segal 
(2008)).  It is interesting to note that the world excluding China has become more unequal (after 
2000-2005) than the world including China, whereas the opposite was true earlier.  China’s 
inclusion has clearly also had a significant moderating influence on world inequality, in 
particular in the period 1980-2000.  This was presumably because rapid Chinese growth served 
to reduce average gaps between the Chinese people and those richer than them.  This effect 
overwhelmed the increase in inequality within the country and indeed increases in inequality 
elsewhere.      
Figure 2.3: Inequality for World with and without China 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using GCD 
 





Figure 2.4 presents the evolution of the number of poor across the world (with and without 
China) defined by various poverty lines. Here again we see the huge impact of China in global 
poverty reduction. The rest of the world has seen the number of poor increase (or almost no 
change for the World Bank’s $1.25 (2005 PPP) poverty line in recent years) from 1960 to 2010, 
with a slight decline after 2010, while China has seen a huge decline in number of poor. Future 
decline in poverty for this poverty line will need to be brought about as a result of a sizable 
contribution from other developing countries as the estimates poverty headcount ratio in 2013 for 
China for this poverty line is only eleven percent.  Using GCIP, Reddy and Lahoti (2015) present 
alternate poverty estimates using 2011 PPPs and alternate poverty lines and compare them with 
the World Bank’s latest estimates.  
Figure 2.4 Poverty rates using various poverty lines 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using GCIP. 
Note: The $4.16 poverty line corresponds to the minimum per-capita expenditure required to obtain a home-cooked 
nutritious meal in the US as estimated in the Thrifty Food Plan of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). More details on the poverty line can be found in Reddy and Lahoti (2015).  
 
These are only examples of the range of analyses to which the GCIP can be put.  As we discuss 




worldwide has been over the last fifty years depends very much on the criteria that we adopt (e.g. 
how high we set a poverty line).  Such an insight is only possible because of the long-range and 
global analysis that the GCIP makes possible.  Applications to monitoring and forecasting are 
also potentially interesting, since with continually updated and forecasted growth data, income 
and consumption profiles of national, regional and world populations can be estimated, so as to 




The lottery of birth -- to whom one is born, when and where -- accounts for the majority of 
variation in the resources and opportunities available to human beings.  Within nations, other 
influences -- one’s gender, ethnic or racial category and other such factors -- serve to 
disadvantage some individuals in myriad, often invisible, ways from before they are born until 
their deaths. These patterns of inequality can be reinforced over generations through the effects 
of structural barriers, differences in political power or social discrimination, limiting the potential 
of persons to flourish equally or indeed to do so at all.  One recent estimate suggests that the 
richest eight percent of individuals in the world enjoy the same income as the other ninety two 
percent of the population (Milanovic 2013) and this is likely an underestimate as the incomes of 
the rich are poorly reflected in household surveys and even in tax records41.   
 
In recent years, prominent social movements across the world (from the Indignados in Spain to 
the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil to the Occupy movements 
and the Arab Spring protests) have all been at least partly driven by the perceived illegitimacy of 
existing (and often growing) economic and political inequalities, and these are only the most 
well-known such instances.  Governments in many parts of the world, it seems, are faced with 
dissatisfied or disaffected citizenries.  At the same time, the middle class is also burgeoning in 
many countries and, especially if modestly defined, arguably in the world as a whole.  Poverty 
appears to have fallen by certain measures although in a very geographically uneven way.  Rapid 
economic growth appears to have been very unevenly shared within and across countries with 
some countries doing far better than others at generating inclusive growth, regardless of how this 
is understood.  These diverse facts give rise to a complex picture of a changing global reality.  
Better research and data is needed to begin to capture the gross contrasts as well as the necessary 
nuances.  Such data must be used not only for purposes of description but in order to better 
                                                
41 Some recent attempts have been made to try and include additional data from alternative sources such as tax and administrative records 
generally (most notable in this regard is the work of the authors of the Top Incomes Database).  We hope to supplement future versions of our 




understand and influence the determinants of the changing relative and absolute fortunes of 
people.  
 
We have described the Global Consumption and Income Project and presented some examples of 
the sorts of inferences that might be drawn from it. There are myriad applications that can be 
imagined.  We present a work in progress that offers possibilities for a deeper understanding of 
the evolution of material well-being both within and across countries, for geographical regions 
and groups of countries and for the world as a whole, and that extends from description to 
explanation.  It is to this end that we introduce our project, and invite interested specialists and 





2. Appendix: Country Splits and Unifications 
 
 
I. Countries undergoing Splits: 
 
There are countries in our database which experienced splits and for which we have data 
pertaining to the entities both before and after this event. Examples of the affected pre-existing 
entities include Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the USSR and 
Yugoslavia. Other countries which experienced splits over the period, such as Sudan, are ones 
for which we do not yet have sufficient data to incorporate them separately.   
 
I.1 Former Socialist Economies: 
 
For Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia we apply the following procedure.  In most of 
these cases, we have data on means and distributions for the countries emerging from the 
split from near to the year in which they were formed and some distributional data on the 
combined country for the earlier period.   As some of the countries undergoing splits were also 
formerly socialist economies, problems of available of distributional and mean information are 
compounded by the often lesser availability of household data for such countries. 
 
Our approach to handling these countries is to attempt to assign a pseudo-mean and pseudo-
distribution to the constituent countries even prior to the split, while recognizing that the 
assigned values may in fact be more characteristic of the unified country, and thus 
recommending appropriate interpretative caution.  Such an approach allows us to estimate trends 
for the individual constituent units over a longer period, as well as to construct and report 
aggregates (whether prior to or after the split).   Each of these possible choices has its benefits 
and costs in terms of statistical meaningfulness vs. inter-temporal comparability.   
 
For the affected countries mentioned above, we use distributional data from the 
combined country to create a pseudo-distribution of each of the countries undergoing splits for 
years when the countries were one, as we do not possess distributional data for the individual 
constituent countries. We recognize that this is an inadequate assumption, in part because the 
distribution for the unified country reflects differences in income between successor countries as 





Although we do possess some mean estimates for the combined countries from national accounts 
or independent academic and institutional estimates, we do not use these for the constituent 
countries both because this would mean using the same mean for all constituent countries in the 
earlier years and because we don’t have reliable national-level inflation data for the pre-split 
period to convert these estimates into units of a common PPP base year after the split.  We 
therefore instead estimate means for the countries undergoing splits by extrapolating backward 
using real per-capita-income growth rate data, which is available in many instances.  Where 
growth rate information for the constituent countries is not available, we use the growth rate of 
the combined country as a proxy for the growth rate of each of the countries resulting from the 
split.  In particular, for the three countries undergoing splits mentioned  
 
Table 2.A1: List of countries that split between 1960 and 2015 
 
 
Survey Years Growth Data 
Source of Growth 
rate data Inflation Data 
Yugoslavia 1968-1990 1961-2006 Angus Maddison  
 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001-2007 1991-2015 TED and WDI 1994- 
Croatia 1988-2008 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1985- 
Montenegro 2005-2011 1991-2013 TED and WDI 2000- 
Serbia 2002-2010 1991-2013 TED and WDI 1994- 
Slovenia 1987-2011 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1992- 




     USSR 1980-1989 1961-1990 Angus Maddison 
 
     Armenia 1996-2012 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1990- 
Azerbaijan 1995-2008 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1990- 
Belarus 1988-2011 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1990- 
Estonia 1988-2011 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1992- 
Georgia 1996-2012 1966-2015 TED and WDI 1965- 
Kazakhstan 1988-2010 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1990- 
Kyrgyz Republic 1988-2011 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1987- 
Latvia 1988-2011 1966-2015 TED and WDI 1965- 
Lithuania 1988-2011 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1990- 
Moldova 1988-2011 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1989- 
Russia 1988-2010 1961-2015 TED and WDI 1989- 
Tajikistan 1999-2009 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1985- 
Turkmenistan 1988-1998 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1987- 
Ukraine 1985-2010 1981-2015 TED and WDI 1987- 




     Czechoslovakia 1964-1992 1961-2006 Angus Maddison 1975- 
     Czech Republic 1988-2011 1971-2015 TED and WDI 1990- 
Slovakia 1988-2011 1986-2015 TED and WDI 1992- 
 
above, we employ data on growth rates for the constituent countries from 1980 onwards from the 
Total Economy Database.  Prior to 1980 we use the growth rates for the combined entities as 
provided by Angus Maddison.42    
 
Table A1 has details on the data used for each of the combined countries undergoing splits. 
 
I.1 Other Countries Undergoing Splits 
 
For the other countries undergoing splits, we have made specific assumptions, for instance about 
the coverage of surveys from before and after the split. These are mentioned in the online 
appendix on country assumptions (see gcip.info).  
 
II. Countries Undergoing Unification:  
 
Among the countries undergoing unification during the time interval covered by the database are 
Germany and Yemen.   We do not have sufficient information for the constituent parts of Yemen 
prior to or posterior to its unification to form a picture of the country at this time.  
 
For Germany, we use West Germany’s distribution and mean for all of Germany prior to 
unification. We are actively interested in finding and integrating East German data from prior to 




                                                
42 Maddison provides estimates of the level of real per-capita income in 1973 and in 1990 for a number of constituent countries (e.g. Soviet 
Republics) which could permit determining an average annual growth rate over the period, but we refrain from employing a smoothed estimate in 
favor of using TED annual estimates for the period from 1980 to 1990.  
 
 
3. Who Got What, Then and Now? A 
Fifty Years Overview from the Global 





Using new comprehensive data and tools from the Global Consumption and Income Project 
(GCIP), covering most of the world and more than five decades, we present a portrait of the 
changing global distribution of consumption and income and discuss its implications for 
understanding inequality and inclusivity of growth and development.  We show how regional 
distributions of income and consumption have evolved very differently over time.  We undertake 
sensitivity analysis to quantify the impact of various choices made in database construction and 
analysis.   We find, in keeping with other studies that levels of consumption and income have 
increased across the distribution, that the global distribution has become more relatively equal 
due to falling inter-country relative inequality though more absolutely unequal.  We describe the 
singular role of China in bringing about the observed changes.  We also present new findings 
about some old ‘stylized facts’ as well as new ones deserving study.  
   
3.1. Introduction  
 
The distribution of income within and across countries has been the subject of considerable and 
growing academic and popular interest in the recent past.  This has been driven both by moral 
concerns and by the need to understand the effects of global economic integration in order to 
make political and institutional choices.  Debates about the evolution of poverty, inequality and 
the extent to which the benefits of growth and development have been shared both within and 
across countries have all drawn attention. 
 
The last three decades have also experienced a data revolution. More and better surveys have 
been collected by multiple agencies, including the World Bank (e.g. through the Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys), the LIS (formerly known as the Luxembourg Income Study) 
and others, with some effort being made to achieve greater international comparability. 
Extensive efforts to collect price data by the International Comparison Program (ICP) have also 
                                                




provided greater ability to account for differences in purchasing power across countries (if not 
over time). The ICP collects comparative price and expenditure data from countries to estimate 
purchasing power parities (PPPs) of countries periodically. PPPs are meant, inter alia, to 
facilitate cross-country comparisons of material well-being through better assessment of 
differences in price levels and resulting command over real resources (Deaton & Heston, 2010).   
As a result of these developments, and accessible computing power, researchers have come to be 
able to produce estimates of global inequality based on collections of household surveys -- as 
opposed to on estimates of GDP per capita2 -- in the last twenty years.  There have been in recent 
years additional attempts (see e.g. Milanovic, 2012; Lakner & Milanovic 2015; Anand & Segal 
2014; Edward & Sumner 2015 for useful examples of such work) to provide more developed 
portraits of the pattern of material living standards of the world’s population.  
 
Our paper adds to the literature both in terms of methods and substantive conclusions, building 
on a new and unprecedented resource —the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP) - 
that is composed of two distinct databases - the Global Consumption Database and the Global 
Income Database. These databases improve upon previous efforts in a few important ways. Most 
existing studies mix income and consumption surveys and use this pooled data to compare 
inequality across countries or regions, and over time. By contrast, to avoid the potentially 
misleading effects of such pooling, we standardize the welfare concepts used.  In particular, to 
portray the global consumption distribution we use only distributions from consumption surveys 
or estimated ‘equivalents’ implied by adjusting income surveys that are part of the larger 
database. We apply an analogous principle when portraying the global income distribution.  
Another limitation of current databases is that they often provide estimates for only a few 
benchmark years or restrict coverage to a subset of countries. Although there could be reasons 
for such an approach, the GCIP in contrasts attempts to maximize coverage (by the judicious use 
of interpolation and by using all primary data sources available to us). This makes it possible to 
provide a considerably more comprehensive portrait by covering a larger group of countries 
(161), a longer time period (1960 to the present as opposed to the mid- or late 1980s to the 
present) and annual portraits of the world distribution, drawing on the nearest available surveys.  
In addition, in the GCIP, we employ purpose-built tools for aggregation that allow us to analyze 
evolution of material well-being for sets of individuals belonging to user-defined country groups 
(e.g. regions of the world or countries sharing other specified traits) in a manner that is not 
possible with other existing databases.  These tools require the annual estimates we generate, as 
without them the resulting holes in the data would make aggregation impossible.  We extensively 
                                                
2 Early estimates of global differences in income based on per-capita income data go back at least to Nurkse (1953) who draws on early data from 




test the sensitivity of our results to different assumptions, including about regarding the selection 
of the data for the consumption and income databases, standardization method, exchange rates 
used and the impact of exclusion of certain countries from the global distribution.  The approach 
we adopt is described in detail in Lahoti, Jayadev and Reddy (2016) and in the complementary 
materials available on the associated website (gcip.info). 
 
In this paper, we undertake two separate but interlinked tasks using the dataset and the methods 
and tools we have developed along with it. First, we provide a portrait of the global distribution 
of income [in what follows we will often refer to income as shorthand for ‘income and 
consumption’] and its constituent regional distributions and describe their evolution over time. 
Second, we describe the degree to which income or consumption levels of individuals have 
increased at various points in the distribution.  In particular countries, most notably China, 
beneficial effects of rapid growth such as poverty reduction appear to have been combined with 
very inequitable distribution of gains. We undertake a special focus on the countries that are 
experiencing rapid growth to identify whether this is the case more generally, and to characterize 
their contribution to the overall change in the global distribution. 
 
To briefly summarize our key results, a few points may be noted. First, global incomes have 
increased across the board over the last three decades. Median income doubled from 2005 PPP 
$73 to 2005 PPP $154 per month from 2000 to 2015 after much slower growth in the previous 
decade. Second, the global income distribution has become substantially more relatively equal in 
the last three decades. Most of these improvements came in the period after 2000 and can be 
attributed to inter-country rather than intra-country effects: the very rapid growth of China and to 
a lesser extent of India during this phase. China’s population has experienced an enormous 
advance that has shaped the world distribution as a whole and others’ relative positions. The rest 
of the world excluding China has witnessed increase in median incomes of only twenty six 
percent between 1980 and 2013 while China’s median has increased by 1188 percent in the same 
period; and the income distribution for the rest of the world is still twin peaked. Third, country 
experiences vary widely, and there is some evidence of ‘inequality convergence’ with previously 
more unequal countries becoming more equal over time and vice versa, although the majority of 
the world’s population lived in countries with rising inequality. Also countries from Sub-Saharan 
Africa have the highest income inequality in the world upending the `stylized fact’ that Latin 
American countries are among the most unequal in the world3. Fourth, we focus on the fifteen 
                                                
3 The main reason for this somewhat unusual finding is that the current ‘stylized’ fact derives from the artifact that Sub-Saharan countries 
typically are based on consumption surveys (which are more equal than income surveys) while the opposite is true of Latin American countries. 




fastest growing countries in the world and find that despite significantly high growth across all 
these countries, the impact of Chinese growth dominates in changing the world income 
distribution.  Finally, we undertake a welfare analysis and find that while global ‘welfare’ 
estimated by any standard income-focused aggregative welfare function has increased 
substantially over the last fifty years most of the change has happened in the period since 2000. 
The rest of the world excluding China has seen no Pareto-improvements in the period 1970 to 
2000.   
3.2. Data 
We use data from the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP), constructed according to 
the methods presented in Lahoti, Jayadev and Reddy (2016) and associated online materials 
(available on gcip.info) which together offer details of the procedures used, ongoing revisions to 
the methods employed, and how the data differs from other available sources. We construct 
estimates of annual data from 1960 to 2015, for each percentile of the population from 161 
countries covering 97 percent of the global population in 2015. The GCIP is a complete ‘time-
space system’ which produces estimates for every country-year, which is essential in order for us 
to be able to use it in a flexible way to construct estimates for country aggregates.  
 
The GCIP was also, distinctively, built keeping the goals of attaining transparency, replicability 
and flexibility foremost during its construction. We aim to document fully the assumptions and 
choices made in the database generation process. The database is constructed in a manner that is 
intended to make it possible to adopt alternate assumptions and thus to test the sensitivity of the 
choices made, of which we demonstrate some examples in this paper. 
 
Construction of the GCIP datasets involves several decisions on selection of data and methods 
used; some of the most important ones are discussed here briefly.  First, we restrict ourselves to 
surveys that provide household per-capita data, as data employing equivalence scales in their 
construction use widely variable and incomparable methods and constitute a smaller proportion 
of the available data4. Second, for country-years with no consumption and income survey we 
                                                
4 The majority of developing countries report grouped survey data in per-capita terms and hence we cannot apply any other equivalence scale to 
such grouped data. In the case of developed countries where data might be reported using an equivalence scale (for example for surveys from 
LIS, SILC and ECHP) we have used the underlying unit data to estimate instead per-capita measures. Findings based on applying an equivalence 
scale might differ from the ones based on using per-capita data as distributions of size and composition of households can be systematically 
different across regions. For example, Sub-Saharan African households tend to be larger and with more children than those in Latin America or 
other regions. But there is no consensus on the appropriate equivalence scale to use and how this would vary by country or region. Determining 
an appropriate equivalence scale is outside the scope of this paper, although as we note in Jayadev, Lahoti and Reddy (2016) the choice of scale is 
greatly consequential and the arguments for choosing one of these are weak.  In order to maintain comparability we use per-capita measures as is 




interpolate or extrapolate the consumption or income profile using survey data from the closest 
survey years and appropriate growth rates5 from the national accounts. This method is similar to  
  
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Surveys in Global Consumption Database (GCD) 
  1960-69 1970-79  1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-13 Total 
Number of Surveys 79 81  283 518 700 337 1998 
Number of Countries 
with Surveys 44 44 
 
98 132 152 119 161 
% Consumption 
Surveys 14 12 
 
23 39 45 39 37 
% Surveys Covering 
Complete Population 56 68 
 
77 98 100 100 93 
% Surveys Covering 
all Areas in the 
Country 95 95 
 
93 96 97 98 96 
% Surveys with Mean 
Levels Information 41 49 
 
65 92 96 92 86 
Source of Surveys 
(%)     
           
ECHP 0 0  0 17 2 0 5 
EU-SILC 0 0  0 0 25 34 14 
LIS 3 15  13 8 5 7 8 
Povcalnet 0 0  15 31 40 35 30 
Data from Statistical 
Office 0 0 
 
0 0 1 2 1 
SEDLAC 0 1  7 17 21 19 16 
WYD 0 0  1 2 1 0 1 
WIID 97 84  64 26 6 2 26 
Regions (%)                
East Asia & Pacific 5 14  11 9 10 11 10 
Europe & Central 
Asia 38 43 
 
54 46 51 52 50 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 23 20 
 
19 23 21 22 22 
Middle East & North 
Africa 5 6 
 
3 3 3 2 3 
North America 0 5  1 1 1 1 1 
South Asia 19 7  4 3 3 3 4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 10 5  8 13 11 10 11 
Income Grouping (%)                
Low income 9 5  4 11 19 13 9 
Lower middle income 31 17  24 29 15 7 24 
Upper middle income 39 45  44 33 42 53 40 
High income 21 33  28 27 25 27 27 
 
 
                                                
5 We use growth rate of household final consumption expenditure per capita when available for interpolation/extrapolation. We do not use any 
adjustment factor for the growth rate as used by Ferreira et. al (2016) but this should have minimum impact on our interpolations as means are 




the one used in Povcalnet and is described in detail in Lahoti, Jayadev and Reddy (2016)6. These 
extensions might raise some valid concerns that we are aware of and hence are careful in our 
assumptions and provide an option for concerned users to use only actual survey data. For the 
period after mid-1980’s the density of surveys is dense, and our interpolation/extrapolation is 
unlikely to impact results in any significant way. A larger amount of the data before 1980 is 
interpolated or extrapolated due to sparse survey information and thus has to be treated with 
caution, but is still indicative of the trends during this period. 
 
Third, the GCIP uses a regression-based ‘standardization’ method to predict the consumption 
shares of each quintile of the population for the Global Consumption Database (GCD) in 
country-years, which have an income survey but no consumption survey and the obverse for the 
Global Income Database (GID).  The distribution of income is known to be more concentrated 
than that of consumption, but almost none of the existing databases correct for this (Ferreira et al, 
2016; Lakner & Milanovic, 2015). We use information from 204 country-years across 71 
countries in which there is both consumption and an income survey reported by the same 
statistical agency to derive a regression relationship between consumption and income for each 
quintile, using a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) approach. We use various controls and 
different methods and specifications to test robustness of the relationship between income and 
consumption for each quintile. The set of countries on which we have information are spread 
across geographical and income groupings and over time. We find that the regressions are fairly 
accurate for in-sample prediction. We thus apply the same relationship to make out-of-sample 
predictions for other country-years. After doing so we find that the difference between income 
and consumption Gini coefficients (arising from comparisons of results from the two 
standardized datasets for the same country-year) is between 7 and 10 points, which is 
comparable to estimates in the literature based on simply comparing average differences7. A 
detailed description of the method used for standardization is provided in Lahoti, Jayadev and 
Reddy (2016)8.  
 
 
                                                
6 Almost all databases, even the ones using benchmark years do some degree of interpolation/extrapolation to line up surveys for a particular year 
to do comparisons across countries.  
7 In the full PovcalNet data, the average Gini index of consumption surveys is approximately 10 Gini points lower than the average Gini over the 
income surveys (Lakner and Milanovic, 2015). Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) suggest an adjustment of 6.6 Gini points based on comparison of 
average values in the Deininger and Squire (1996) database. 
 
8 We do not standardize the various income concepts (gross, disposable, monetary) as we do not have enough data to ascertain relationships 
between gross vs. disposable vs. monetary shares for different quintiles as was the case with consumption and income. When we have a choice 
between surveys with various income concepts for a country-year, we prefer the disposable income over other income concepts (see Lahoti, 






Figure 3.1: Survey Means and GDP Per Capita for Survey Years from 1960 to 2013 
 
 
Finally, we use estimates of consumption or income levels from surveys wherever they are 
available.  This is a consequential choice, since survey means are often discrepant from (and 
typically lower than national accounts means).  Figure 1 shows the relation between GDP per 
capita and survey means for country-years in our dataset.  It can be seen that, generally, survey-
means are much lower than the household consumption component of GDP-per-capita and thus 
of GDP-per-capita itself9.  Investigation of the data suggests that this is a phenomenon that 
crosses decades and world regions.   For this reason among others, the estimates of the absolute 
level of income that we arrive at, as well as its distribution, must be viewed with the proverbial 
salt in hand. We also standardize the means by converting means from income surveys (whose 
distribution was standardized in the previous step) used in the Global Consumption Database 
(GCD) to consumption means by using the share of consumption in National Accounts as a 
multiplicative conversion factor, while we use the reciprocal share to convert consumption to 
income means for the Global Income Database (GID).  
 
                                                
9 The growth rates of survey means and of GDP-per-capita are also substantially different (but it is more difficult to find a clear trend of growth in 




We present the main results using 2005 PPPs and not the most recent 2011 PPPs as there is still 
debate in literature on which ones are more appropriate (Deaton and Aton, 2017; Ravallion, 
2014) and we ourselves take an agnostic view with respect to PPP base years, especially where 
comparison over lengthy periods of time as well as space are involved. However, we have 
reproduced all of our primary results using both PPP base years and report the differences where 
they are noteworthy.  
 
The Global Consumption Database (GCD) has a wide geographical and temporal coverage with 
data from various secondary and primary sources as seen in Table 3.1. The GCIP presently 
contains survey data for 1998 country-years spanning the period of 1960-2013 for 161 countries. 
Most of the surveys are nationally representative (96% cover complete geographical area and 
93% cover the entire population). Our data is drawn from various secondary sources like the 
World Bank’s Povcalnet database, UNU WIDER’s World Income Inequality Database (WIID), 
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and Caribbean (SEDLAC), European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), World 
Income Database (WYD) and from the LIS database and from data directly obtained from 
National Statistical Offices.  
 
The density of surveys varies drastically across the decades. The 1960’s and 1970’s have the 
lowest density of surveys with only 79 and 82 country-year observations respectively from 44 
countries. This is largely because of paucity of household surveys, especially in the developing 
countries, during this period. Our choice of using only per-capita surveys also restricts the 
number of country-years as this period has several surveys where only total income is reported at 
household level with no adjustment for household size. The formerly communist countries also 
have sparse data on income or consumption distribution prior to 1990. Given this data limitation 
we advise caution in interpreting the results encompassing the earlier period.  
 
The GCIP datasets used in this paper reflect further improvements in methods of construction of 
the dataset described in Lahoti, Jayadev and Reddy (2016). In particular, we have made 
systematic efforts to reduce the volatility of data arising from surveys being selected from 
different data sources, by using specific methods to select surveys that belong to consistent long 
survey series. We have also extended the datasets by adding new survey sources (European 







We begin by presenting a portrait of the distribution of global consumption and income using the 
GCID.  All studies on global inequality combine data across different countries that vary in terms 
of the welfare concept as well as in what is included operationally in the welfare concept10. In 
particular, items that are included in consumption/income surveys are not consistent across 
countries or over time. One important example, which by itself could very substantially influence 
comparisons, is imputed rent for self-owned homes, that is included in some countries but not all 
and even when included is estimated based on different methods across countries.  Such 
variations can be sizable across different survey sources even for a single country, leading to 
difficulty in making comparisons over time, or to apparent volatility due to the combination of  
  
Table 3.2: Global Consumption and Income Levels  
Consumption per capita per month at various 
percentiles in 2005 PPP 
    year 10th 20th 50th 90th 95th 99th Mean 
1960 6 10 36 324 496 893 122 
1970 7 11 42 453 686 1226 163 
1980 10 15 44 530 795 1395 189 
1990 16 22 50 603 933 1678 215 
2000 19 27 61 610 955 1800 231 
2005 23 32 74 639 1005 1931 252 
2008 24 34 82 661 1028 1969 269 
2010 26 37 90 692 1069 2013 281 
2013 31 44 105 719 1070 2014 295 
2015 34 48 116 759 1117 2091 313 
Income per capita per month at various percentiles in 
2005 PPP 
    year 10th 20th 50th 90th 95th 99th Mean 
1960 8 12 40 408 653 1219 155 
1970 9 14 44 570 904 1662 207 
1980 12 18 47 681 1052 1907 242 
1990 14 22 60 765 1176 2173 270 
2000 16 26 73 830 1290 2414 297 
2005 20 33 95 894 1378 2577 333 
2008 22 36 111 947 1434 2683 363 
2010 24 39 121 981 1474 2749 378 
2013 28 45 139 1016 1517 2837 402 
2015 31 50 154 1080 1599 2981 430 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: All numbers are in 2005 PPP $.   
 
 
                                                
10 Even though an expert group has recommended guidelines for collection of income distribution data (de Canberra, 2001) they are rarely 




such sources.  Global estimates are also prone to several sources of uncertainty both intrinsic to 
the methods used and arising from the plausible use of different methods.  Areas in which such 
uncertainties arise include survey design and sampling, PPP estimation, standardization methods 
used to compare income and consumption and others.  Although they are known to exist, not all 
of the resulting probable errors can be quantified.  Given these difficulties, all estimates based on 
the existing data, both ours and others, are subject to concerns about meaningfulness and 
reliability (see Anand & Segal, 2008, 2014 for more details).  It is interesting that nevertheless, 
certain regularities emerge across different research efforts. 
Figure 3.2: Global Income Distribution 
 
Note: kernel=epanechnikov, stata default bin size. 
 
For example, our database is able to reproduce the general finding (see e.g. Milanovic, 2012; 
Lakner & Milanovic, 2015) that the last three decades have seen substantial increases in material 
living standards for the world population considered as a whole, especially in the period after 
2000, when comparing percentiles with corresponding percentiles. In 1990, half of the world’s 
population had consumption levels of $50 (in 2005 PPP dollars) per month or $1.64 per day, or 





Table 3.2 provides snapshots of the distribution of global consumption and income distributions 
for different years between 1960 and 201511. The extraordinary growth rates experienced by a 
number of developing countries in the 2000s are evident in the fact that while the median income 
grew at a compound annualized rate of 2 percent from 1990 to 2000, it more than doubled 
between 2000 and 2013 to 4.2 percent.  
 
Figures 3.2 shows the evolution of the distribution of global income over a longer period of time. 
We find the gradual disappearance of the ‘twin-peaks’ phenomenon of slight bi-modality in the 
global distribution studied by, among others, Milanovic, 2005; Weisbrod et al, 2007; Lakner & 
Milanovic 2015. It is crucial to note that in this figure and similar ones that follow the scale is a 
logarithmic one in which given visual distances on the scale correspond to larger and larger 
differences in absolute income as one examines comparisons involving higher incomes and may 
therefore visually understate the level of global inequality. 
  
The remarkable impact of Asia’s rise in the global economy over the last 25 years can be seen by 
examining the regional superposition graphs (Figures 3.3 and 3.4) for consumption in 1990 and 
in 2013. These show the contribution of each geographical region to the overall distribution of 
consumption as well as their individual distributions at two periods in time. The most striking 
development is perhaps the disappearance of pre-existing twin peaks in East Asia and the 
movement of most of its population to a higher level of consumption.   As the figures show, the 
median of the distribution in East Asia was at $32 2005 PPP per month in 1990 but by 2013, the 
median of the distribution had come to be around $135 2005 PPP per month. As is also clear, 
despite India’s substantial GDP-per-capita growth in the period, compared to 1990, South Asia 
has fallen behind East Asia and the Pacific12. The median of the distributions was roughly the 
same in 1990, but by 2013 the median in South Asia is at less than half the level of East Asia and 
Pacific. Another notable feature of the data is a degree of convergence within Europe and Central 
Asia leading to a less skewed and more even distribution, perhaps due to increases in income in 
formerly planned economies.  
 
As a result of the fast growth of the Chinese (and to a lesser extent Indian) economy, the world 
distribution of income and consumption is more equal in 2013 than it was in 1990. Table 3.3 
provides estimates for global interpersonal income inequalities over the period for various  
                                                
11 Note that the data before 1980 should be treated with extreme caution, since there are only survey-based observations for around a fourth of the 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s. 
12 This is partly because growth rate of survey means in India is far less than its growth in GDP-per-capita (Annualized compound growth rate of 




Figure 3.3: Regional Superposition Consumption Density for 1990 
  





inequality measures. In 1990 the global income Gini coefficient was 0.72 while the global Theil 
index was 1.02. In 2013, these had fallen to 0.66 and 0.82 respectively. Even if one were to 
exclude China, global inequality would be estimated to have fallen although only due to the 
interval between 2005 and 2013. Once again it is noteworthy that all the reduction in inequality 
occurred after the 2000s. In the period 1990 to 2000 global relative inequality did not decrease 
substantially.  
 
Table 3.3: Global Relative Income Inequality Measures  
 
Gini MLD Theil-T Palma Ratio Mean to Median Ratio 
1960 0.71 1.12 0.97 16.02 3.89 
1970 0.72 1.22 1.01 19.12 4.71 
1980 0.72 1.2 1.01 17.84 5.13 
1990 0.72 1.17 1.02 16.37 4.54 
2000 0.72 1.13 1.01 14.99 4.05 
2005 0.69 1.04 0.94 12.75 3.51 
2010 0.67 0.98 0.86 11.34 3.12 
2013 0.66 0.93 0.82 10.19 2.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 3.5: Change in within-country inequality in the period 1980-2013 
 
 
While the world distribution of income has grown more equal, the experience of within-country 




Gini coefficient within country between 1980 and 2013. The size of each circle corresponds to 
the population of the country in question. Where observations are above the 45 degree line, 
countries have become more unequal, while countries have become less unequal if the 
observation lies below the line. There is some evidence of inequality convergence noted by 
Ravallion (2001), Dhongde and Xing (2013) among others as the line of best fit for the 
observations is flatter than the 45-degree line   Roughly half of the countries show rising 
inequality, but about two-thirds of the population lives in countries with rising inequality (a 
difference mainly driven by China).   
 
One interesting point to note about the scatterplot on inequality convergence is the 
preponderance of Sub-Saharan African countries among those with high inequality both at the 
beginning and at the end of the period (higher than most Latin American countries, contrary to a 
prominent received ‘fact’ in economics). This is a result of the fact that we have standardized the 
concept of advantage (consumption vs. income) so as to make estimates of inequality more 
comparable; while surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa typically are of consumption, those in Latin 
America are typically of income, which without adjustment leads to greater estimated inequality 
in the latter.   The high-inequality of Sub-Saharan African countries (and the finding that it is 
among the highest in the world, and in particular higher than in Latin America) holds in our 
database for earlier decades as well. In addition, it is interesting to note the extent to which 
previously relatively equal European economies have become more unequal. 
 
Table 3.4: Average Within Country Income Inequality by Region  
 Unweighted Population weighted 
 
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013 
East Asia & Pacific 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.5 0.5 
Europe & Central Asia 0.3 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.36 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.48 
Middle East & North 
Africa 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.54 
North America 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.4 0.4 
South Asia 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.62 0.6 0.58 0.6 0.59 0.56 
World 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.47 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Although global inequality has declined between 1990 and 2013, within-country inequality 
increased on average in the same period (Table 3.4). The population-weighted average income 




occur when one uses a consistent income Gini coefficient (obtained after standardization). We 
observe this in case of Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries that reverse positions as a 
result of this. Average within-country income Gini coefficients for Latin American countries are 
higher than consumption Gini coefficients for Sub-Saharan African countries, but Sub-Saharan 
African countries have higher income Gini coefficients after standardization than Latin 
American countries13. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin American countries also witnessed 
substantial decline in average within-country inequality between 2000 and 2013, while other 
regions saw either an increase or no change in within-country inequality.  
 
Figure 3.6 provides a depiction of inequality within countries as measured by the income share 
of the top decile. We should note here that in every country this is a likely under-estimate due to 
the well-known problem of under-sampling, under-reporting and higher non-response among the 
very rich. This noted, a number of Sub-Saharan African nations dominate the map. 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the total world inequality attributable to between and within country inequality 
(using an additively decomposable income inequality measure). Again, as a result of the growth 
of China, the importance of between-country inequality has fallen sharply in explaining global 
inequality. Within-country inequality in 2013 accounts for 45% of global inequality as opposed  





to 24% contribution it made in 1980.  In fact, the between-country component of inequality is at 
its lowest ever in our sample. Some of this convergence is driven by the fast growth of China and 
other countries but it also has to do with the steady, even if relatively slower, growth of other 
developing countries (such as Brazil).  The contribution of China in this regard is crucial.  
                                                




Without China, the between-country component of global interpersonal inequality would have 
fallen marginally from 67 percent in 1990 to 62 percent in 2013 (as compared to falling more 
markedly from 76 percent to 55 percent with China). 
 
Given the facts of global income inequality convergence and the fall in between country 
inequality over the last 50 years, it is perhaps not surprising to see, as we do in Figure 3.8 that 
global relative income inequality is at its lowest measured, whichever inequality measure we use.  
Even when one examines global absolute inequality (relative inequality as measured by any 
inequality measure such as the Gini or Theil times the mean), which gives consideration to 
absolute differences, the remarkable equalizing impact of Chinese growth in the recent past is 
visible. Figure 3.9 shows the trend in absolute inequality over the last 40 years. Unsurprisingly, 
given that these measures register increasing inequality as long as the absolute income increase 
going to a poorer person is lower than that going to a richer person, over most of the period it 
shows rising inequality (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2010; Niño‐Zarazúa, Roope & Tarp, 2016).  
Figure 3.7: Decomposition of Global Income Inequality into within and between country 
components (2005 PPP) 
 
Note: Inequality measure is Mean Log Deviation - GE(0) 
 
Despite the very high bar for inequality reduction, there has been a relative decline in increase in 
inequality during the last period of high overall developing country growth (2005 and 2010), if 





Of course, there are many complex and diverse experiences across regions in regard to growth 
and distribution in this period. In order to capture these variations, we undertake a regional 
decomposition of inequality trends (Figure 3.8). We use the World Bank’s regional categories 
and assess the trends in income Gini coefficients for the resulting regions considered as a whole. 
A few striking conclusions emerge. First, the East Asia and Pacific has been one of the highest 
inequality regions in the world till 2005 (contrasting with the widely held ‘stylized fact’ that 
individual East Asian countries have had fairly low inequality as compared to other regions 
historically).  This is because it contains populations at very different levels of development, 
from very poor Chinese or Indonesians for example, to Japanese (and more recently Koreans or 
Singaporeans) who enjoy levels of income of rich countries. However, even within this disparate 
group, China’s rapid income growth has meant that inequality has fallen since 1980 because of 
the impact of that income-growth on inter-country differences within the region.  
Figure 3.8: Regional Relative Interpersonal Income Inequality (Gini, 2005 PPP) 
 
 
Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, North America is much more homogenous as a 
region and overall inequality is correspondingly lower. However, rising inequality within the US 
in particular has meant that inequality has risen sharply since 1980. South Asia and Europe and 
Central Asia, are not as homogenous in incomes as North America, but are decidedly more 




Asia and in Europe and Central Asia, the experience of the last 30 years has been one of 
increasing inequality within the regions (except for a small decrease after 2005). By contrast, in 
the initially high inequality regions of Latin America and in Sub-Saharan Africa, inequality has 
fallen or remained constant.  Taken as a whole, we once again see the pattern of income 
inequality convergence noted previously, this time by regions: in 1980, Gini coefficients ranged 
from 0.35 (North America) to 0.75 (East Asia Pacific), but by 2013, the range had narrowed to 
0.4 to 0.61.   In Latin America, inequality rose between 1990 and 2000 before falling 
subsequently. The period between 1960 and 1990 was, moreover, a more dramatic period of 
inequality reduction for the region than the 2000s, which have been much vaunted as a time of 
decreasing inequality in individual Latin American countries.14   
Figure 3.9: Global Absolute Income Inequality (2005 PPP) 
 
 
A similar pattern of regional inequality change is also witnessed when we look at other measures 
of relative inequality such as the mean log deviation (GE(0)), the Theil index (GE(1)), the mean-
to-median ratio or the Palma ratio (Table 3.5).  Between 1990 and 2013, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, East Asia and Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa experienced sharp declines in all these 
measures, while South Asia and North America saw increases in these measures.  
                                                
14 It is important to note the distinction between inter-personal inequality in entire regions (e.g. the Gini coefficient of a region) , as contrasted 
with the pattern of inter-personal inequality of countries in a region (e.g. the average Gini coefficient of countries in a region).  The latter has 
almost invariably been the focus of studies.  The two can, however, evolve differently as differences between as well as within countries matter 






















1990 0.47 0.53 0.59 0.38 0.43 0.65 0.72 
2000 0.52 0.54 0.6 0.4 0.44 0.64 0.72 
2013 0.46 0.5 0.64 0.4 0.44 0.61 0.66 
 
MLD 
1990 0.4 0.53 0.63 0.26 0.31 0.82 1.17 
2000 0.58 0.56 0.67 0.28 0.33 0.8 1.13 
2013 0.44 0.46 0.8 0.29 0.33 0.71 0.93 
 
Theil 
1990 0.37 0.54 0.68 0.24 0.35 0.89 1.02 
2000 0.47 0.56 0.71 0.28 0.36 0.84 1.01 
2013 0.36 0.45 0.81 0.28 0.36 0.78 0.82 
 
Mean to Median Ratio 
1990 1.51 1.79 2.27 1.23 1.5 2.64 4.54 
2000 1.68 1.83 2.32 1.29 1.5 2.54 4.05 
2013 1.39 1.59 2.72 1.29 1.49 2.34 2.9 
 
Absolute Gini 
1990 259.03 137.66 112.17 526.79 21.42 46.55 194.77 
2000 309.04 152.93 130.59 633.62 27.29 40.02 212.59 
2013 359.49 169.59 225.5 659.09 41.9 52.89 264.68 
 
Absolute MLD 
1990 222.4 137 121.07 361.35 15.46 59 315.75 
2000 344.15 157.43 146.78 448.32 20.52 50.34 336.11 
2013 342.01 156.07 283.14 473.93 31.66 61.61 372.16 
 
Absolute Theil-T 
1990 205.09 139.6 130.62 331.81 17.48 63.94 274.83 
2000 275.26 158.3 154.65 444.27 22.57 52.94 301.05 
2013 281.35 153.7 285.32 454.55 34.35 67.28 328.71 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3.6 provides comparisons of estimates of global interpersonal relative inequality (Gini 
coefficient) across a range of different studies. These studies differ in the welfare concept 
(income, consumption or mixed), data source (e.g. household survey or national accounts means; 
with or without adjustment of top incomes using administrative/National Accounts data) and 
exchange rates used (e.g. PPP concepts and base year). Global relative income inequality is 
estimated to be in a narrow range across the studies and to have been stable in the 1990’s with a 





3.4. Aggregate Analysis: Fast Growing Countries 
As we have seen above, there have been marked changes in the world distribution of individual 
material advantage, in particular in the period after 1990.  It may be asked which countries’ 
changes are most responsible for bringing about the observed overall changes in the world 
distribution?  For instance, is there a single country such as China or a group of countries such as 
the much discussed BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) or another such 
group of sufficiently large and fast-growing countries that plays this role?  To investigate this 
question, we define a group of ‘fast growing countries’ and then proceed to examine their impact 
on the world distribution and to compare this to the impact of the BRICS countries without 
China, and of China alone.  In doing so, we exploit a unique feature of the GCIP, which makes it 
straightforward to characterize user-defined aggregates of countries.  
 
In recent years much attention has been given to the impact of a few large developing countries 
that have experienced exceptionally high growth rates on the structure and dynamics of the world 
economy.   During the first decade of the century, the majority of global growth started to be 
produced in developing countries.  This fact has had enormous implications for understanding 
such matters as which countries drive global consumption and investment dynamics, the location 
of business opportunities, the changing political status of countries, and how the profile of 
material affluence, poverty and inequality in the world have been shifting.  
 
What qualifies a country as a ‘fast-growing country’?   Either an absolute or a relative 
conception of what it means to be fast-growing could be adopted.   However, growth-rates from 
different sources are quite different.  In particular, growth-rates of income from surveys are often 
very different than those from national income accounts for the very same country-year.  We are 
able to make such a comparison for a larger number of cases as we estimate the means that 
would have resulted from ‘missing’ survey data in non-survey years (through interpolation or 
extrapolation from survey-years) and because we estimate the survey-based estimates that would 
have resulted from an income survey when we have only a consumption survey.   Although the 
literature has recognized the lack of consistency of national accounts and survey-mean levels and 
(less frequently) of growth rates (Deaton, 2005; Ravallion, 2003b) it may not have been fully 
appreciated how pervasive the difficulty is, in particular encompassing developed as well as 
developing countries, occurring in all major regional groups and extending over all decades for 







Table 3.6: Comparison of Global Inequality Estimates from Different Studies  
  1988 1993 1998 2003 2005 2008 2013 
Global Consumption and Income 
Database (Income) 
72.5 72 71.6 70.6 69.4 68 66 
Anand and Segal (2014) (with top 
incomes) 
72.6 72.7 72.2 73.5 72.7     
Anand and Segal (2014) (without top 
incomes, survey means) 
70.5 70.7 69.8 71.1 70.1     
Anand and Segal (2014) (without top 
incomes, Household Consumption 
from National Account) 
73.9 72.1 71.1 70.6 69.8     
Lakner and Milanovic (2015) (National 
Account Means + top heavy Pareto 
imputation) 
76.3 76.1 77.2 78.1   75.9   
Lakner and Milanovic (2015) (National 
Account Means) 
71.5 70.5 70.6 70.7   67.6   
Lakner and Milanovic (2015) (only 
survey means) 
72.2 71.9 71.5 71.9   70.5   
Milanovic (2012) 67.8 69.3 68.8 70.1       
Milanovic (2005) 61.9 65.2 64.2         
Milanovic (2002) 62.5 65.9           
Bhalla (2002) (Income) 67   65         
Bhalla (2002) (Consumption) 66   63         
Bourguignon & Morrisson (2002)   66           
Chotikapanich et. Al (1997) 65             
Dikhanov & Ward (2002) 69   68         
Dowrick & Akmal (2005) (GK)                                                                         64       
Dowrick & Akmal (2005) (Afriat)   71           
Sala-i-Martín (2006) 65 64 64         
Bourguignon (2012) 71   69     66   
Notes: Milanovic (2012): Table 4, p. 14: Gini from row 5 (2005 PPP, sep. rural-urban prices for China, India 
& Indonesia); Theil from row 3 (2005 PPP, sep. rural-urban prices for China only); 2002 figures for 2003 
benchmark. Milanovic (2002): Table 16, p. 72: Using full sample; Table 19, p. 78 (decomposition): Only for 
common sample. Milanovic (2005): Table 9.4, p. 108: Using full sample; Table 9.5, p. 112 (decomposition): 
Only for common sample. Bourguignon (2012): Figure 1, only approximate, because read-off from figure; 
1988 refers to 1989, 1998 refers to 1997, 2008 refers to 2006. Otherwise: Anand and Segal (2008), Table 1: 
Survey estimates allocated to benchmark according to rules with micro data: 1988: Bhalla (2002), CVR 
(1997), and DW (2002) all refer to 1990; 1993: BM (2002) refer to 1992; 1998: Bhalla (2002) refers to 2000, 
and DW (2002) refers to 1999. GCIP's 1988 estimate refers to 1990. 




To focus on countries that might have a non-negligible effect on world economic dynamics or on 
the structure of the world-distribution, we isolate ones with a population of ten million or 
more.  As a rough-and-ready criterion, we initially identify among these the top fifteen countries 
by per-capita income growth rate (see Table 3.7) according to surveys or national accounts.  As 
can be seen, the countries that emerge from these two exercises are rather different.  In 







Table 3.7: Fastest Growing Countries  
Country 
 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate Survey Mean Growth Rate 
China  9.01 8.96 
Cambodia  5.53 3.43 
Vietnam  5.38 6.24 
India  4.67 2.93 
Sri Lanka*  4.64 2.77 
Korea, Rep.*  4.58 2.05 
Chile*  3.72 1.46 
Thailand  3.71 4.21 
Bangladesh*  3.68 2.61 
Malaysia*  3.64 2.74 
Poland*  3.62 1.74 
Mozambique  3.55 2.88 
Indonesia  3.54 4.69 
Uganda  3.26 4.44 
Dominican Republic*  3.07 0.96 
 
Countries part of top 15 fastest growing countries based on Survey Mean Growth 
Rate but not part of list based on GDP per capita growth rate 
Kazakhstan  2.50 4.89 
Nepal  2.45 4.21 
Chad  2.20 4.19 
Russian Federation  0.68 3.73 
Pakistan  1.77 3.05 
Tunisia  3.06 2.91 
Note: Only countries with a population of greater than 10 million in 2013 are included in the analysis. The 
countries marked with * in the table would not be part of the top 15 fastest growing countries if survey mean 
growth rates were the criteria used instead of GDP per capita growth rate. Compounded annual growth rates are 
reported in the table.  
 
inclusion of some countries (e.g. Nepal, Chad, Pakistan and Russian Federation among others) 
not viewed in widespread perceptions (typically based on national accounts based growth rates) 
as star performers.   As survey-based growth rates attributed to individual years are based on 
interpolation between sometimes distant survey-years they may be more subject to variations 
resulting from single-year variations or changes in methodology as compared to annual growth 
rates.    However, survey and national accounts based characterizations differ for many reasons 
(for instance because certain components of national accounts do not enter into household 
income or consumption at all).   We prefer to use both the sources for aspects of the 
analysis.  Specifically, we assess changes to the national economy (through which we identify 
the countries in the aggregate) in terms of per-capita growth rates from national accounts, and we 




income from household surveys.   Specifically, we select the fifteen countries with highest per-
capita-income growth according to national income accounts and with population of at least ten 
million as our fast-growing emerging countries, and then proceed to analyze the changes 
experienced by their population in aggregate as well as the contribution of these changes to those 
experienced by the world population, over a relevant time period.   
  
Figure 3.10 depicts the initial Gini coefficient and changes in the Gini coefficient between 1990 
and 2013 for these fifteen fastest-growing countries. Contrary to the belief that fast growth is 
generally accompanied by increase in inequality we do not find any such clear pattern here. Six 
countries experience a decline in inequality, while five experience an increase and four witness 
no change in inequality during this high growth period. 
 
Figure 3.11 shows the change in distribution for China, the next fourteen fastest growing 
countries as an aggregate and the rest of the world between 1990 and 2013. The median income 
for China increased 57 percent during this period, while the rest of the fast-growing countries  
Figure 3.10: Change in Gini Coefficient between 1990 and 2013 for the Fastest Growing Countries  
 
Note: Countries in the list are the top 15 fastest growing countries by GDP per capita during 1990-2013 period with 






Figure 3.11: Change in Income Distribution for Fast Growing Countries (2005 PPP) 
 
 
saw an increase of only 19 percent and the rest of the world witnessed no change in median 
income. The movement of the Chinese distribution and to a lesser extent that of the other fast-
growing countries account for almost the entirety of the movement of the world distribution 
during 1990 to 2013. We undertook a similar exercise for China, BRIS (Brazil, Russia, India and 
South Africa) and the rest of the world and find that BRIS and rest of the world contribute only 
marginally to change in global income distribution as compared to China (analysis not shown 
here). 
3.5. Aggregate ‘Social Welfare’ 
 
Given the uneven nature of growth as well as the changes in inequality, how might we go about 
assessing whether the world taken as a whole has experienced economic welfare gains during the 
period in consideration and if so to what extent? A useful tool in this regard is the Generalized 
Lorenz Curve (GLC) which allows us effectively to rank distributions in terms of welfare. 
Shorrocks (1983) showed that for any welfare function that is Schur Concave (i.e. responds 
negatively to regressive Pigou-Dalton Transfers and is therefore inequality averse) and that is 
positively responsive to income, a given distribution of income would provide more welfare than 




welfare functions would agree on the welfare ranking of two situations if and only if such 
‘dominance’ is established.  Figure 3.12 depicts the generalized Lorenz curve for the world 
distribution of income in four periods of time. Clearly, by any measure, compared to 1960, the 
welfare of the world had increased by 1990. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly however, there was 
no unambiguous welfare improvement between the 1990 and 2000 distributions of income, since 
the generalized Lorenz curves lie almost on top of each other. However, following that period, 
we see that by 2013, by any measure, global welfare had again increased.  Assessment of the 
actual change in welfare in quantitative terms is also possible but requires the choice of a specific 
welfare function (or class of functions). 
 
While the GLC provides a framework for welfare comparisons, using a growth incidence curve 
provides a more detailed depiction of the beneficiaries of growth across this period. Growth has 
been broadly ‘inclusive’ in the limited sense that it has taken place across percentiles of the 
world distribution, but it has been rather uneven across the different percentiles, and the temporal 
pattern of increases has also varied across percentiles, as shown in Figures 3.13 and 3.14.  
Between 1960 and 2010, the poorest experienced a greater share of their cumulative growth, in 
particular of consumption, early in the period.  However, we observe an interesting hump-shape 
(which was first described as an elephant shape by Lakner and Milanovic (2015), arising during 
the interval of the greatest dynamism (2000 to 2013 and 1990 to 2013)15. The middle-income 
groups – those between the 40th and 60th percentiles - saw their incomes rise rapidly in this 
period, while those in a rather higher income bracket (80th -95th percentiles) saw their incomes 
grow much more slowly, mainly because the richer countries in which they disproportionately 
lived experienced lower growth.  Of course, problems of estimation of top-incomes in household 
surveys provide an essential qualification to any such conclusion. Lakner and Milanovic (2015) 
plot GICs for the period 1988-2008 and show a larger uptick in growth after the 95th global 
percentile than observed in the period 1990-2013 in our graphs. For the same period 1988-2008 
we also see higher growth above the 95th percentile using GCIP data, but this effect diminishes if 
the period is extended to 2013. GICs for the longer time frame of 1960-2013 are far flatter than 
for the more recent period and also consumption GICs show a far more pronounced pattern than 




                                                
15 The literature that has been spawned by the so-called elephant graph is already sizable. For a critique and response see  Corlett (2016) and 




Figure 3.12: Global Generalized Lorenz Curve (2005 PPP) 
 
 
The importance of the Chinese experience in this transformation can be seen to be critical since 
the Chinese population makes up a disproportionate share of those in the fortieth to seventieth 














Figure 3.13: Global Consumption Growth Incidence Curve (2005 PPP) 
 
 






position of the populations of several large countries over time. This is done in Figures 3.15 and 
3.16. In 1990, all of the US population enjoyed incomes that would place them in the top quintile 
of the world income distribution. The Chinese percentile distribution was in the group of bottom 
countries depicted. By 2013, however, the Chinese percentile distribution dominated those of 
several of the other countries and had caught up with Brazil. China is now truly the ‘Middle 
Kingdom’ of the world as most of its population lie between the fortieth and seventieth 
percentile of the world distribution.  Nigeria is now dominated in relative terms by the other 
percentile distributions depicted here (although it was not previously).  The Chinese relative 
position looks better when we plot income distributions but is slightly weaker when we plot the 
consumption distributions of different countries due to the relatively high savings rate of Chinese 
population. In income distributions, 
 China and Brazil overlap, but China is substantially lower than Brazil when one plots 
consumption distribution. Also, even though GDP per capita for Brazil in 2013 was about a third 
higher than China the survey means are almost the same. This is due to differences in the 










China national accounts and survey means track each other closely whereas they don’t to the 
same extent in Brazil. These differences in bilateral comparisons due to the measures chosen 
shows that the broader picture too might be dependent on the particular indicator used for 
comparisons and that systematic exploration of such dependence is necessary to arrive with 
greater confidence at overall results.  
Figure 3.16: Relative Position of Countries in 2013 based on Income (2005 PPP) 
 
 
3.6. Sensitivity of the Global Distribution to Alternate 
Methodological Choices 
 
In constructing the databases and in the subsequent analysis we make several choices. These 
include: adopting a conversion factor for transforming means expressed in national currency 
units to a common unit which can then be used for cross-country comparisons, making a decision 
on whether or not to standardize the distributions by estimating income from consumption (or 
vice versa), and using means from surveys or national accounts. Our benchmark analysis, on 
which the discussion above is based, uses 2005 ICP consumption PPPs calculated based on the 




standardize the distributions and use means from surveys (all discussed further in the paper 
presenting an overview of the database, previously cited).  In this section, we modify some of 
these choices and evaluate the impact.  This is in keeping with our larger goal: that the GCIP 
should be flexible and permit alternate choices so that we might make choices deemed more 
warranted for specific purposes as well as better understand the robustness of specific 
conclusions. 
 
We use 2011 ICP consumption PPP’s as alternate currency conversion factors in the analysis 
below. We also construct a consumption database (Mixed Surveys with Income Preference or 
MSIP) in which we do not attempt to estimate consumption distributions from income surveys 
but rather pool the distributional information without prior adjustment of either the distributions 
or the means.  There is consumption preference only in the sense that if we have both income 
and consumption surveys to choose from for a country-year we prefer consumption surveys, 
which is a preference that could as well have been reversed. We again exclude China from some 
of the analysis to evaluate the country’s impact on the world.  
Figure 3.17: Kernel Density Graphs for Various Global Distributions for 2013 
 
 
Figure 3.17 depicts the density function corresponding to the resulting alternate databases. The 




Figure 3.18: Global Generalized Lorenz Curve for World Excluding China (2005 PPP) 
 
 
(GCD) for the 2005 PPP base year, apparently because there are many poorer people in the 
world whose reported or estimated consumption appears to be significantly higher than their 
income.  It is unclear whether this comparison arising from a ‘snapshot’ of the two distributions 
reflects a temporary phenomenon or one that is more durable, and why it is present.  As we 
discuss further below, there is evidence that the gap has increased markedly since 1990, 
suggesting the possibility of growing debt or asset-depletion driven consumption.  Interestingly, 
the density of the income distribution arrived at without any standardization (i.e. by assuming 
that a consumption distribution is in relative terms exactly the same as an income distribution 
when only information about the latter is available, but combining this with an estimate of the 
consumption mean) is almost identical to the consumption distribution. This may be because 
many populous regions in the world tend to have consumption surveys, in particular in South 
Asia and Africa and often in East Asia too, and thus provide much of the mass of the density 
functions in both cases.  Although we show the income distribution for the 2011 PPP base year 
on the same graph, it must be kept in mind that these are in different units (2011 international 
dollars) that are not strictly comparable to the units in which the 2005 PPP base year 
distributions are expressed.  Nevertheless, interpreted in terms of the perspective of the country 
with respect to which international dollars are normalized (the US), in which there was marginal 




right (i.e. rather higher incomes in the world, especially for the sections of the population in the 
middle of the distribution) as a result of the application of the 2011 PPPs.   
 
The level of inequality as judged by different inequality measures varies across the alternate 
datasets (Table 3.8). Trends in global inequality over the past two decades are similar whichever 
dataset or measure we use. Global inequality appears to increase or remain unchanged between 
1990 and 2000 and then to decline between 2000 and 2013. China has a major role to play in the 
moderate but decided global inequality decline in the period 1990-2013.  Excluding China from 
the world results in ambiguous changes in global income inequality: the 1990-2000 period 
witnessed small increase or no change in inequality and 2000-2013 period saw a small decline in 
inequality. Average within-country inequality is 7-10 Gini coefficient points higher when using 
the income as the welfare concept as opposed to consumption, with the non-standardized version 
coming close to the average when the consumption database is used (Table 3.9).  
 
The latest round of ICP data was collected in 2011 and a resulting report released in 2014 (World 
Bank (2014)). The PPP estimates from the 2011 round are quite different from ones based on 
extrapolations using the 2005 PPPs, perhaps in part due to methodological changes, in part due 
to sampling variations, and in part due to real changes in the structure of the world economy 
between the two base years, which are reflected in PPPs that represent data collected in a given 
year.  Most poor countries are estimated to be richer relative to developed countries when 2011 
PPP are used than was estimated earlier based on 2005 PPPs.  It is important to appreciate that  
 
Table 3.8: Global Relative Interpersonal Inequality for Various Global Distributions  
 
Gini MLD Theil-T 
 
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013 
GCD 2005 PPP 0.71 0.69 0.64 1.04 0.98 0.79 0.98 0.95 0.77 
GID 2005 PPP 0.72 0.72 0.66 1.17 1.13 0.93 1.02 1.01 0.82 
GCD 2011 PPP 0.67 0.65 0.59 0.88 0.83 0.66 0.85 0.82 0.64 
GID 2011 PPP 0.69 0.68 0.62 1.01 0.98 0.81 0.9 0.9 0.72 
GCD No 
Standardization 
2005 PPP 0.71 0.7 0.64 1.06 1 0.8 1 0.97 0.78 
GCD Excluding 
China 2005 PPP 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.97 0.98 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.81 
GID Excluding 
China 2005 PPP 0.7 0.71 0.68 1.12 1.18 1.02 0.91 0.98 0.88 
GCD Excluding 
China 2011 PPP 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.82 0.84 0.74 0.75 0.79 0.71 





this applies to comparisons between any pair of country-years in our space-time tableau and not 
merely to the base years in question. The PPPs for individual consumption by households (used 
in the benchmark version of GCIP) were revised downwards (on which see e.g. Deaton and 
Aten, 2017; Ravallion, 2014). These changes would have a sizable impact on global between-
country inequality and through that on overall global inter-personal inequality if the 2011 PPPs 
were used. Our estimates indicate that global between-country inequality in 2013 as estimated by 
the Gini coefficient was five points lower (0.50 vs 0.55) when using the 2011 PPPs for 
comparisons rather than the 2005 PPPs (Table 3.10). Global inequality was also lower in 1990 
and 2000 when using the 2011 PPPs. 
 
Table 3.9: Within-country Inequality for Various Global Distributions (Gini, population 
weighted Average) 
 
1990 2000 2013 
GCD 0.36 0.39 0.39 
GCD-No Standardization 0.37 0.4 0.4 
GID 0.46 0.47 0.46 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
To test the sensitivity of our welfare results to Chinese growth, we redo the Global Generalized 
Lorenz curves for the rest of the world excluding China (Figure 3.18). Here we find that, without 
China, between 1970 and 2000 there were no pareto-improvements in the income distribution 
(some percentiles in 1970 performed better than in 2000 and also in the intermediate years). The 
period after 2000 clearly saw large Pareto gains even if one excludes China.  
 
Table 3.10: Between-country Inequality for Various Global Distributions (% of Total 
Inequality, MLD) 
 







1960 84 82 76 74 66 61 
1970 85 83 78 75 68 64 
1980 84 82 76 73 67 63 
1990 80 77 67 63 67 62 
2000 75 71 63 58 66 61 
2005 73 68 59 53 65 59 
2010 69 65 56 51 63 58 
2013 69 63 55 50 62 57 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The cumulative growth record across the percentiles in the global distribution depends on the 
dataset used to evaluate it (Figure 3.19).  For each dataset considered (varying for example 




exchange rate concepts) there was a peak in growth rates between the fiftieth and sixtieth 
percentile, but the levels of cumulative growth vary tremendously by percentile.  It can be seen 
that the most consequential choice is that between income and consumption based estimates, 
with income-based estimates showing a bell-shaped growth incidence curve with much higher  
Figure 3.19: Global Growth Incidence Curves for Various Global Distributions for 1990-2013 
 
 
cumulative growth rates for the middle-sections of the world population.  The high growth-rates 
of the middle sections of the population are, however, crucially dependent on the role of China, 
as can be seen by comparison with the growth incidence curve for income that strips it out.    It is 
also noteworthy that there is slight non-monotonicity as one moves to the right, with the very 
highest percentiles in the world having somewhat higher cumulative growth rates than those 
immediately below them.  These results could of course be further substantially influenced by 
the inclusion of top-income information from non-survey sources (an extension to the database 
we are presently working on).    The growth-rates for consumption for the poorer sections of the 
world population also seem to have been generally considerably greater for consumption than for 
income over the time-period, suggesting that the magnitude of the excess of consumption over 







We have in this paper provided a broad overview of the changes in the world distribution of 
income and consumption over the last fifty-five years. Using a more comprehensive and 
internally consistent database than previously available, we reproduce some patterns that have 
emerged in other recent research and drew some new conclusions about the differing patterns in 
regional distributions and the sources of changes in global inequality as well the overall record of 
world development. The enormous importance of China for our conclusions in all of these areas 
of concern stands out. Collective global economic ‘welfare’ as assessed according to standard 
assumptions appears to have increased, but the major increase took place in the early 2000s, and 
may or may not be durable.  
 
We gave some support to previous findings (for example the disappearance of the global ‘twin 
peaks’ and the appearance of a degree of ‘inequality convergence’) and identified new stylized 
facts (for example the fact that the Sub-Saharan African countries’ inequality, when measured in 
a way so as to standardize these surveys with those from other countries, is among the very 
highest in the world, and in particular higher than in Latin America).  We identify some new 
findings of interest for further research (such as that the lowest percentiles of the world 
distribution appear to be dissaving). Moreover, we show that much of our picture of what has 
happened to the world depends on choices with respect to the variable depicting individual 
advantage, the choice with respect to exchange rate (e.g. PPP of a given base year).  Each of 
these may be justified depending upon the purpose at hand, but has significant implications for 
our understanding of how the world’s population, as a whole and in its parts, has been faring.  
 
GCIP is an invaluable resource to study evolution of material living conditions in the world. In 
Reddy and Lahoti (2016), we used GCIP data to show that while absolute poverty has declined 
by most measures, but by comparison to a higher and plausible poverty line, poverty across the 
world has not changed significantly over three or even five decades. In Jayadev, Lahoti and 
Reddy (2015), we discuss the various ways of defining the global middle class and use GCIP to 






4. How Serious is the Neglect of Intra-
Household Inequality in Multi-




Income-based as well as most existing multidimensional poverty indices (MPI) assume equal 
distribution within the household and thus are likely to lead to yield a biased assessment of 
individual poverty, and poverty by age or gender.  In this paper we first show that the direction 
of the bias depends on how these measures use individual data to determine the poverty status of 
households, while the impact of these assumptions on inequality between individuals cannot be 
determined a priori.  We then use data from the 2012 Indian Human Development Survey to 
create a standard household-based MPI closely related to that proposed by Alkire and Santos 
(2014) as well as UNDP (2014), and compare it to an individual level MPI that individualizes 
education and nutrition and some aspects of the living standards dimensions. We find that the 
poverty rate of females is 14 percentage points higher than that of men in our individual MPI 
measure but only 2 percentage points higher when using the household-based measure. 
Similarly, the age differentials in poverty are much larger using the individual-based measure. 
Using a decomposable inequality measure, we find the contribution of intra-household inequality 
to the total inequality in the individual deprivation score inequality to be 30% and total 
inequality is also some 30% higher using the individual-based measure, while inequality among 




The ultimate objective of measuring poverty and inequality is to determine the wellbeing of 
individuals. But most empirical analyses of poverty assumes that resources are distributed 
equally, or according to need, within the household and equate poverty status of the household 
with the poverty status of all individuals in the household.  Such household-based poverty 
measures are then often used to track trends in well-being, target social and economic programs, 
and measure the impact of interventions. 
 
 But the assumptions of equal or needs-based distribution is inconsistent with the theoretical 
literature on intra-household bargaining, which has shown that well-being outcomes depend on 
                                                
1 This paper is co-authored with Stephan Klasen. We are grateful to Nichole Rippin for clarifications on the CSPI measure. We are also grateful 
to Sabina Alkire, Isis Gaddis, Thomas Pogge, and Sanjay Reddy for helpful discussions on the topic and to participants in the Goettingen 





the bargaining power within the household where equal distribution would be more of the 
exception than the rule.  These bargaining models have received overwhelming empirical 
support in the literature (e.g. Lundberg & Pollak, 1993; Lundberg, Pollak, & Wales, 1997; 
Manser & Brown, 1980; McElroy & Horney, 1981; Grossbard-Shechtman 1993; Gersbach & 
Haller, 2001; Edlund & Korn 2002, Chiappori 1988, 1992). 
 
More generally, there is overwhelming evidence collected across multiple contexts over the last 
two decades on intrahousehold inequalities against the need-based or equal distribution 
assumption (e.g. Haddad et al., 1997; Quisumbing & Maluccio 2000; Aronsson, Daunfeldt, & 
Wikström, 2001; Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinott, & Kanbur, 1995). In particular, 
substantial and consequential gender inequalities in the allocation of resources have been shown 
to exist in many contexts, with particular sizable gaps existing in some regions of the developing 
world, particularly parts of South Asia and the Middle East (e.g. World Bank, 2011; Klasen & 
Wink, 2002; 2003, Asfaw, Klasen, & Lamanna, 2010; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982; Hazarika, 
2000). 
 
As a result of this it is likely to be the case that household-based assessments of poverty by 
gender understate the gender gap in poverty, at least in some parts of the developing world.2  
And similarly, often-done analyses of child poverty or poverty among the elderly will yield 
biased results as the equal distribution assumption is unlikely to hold (e.g. Dreze & Srinivasan, 
1997; Corak, Fertig & Tamm, 2008; Deaton & Paxson, 1998).  More generally, poverty rates 
might be biased and their distribution by region or household type distorted, leading to biased 
assessments of individual well-being and policies, and biased targeting.  
 
Even though this has been long recognized there have been only few attempts at measuring 
poverty and inequality using truly individual level achievements. The dominant approaches in 
both unidimensional income and multi-dimensional poverty measurement (MPI) use the 
household as the unit of analysis to determine poverty status of individuals.  
 
In 1990, Haddad and Kanbur assessed how serious the neglect of intra-household distribution is 
when considering poverty in calorie intake (Haddad & Kanbur, 1990).  Using Philippine data 
they show that 30 to 40 percent of all inequality is intra-household inequality and would be 
missed if individual data was ignored. They also find that ranking between males and females 
                                                
2 At the same time, there have also been some unverified claims about gender gaps in poverty, such as the widely made claim in the 1990s that 
70% of the world's income poor are female.  If one assumes equal distribution at the household level, it is impossible to arrive at such a figure; 





reverses when using individual data, with poverty rates among women being higher when using 
some poverty measures.  
 
Several methods have been developed in recent years that allow one to estimate intra-household 
inequality using only household-level monetary information. (Lise & Seitz, 2011, Chiappori, 
Fortin & Lacroix, 2002, Dunbar, Lewbel & Pendakur, 2013, Browning, Chiappori & Lewbel 
2013). Case & Deaton (2002) and Chiappori & Meghir (2014) provide an excellent review of the 
various approaches used in the literature.  But first and foremost they note the serious challenges 
when doing so.  This is due to the presence of public goods within the household, the difficulty 
in identifying the sharing rule within the household given limited data and varying preferences 
across household members; and lack of sufficient data on individual consumption and time use 
for household members all of which complicates the estimation of intra-household inequality. 
Case & Deaton (2002) in their review conclude that most methods in the literature rely on 
controversial, easily challenged and non-transparent assumptions. Also none of these methods 
have gained widespread acceptance. They suggest that the best way forward might be collection 
of more data on individual consumption and interviewing multiple people in the household. But 
even such improved data will not solve the conceptual problem of determining how the use of 
household-specific public goods can be attributed to its members.   
 
In contrast to the income dimension where household-specific public goods make an assessment 
of individual income poverty particularly difficult (e.g. Klasen, 2007), many non-income 
deprivations, e.g. in the health and education dimensions, can, in principle, be attributed to 
individuals so that an individual multidimensional poverty measure appears more feasible at first 
sight.  And in fact, these individual-level data are typically available in standard survey 
instruments.  Yet in existing popular multi-dimensional poverty measures such as the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) used by UNDP and OPHI (see Duclos 2011; Alkire & 
Foster, 2011; Alkire & Santos, 2014, d’Ambrosio & Chakravorty, 2010), deprivations are also 
determined at the household level; and all individuals within the household are assigned the 
deprivation and poverty status of the household without any differentiation within the household. 
In cases where the household is deemed deprived or poor then all individuals in the household 
are deemed to suffer equally from these deprivations. Consequently, the gender or age-
segregated poverty numbers obtained from these calculations are unreliable at best, and deeply 
misleading at worst.  And even overall poverty numbers, trends, and correlates might be 





An individual might be personally deprived in several or most dimensions to be actually deemed 
poor; but the household might be deemed non poor based on combined assessment of household 
members and hence the individual though deprived would be deemed as non-poor or vice versa 
in a household-based analysis. The bias this generates in household-based multidimensional 
poverty assessments depends on how the thresholds for household poverty in a dimension are 
set, or how the individual-level data is combined to create a household-level indicator. The 
deprivation thresholds can be defined in a restrictive way where the achievement of the worst-off 
member of the household has to be above the threshold for the household to be non-deprived. In 
these cases the deprivation rates among individuals would be higher in the household-based 
analysis, as long as not all households are indeed equally deprived in that dimension, than the 
analysis which takes into account only individual’s personal status. But deprivation thresholds 
could also be defined in an expansive way, where only the achievement of the best-off individual 
has to be above the threshold for the household to be non-deprived. In such cases, the deprivation 
rates among individuals would be lower in the household-based analysis if not all are as well off 
as the best-off as compared to an individual-based analysis. UNDP and OPHI's MPI use a mix of 
indicator threshold definitions – restrictive and expansive – so that the net bias of their neglect of 
intra-household inequality is not clear a priori.    
 
There have been some survey-based multidimensional measures proposed exclusively for 
different demographic groups within the population (Alkire et al., 2013; Roche, 2013), but most 
focus only on a subset of the population like women or children. Ramaya, Lahoti & 
Swaminathan (2014) construct an individual level multidimensional poverty measure for adults 
in Karnataka, India. They found substantial gender differences in poverty that are absent when 
using household measures. Bessell (2015) proposes an individual deprivation measure for adults 
based on custom-made surveys in the Philippines, finding rather little gender inequality in this 
deprivation measure. While these studies are instructive, they are only focused on particular 
groups and thus cannot assess poverty at the individual level for the entire population or assess to 
what extent household-based analyses under- or overstate individual poverty and inequality.  
Also, they are based on particularly detailed, unique, and often custom-made surveys using small 
samples, making replication at higher scales and across contexts difficult (and costly).    
  
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to present a multi-dimensional poverty measure at the 
individual level that accounts for intra-household inequality across the entire population. We aim 
to ascertain if individual welfare and inequality among them is under- or over-stated when using 




from India, we use our measure to estimate individual poverty and inequality as well as the size 
of the bias of household-based analyses.  
 
In our application, we find that women and older individuals in India are far more deprived and 
poor than men and younger individuals. This simple fact is obscured and gender and generational 
differences are absent when measuring poverty and inequality using the standard household-
based approach. In particular, the poverty rate of females is higher by 14 percentage points than 
men in our individual MPI measure but only 2 percentage points higher when using the 
household-based measure. The poverty rate among individuals aged fifty and over is higher by 
46 percentage points than among children aged between 7 and 18 years of age in the individual 
measure, compared to only 2 percentage points when using the household-based measure. Using 
a decomposable inequality measure, we find the contribution of intrahousehold inequality to the 
total inequality in the individual deprivation score inequality to be 30% and total inequality is 
also some 30% higher using the individual-based measure, while inequality among the poor is 
found to be 5% smaller using the individual measure. We also find that in over 60 percent of 
households the average deprivation level of women in the household is greater than average 
deprivation level of men.  
 
At the same time, we note that our approach to individualize poverty measurement can only be 
seen as a first attempt in this direction and is hampered by insufficient data on individual well-
being in standard household surveys; improved data would likely lead to even larger differentials 
in poverty by age and gender, at least in a country such as India. The paper is organized as 
follows.  In the next section we discuss our theoretical framework, section three discusses data 
and methods, section four results, and section five concludes.   
4.2. Theoretical Framework  
 
We adapt the theoretical framework for assessing the impact of neglecting intra-household 
differences in the uni-dimensional setting presented in Haddad & Kanbur (1990) to a multi-
dimensional setting. 
 
Let’s assume that wellbeing of individuals is measured by y. In a uni-dimensional setting, 
wellbeing is generally measured by consumption, income or nutrition. In a multi-dimensional 
scenario let d (≥ 2) represent the number of dimensions in which well-being is assessed and !!" 
(≥ 0) represent the achievement of individual i in dimension j. Let the total number of 




multi-dimensional poverty analysis commonly include education, health, and indicators of 
standard of living. Each dimension j is assigned a weight !!. The weights represent the relative 
importance assigned to each dimension by the analyst. Let !! denote the threshold below which 
an individual is deemed deprived in dimension j, and let z be the row vector of dimension 
thresholds. For each individual i, let !!! denote the deprivation vector of d elements, whose 
elements !!"!  are defined by !!"! =  !! when !!" < !!, while !!!! =  0 otherwise. We assume that 
information on individual’s deprivation with respect to any particular dimension is binary i.e. 1 if 
deprived and 0 if non-deprived. 
 
As discussed above, in household-based multidimensional poverty assessments thresholds are 
not defined based on achievements of each individual but collectively for the household, denoted 
by !!!. All members of the household then are assumed to have the identical deprivation vector 
!!". We can construct a weighted deprivation count vector c, whose entry for the ith individual 
is the sum of the weights for the dimensions in which the individual is deprived, !! =  !!"!!!!! . 
When using household data, the deprivation score for all individuals in the household is identical 
and given by !! =  !!!"!!!! . The difference between c and !! for individuals within and across 
households and their distribution is the main object of interest in this paper.  
 
Are the levels of c and !! systematically different, and are individuals of certain groupings 
favored to have higher well-being in one over the other? Do the differences in c and !! impact 
multi-dimensional poverty analysis? The answers to these questions depend on how the 
underlying dimension thresholds are defined in the household-based analysis and the extent of 
within-household disparity in achievements for the dimensions and the poverty line. 
 
Household deprivation thresholds can be defined in various ways. For some indicators, there 
exists only a household-based indicator and the implicit assumption is that, in this dimension, we 
are dealing with is at least partly household-specific public good, even though in some cases 
these might be excludable and/or rivalrous.  This is, for example, the case the standard of living 
dimensions of UNDP's MPI that examine electricity and water and sanitation access for the 
household, or the ownership of durable goods to determine household-level deprivation in these 
dimensions.  In these cases, individual data is not available on these household-specific goods. 
While of course one cannot be sure that all household members profit equally from access to 
these public goods (esp. use of some of the durable goods might be quite unequal), it is very hard 




As a result, most surveys do not contain individual-level information on these dimensions.  We 
will return to this issue in the empirical assessment below.   
 
More important for our purposes here, however, is that for some dimensions, household-level 
assessments and thresholds are built up from individual-level data that is available in the surveys.  
We classify the most commonly used thresholds of using individual-level data to assess 
household-level deprivation into two types, restrictive and expansive. 
 
The deprivation threshold is said to be restrictive when the achievement of the least well-off 
person (or the overwhelming majority of members) has to be above the threshold for the 
household to be non-deprived. For example, in UNDP’s MPI, the threshold that deems the entire 
household to be deprived in nutrition if any one member of the household is undernourished, is 
such a restrictive one. This could generally be represented by a deprivation function defined 
as!!!" =  !!  !"min !!! ≤  !!! !"# 0 !"ℎ!"#$%!.  
 
In such instances the average value of the deprivation score across the population for the 
dimension would be higher than if individual data were used to define deprivations i.e. 
! !!! ≥  ! !! , as long as there is no perfect equality among all household members in this 
dimension. In other words, the number of individuals with the deprivation would be higher using 
household thresholds than individual-specific thresholds. Individuals within the household who 
are better off would be deemed deprived due to deprivation of the worst-off household members. 
In the Indian example below, men on average are better off than women in most well-being-
dimensions, and would more likely be misidentified as deprived in such dimensions.  
 
The deprivation threshold is said to be expansive when the achievement of only one (or a 
minority of individuals) has to be above the threshold for all individuals in the household to be 
non-deprived. For example, in the MPI, the entire household is deemed non-deprived in 
education if at least one household member has five years of education. This can be generally 
represented as !!!" =  !!  !"max !!! ≤  !!! !"# 0 !"ℎ!"#$%!. In such instances the average 
value of the deprivation score across the population for the dimension would be higher than if 
individual data were used instead to define deprivations i.e. ! !!! ≤ ! !! . The number of 




individual-specific thresholds. For example, women in India, who on average are worse off than 
men, are likely to be misidentified as non-deprived using such thresholds.3 
 
In theory, a household deprivation threshold can be constructed from individual data using a 
linear or some other combination of data on individual household members. For example, one 
could deem the entire household as deprived in education if the average number of years of 
education for all adult members of the household is below five years. In such instances 
individuals below the average achievement of the household might have lower deprivation score 
whereas individuals above the average of the household might have higher deprivation scores 
than when individual data is directly used. But in the standard household MPI measures none of 
the thresholds are defined in this way.  
 
The extent of the disparity in individual deprivation status within the household in each 
dimension would determine amount of under- or overstatement. For example, if the within 
household disparity in nutrition deprivation, which is defined in a restrictive way, is large and 
many households have only one undernourished person while others in the household are not 
undernourished then the extent of overstatement would be large. On the other hand, if within 
household disparity is small and in deprived households most members are undernourished then 
the extent of overstatement would be small. An analogous argument can be made in case of more 
expansive deprivation thresholds. The aggregate impact of various dimensions on difference 
between c and !! would depend also on the type of thresholds, weighting and to what extend 
each deprivation misidentifies individuals. In most popular multi-dimensional measures some 
indicators are defined restrictively while others are defined expansively, so some of the over- and 
understatement of deprivation rates would lead to opposing biases and thus partially cancel each 
other in the aggregate measure.  For example, in the MPI proposed by OPHI and UNDP, the 
educational achievement dimension is defined in an expansive way, while the educational 
enrolment, and the undernutrition dimensions are defined in a restrictive way.  
 
To create an aggregate measure of the incidence of multi-dimensional poverty based on these 
dimensional deprivation data, a recently proposed influential approach by Alkire and Foster 
(2011) is to select a cutoff value `k’ and any individual with a weighted deprivation score above 
`k’ is considered multidimensional poor i.e. !! !! , ! =  1 !" !! ≥ ! !"# !! !! , ! =  0 !" !! <
! where !! is the identification function. For aggregating poverty over the population one simple 
                                                
3 The household-based MPI uses third methods to assess household-level deprivation based on individual-level achievement.  In the mortality 





approach is to measure the percentage of population that is poor. The headcount can be formally 
defined as H(y) = q/n where q = !! !! , !!!!!  is the number of persons who are identified as 
poor. UNDP’s MPI has, for example, adopted this approach for identification and aggregation.   
 
The impact of differences between c and !! on the poverty headcount or any of the other poverty 
measures depends on the distribution of deprivation scores, especially with respect to k.  
 
Does the pattern of poverty incidence across groups change when taking intra-household 
differences into account? Suppose we divide the population into m mutually exclusive groups 
population proportion !! with l =1…m. The multidimensional headcount of poverty can be 
written as  
 
! ! =  !!!!!!!! (!); ! !! =  !!!!!!!! (!!) 
 
and the contribution of a group to poverty in the two cases can be shown to be  
 
!! ! = !!!! !!(!) ; !! !




For the contributions to poverty to be different the intra-household inequality has to be very 
different across the two groups, similar to the uni-dimensional case (Haddad and Kanbur 1990). 
If we divide the population by regions and find that intrahousehold inequality is substantially 
higher in rural areas as compared to urban regions and most of the dimension thresholds are 
defined in expansive way (leading to understatement of poverty in household measure), then the 
rural contribution to poverty might increase when using individual data. In such cases there is a 
possibility of change in poverty rankings across the two regions i.e. if !!(!!) > !! !!  then 
with substantially higher intra-household inequality we can get !!(!) > !! ! .  
 
What about inequality in deprivation scores? Is the distribution of the total deprivation score of 
individual deprivation scores c more or less unequal than compared to when deprivation scores 
are based on a household-level assessment !!? And how do the intra-household and inter-
household components of inequality change? In the uni-dimensional case Haddad and Kanbur 
(1990) show that inequality (using all Lorenz-consistent inequality measures) is understated 
when using household-level data. The individual level c can be seen as the result of a mean-





This is, however, not always true in the multidimensional case. In the MPI measures that do 
household-based analysis all individuals within the household are assigned the same status and 
hence intra-household inequality is assumed to be zero by definition and all inequality is inter-
household. So the intra-household inequality is underestimated. But when moving from a 
household-based assessment to an individual assessment, inter-household inequality is also 
affected.  The change in inter-household inequality depends on the distribution of deprived 
individuals across the households in the population. 
 
If the deprivation thresholds are restrictive and deprived individuals are concentrated in some 
households so that households either have all deprived individuals or no deprived individuals, 
then the inter-household inequality is the same when using household and individual data. In 
simple terms, if there is no misidentification of deprivation status of individuals when using 
household thresholds, then total inequality is the same in household and individual analysis. But 
if deprived individuals are spread more widely across households so that deprived and non-
deprived individuals live in the same household then inter-household inequality could be under- 
or over-stated by a household-level assessment (that deems everyone deprived as long as a single 
individual is deprived) depending on the exact dispersion of deprived individuals across 
households, with examples for under- and overestimation provided in the footnote.4  Similar 
considerations hold when the expansive definition is used so that again it is an empirical question 
whether total inequality is higher in an individually-based or a household-based assessment of 
multidimensional deprivation.  
 
What about the pattern of inequality across groups? How does between and within inequality 
among groups change with use of household vs. individual data? For illustration and in our 
empirical analysis we use an inequality measure based on a positive multiple of the variance 
proposed by Seth & Alkire (2014). This is an absolute inequality measure as opposed to a 
relative inequality measure more commonly used in assessing income inequality. An absolute 
inequality measure is invariant to any additive changes to deprivation scores, while a relative 
inequality measure is invariant to any proportional changes to deprivation scores. As discussed in 
                                                
4 Consider a small hypothetical population consisting of two households (A and B) each consisting of three members. We assess MPI poverty for 
this population based on achievements in five dimensions, which have restrictive thresholds and are equally weighted. In the first scenario (S1) 
each member of household A is deprived in one indicator and one member of household B is deprived in four indicators while other two members 
are deprived in one and three indicators, respectively. In the household assessment all members of household A will have deprivation score of 0.2 
and due to restrictive thresholds, all members of household B will have deprivation score of 0.8, resulting in a Gini coefficient of 0.3. In the 
individual assessment the six individuals will have deprivation scores of 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.6 and 0.8 and the Gini of the individual deprivation 
score will be higher at 0.32. Let consider another plausible scenario (S2) with two members of household A with no deprivations and the third 
with deprivation in one dimension, and each member of household B is deprived in four dimensions. In the household assessment of MPI the 
deprivation scores and Gini of deprivation score remains the same as scenario S1, due to restrictive thresholds. But in the individual assessment 
the Gini of deprivation scores decreases to 0.17. So the exact dispersion of deprivation scores across individuals and households determines 




Seth & Alkire (2014), a relative inequality measure for counting based poverty measurement 
approaches will provide contradictory conclusions depending on whether one measures 
attainment or deprivations, which is not the case in absolute measures. Also each deprivation has 
a direct or intrinsic importance justifying the normative assessment of inequality in absolute 
distances (see also Klasen, 2008). The measure can be expressed as 
 






This can decomposed into within-group and between-group components as below: 
 
! ! = 4! [!!(!)
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The first part of the equation is the total within-group component of total inequality. It can be 
viewed as a positive multiple of the sum of variance within each group. !! is the average 
deprivation score in the group l i.e. !! =  ! !!  and A is the average deprivation across the entire 
population. The second component is the total between group inequalities. The between group 
contribution is defined as 
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The within group component is just 1 - !! ! . If we are using household level thresholds and 
data, then   
! !! = 4! [!!
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As discussed earlier the difference in ! !  and ! !!  depends on the type of deprivation 




of difference in the between-inequality contribution by the two methods, and its impact on 
group-based inequalities, remains an empirical question. 
 
In sum, household-based assessments of multidimensional will provide a biased account of 
individual multidimensional poverty.  It will then also bias the assessment of poverty by groups 
as well as the measured total inequality in deprivations.  While for some definitions of 
household-based assessments and levels of intra-household inequality in deprivation, one can 
assess the sign of the bias, for others this is not possible a priori and will essentially become an 
empirical exercise to which we now turn.   
4.3. Data and Methodology 
 
We use data from the 2012 Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) to construct the 
multidimensional poverty measures. IHDS is a nationally representative, multi-topic panel 
survey of 42,152 households across India covering all Indian States. Most of the households 
interviewed were part of an earlier round of IHDS survey in 2005. IHDS covers a wide range of 
topics, which include health, education, employment, economic status, marriage, fertility, gender 
relations and social capital. The survey also asked a few sex-disaggregated time-use questions 
about common household chores like collecting water and cooking. Unlike most household 
surveys, IHDS recorded individual level asset ownership information for land and principal 
residence. This individual level information allows one, for example, to calculate gender asset 
gap within households (see Lahoti, Suchitra & Swaminathan, 2016) 
4.3.1. Dimensions and Indicators 
 
We construct a Household MPI measure (henceforth called Global Household MPI), which is 
based on the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index developed by the Oxford Poverty and 
Human Development Initiative (OPHI) and also used, in a slightly amended version, by UNDP 
(2014). An individual MPI measure is constructed using the same dimensions as the Global 
Household MPI, but by directly measuring individual achievements in some dimensions as 
opposed to household-level deprivation indicators. The individual MPI measure uses slightly 
different indicators than the household measure. In order to facilitate ease of comparisons we 
construct a second household MPI measure which uses exactly the same indicators as the 
individual MPI. This new household MPI measure is referred to just as the comparable 




three dimensions. A list of the various indicators, deprivation thresholds and weights used in 




The education dimension is commonly seen as a central capability Sen’s and Nussbaum’s 
versions of the capability approach (e.g. Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 1998). It also impacts other 
capabilities such as future employment opportunities, self-confidence and the ability to 
participate in public and political life.5 There is near-universal acceptance of the importance of 
education in measuring multidimensional poverty and it is used in all the major MPI measures.  
 
Table 4.1: Dimensions, Indicators and Weights for various MPI measures  
Dimension Indicator Deprived if .. Weight 
Global Household MPI 
Education 




One or more HH members between 7 to 15 years of age 
not enrolled in school 1/6 
Health 
Nutrition One or more adult HH member is underweight, or any 
child is undernourished  1/6 
Mortality Among 
Children 
One or more children born to interviewed women in the 
household died after birth 1/6 
Standard of 
Living 
Electricity No access to electricity at home 1/18 
Floor House Floor made of mud 1/18 
Sanitation No access to private toilet  1/18 
Water No access to Safe Water Source within 15 minutes one-
way distance from the residence 1/18 
Cooking Stove HH uses open fire or traditional chulha without 
chimney to cook 1/18 
Consumer 
Durables 
Owns less than 2 of list of assets (TV, Phone, cycle, 
refrigerator, motorized vehicle) 1/18 
Comparable Household MPI 
Education Years of Schooling No member of Household has completed 5 years of education 1/3 
Health Same as Global Household MPI 
Standard of 
Living 
Electricity No access to electricity at home 1/18 
Floor House Floor made of mud 1/18 
Sanitation No access to private toilet  1/18 
Access to Safe 
Water 
No access to Safe Water Source within 15 minutes one-
way distance from the residence 1/36 
Water Collection 
Time 
Time taken to collect water by all household members 
is one hour or more 1/36 
Cooking Stove HH uses open fire or traditional chulha without 
chimney to cook 1/18 
Consumer 
Durables 
Owns less than 2 of list of assets (TV, Phone, cycle, 
refrigerator, motorized vehicle) 1/18 
Individual MPI 
                                                
5 A recent example is a law passed in the Indian states of Rajasthan and Haryana prohibiting anyone without certain minimum years of education 




Education Years of Schooling  Not completed threshold years of education** 1/3 
Health 
Nutrition Individual is malnourished* 1/6 
Mortality Among 
Children 
One or more children born to interviewed women in the 
household died after birth 1/6 
Standard of 
Living 
Electricity No access to electricity at home 1/18 
Floor House floor made of mud 1/18 
Sanitation No access to private toilet  1/18 
Access to Safe 
Water 
No access to Safe Water Source within 15 minutes one-
way distance from the residence 1/36 
Water Collection 
Time 
Time taken to collect water by individual’s group in the 
Household is one hour or more 1/36 
Cooking Stove HH uses open fire or traditional chulha without 
chimney to cook 1/36 
Cooking Time person does most of the cooking with unsafe stove 1/36 
Consumer 
Durables 
Household  owns less than 2 of list of assets (TV, 
Phone, cycle, refrigerator, motorized vehicle) 1/18 
* Adult ages for 18 years or older is undernourished if BMI is less than 18.5. Individuals 6 to 17 years of 
age are malnourished if BMI-for-age is two or more standard deviations below the median of the reference 
population. Children between 0 to 5 years of age are deemed malnourished if their weight for height is two 
or more standard deviations below the median of the reference population.) 
 ** The threshold years of education for individuals 12 or more years of age is 5 years of education, for 
children between 7 to 11 years of age is the age-adjusted years of schooling so that they complete five 
years of education by age of 12. Children below 7 years of age are deprived if half or more household 
members 12 or more years of age have not completed 5 years of education.  
 
The indicators used to measure education in the global household MPI are proximate literacy and 
children’s enrollment in school. Basu and Foster (1998) argued that presence of a literate person 
provides positive externality for the entire household. In the global MPI a household with at least 
one member who has completed 5 years of education is considered non-deprived (UNDP’s MPI 
sets the threshold at 6 years but assumes the same externality). This is an expansive threshold 
and would lead to underestimation of deprivation rate for this indicator.  Despite this externality, 
education provides first and foremost a benefit to the person who possesses it so that an 
individual perspective seems warranted. In addition, Ramaya, Lahoti & Swaminathan (2014) 
argue that differences in literacy among household members might impact power dynamics. So 
in the individual MPI measure we measure education separately for each person in the 
household. We deem an individual above 12 years of age as deprived if she/he has not completed 
five years of education. For children below age 12, we use a different procedure that we outline 
presently.   
 
The Global MPI uses children’s enrollment6 as a second indicator for education. The right to 
education is a central right of the international Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Since the 
passage of the Right to Education (RTE) Act in 2009, education is also recognized as a 
                                                
6 In addition to enrollment IHDS also measures children’s achievement in reading, arithmetic and writing. In 2005-06 more than 42% of children 
enrolled in grade 5 could not read a simple story, indicating the poor quality of schooling (Desai et al., 2010). We do not include this in our MPI 
measures to maintain comparability with the Global MPI, but ideally this should be part of measuring poverty as enrollment (even though high) is 




fundamental right of every child in India. A child not enrolled in school indicates acute distress 
and curtailment of opportunities for that child.  
 
In the individual MPI measure we do not use this indicator (as there would be no equivalent 
indicator for adults and children outside of this age window). Instead, children between the ages 
of 7 to 12 are deemed deprived if they have not completed the expected age-adjusted years of 
schooling. The expected age-adjusted years of schooling is calculated so that children should be 
on track by age of 12 years7 to complete five years of education. Since children below 7 years of 
age have not started schooling, we have no information on them for the schooling indicator. In 
these cases, we use information on schooling status of other household members as proxy for 
their potential status. Specifically, children below seven years of age are deemed deprived in 
education in the individual measure if half or more of household members 12 or more years of 
age have not completed five years of education. We also test, in later sections, robustness of our 




Health is another central capability. The capability refers to being able to have good health, 
including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; and to have adequate shelter 
(Nussbaum, 2003). It also directly and indirectly impacts other capabilities – malnourishment 
reduces the ability of children to learn (UNICEF 1998), limits ability to participate in social life 
(e.g. disability) and might increase the need for material resources (Rippin, 2012).  
 
We use nutrition and child mortality as the two indicators for health dimension, the same as the 
ones used by the Global MPI8. Nutrition is an especially important indicator for India given the 
overall poor state of nutrition (both among children and adults) in the country (e.g. Klasen, 
2008). In the household measures, an individual is considered deprived in the nutrition indicator 
if any of the adult household members (18 years or more) for whom data is collected are 
underweight (have a BMI less than 18.5), or if any children are malnourished. Individuals 6 to 17 
years of age are undernourished if their BMI-for-age is two or more standard deviations below 
                                                
7 The age of joining school in India is 6 years. So children are expected to complete five year of education by 11 years of age. We provide a 
buffer of one year to account for later entry into schools. (Dotter and Klasen, 2014) 
8 We had also experimented with using major morbidity and disability as health indicators. One issue with using major morbidity and disability as 
indicators for health is that they are partially subjective. As Sen (2002) has argued, self-reported health status maybe seriously limited by the 
respondent’s social experience. A respondent brought up in a community with woeful medical and educational facilities might take certain 
symptoms as “normal” when they clinically might be symptoms of major morbidity. A second issue is that the elderly experience several of the 
diseases defined as major morbidity, even though we have limited the list to exclude life style diseases like heart disease. Life expectancy among 
the poor is less than among richer respondents and hence rich are more likely to live long to experience these diseases. We find that individuals in 
higher consumption quantiles are slightly more likely to be deprived in these two indicators than individuals in poorer consumption quantiles. 




the median of the reference population. Children between 0 to 5 years of age are deemed 
deprived if their weight for height is two or more standard deviations below the median of the 
reference population9. We use the reference population defined by WHO to calculate the 
nutritional status for children.  
 
For the individual MPI measure, we use individual data whenever available to define nutrition 
deprivation. If weight or height data is not collected for an individual then the status of the group 
to which the person belongs defines her or his status.10 Each age group 0-5, 6-17 and 18 and 
above are divided into two based on sex. If half or more individuals in the household from the 
group are nutritionally deprived (based on individual data) then the group is deemed as deprived. 
All individuals in the group for whom nutritional data was not collected get the status of the 
group.11 In cases where data is not collected for any individuals of a particular group then all the 
members of the group within the household get the status of the age group. The age group status 
is deprived if half or more individuals in the age group (male or female) are deprived based on 
individual data. In the previous example if nutritional data is not collected on any of the 5 adult 
male individuals then they are all deprived if half or more of the adult females for whom data is 
collected are deprived. Lastly, if data is not collected for an age-group then all individuals for 
that age group within the household are deprived if half or more individuals in the household for 
whom data was collected are deprived.  
 
All individuals in the household are considered deprived in child mortality, if the interviewed 
women in the household report one or more child deaths. There is no difference between the 
household MPI and individual MPI deprivation status for this indicator. Unfortunately, we do not 
have other reliable individual level health indicators to replace the child mortality indicator.   
 
Standard of Living 
                                                
9 IHDS data on birth history providing the exact age in months has not been released yet, only age in years is available. Using age in years would 
yield inaccurate measure of weight-for-age but this should not have large impact weight-for-height measure. The levels of the two would 
certainly be different (wasting vs. underweight) and the extent of gender bias might differ, but the bias is likely to be in the same direction. Given 
the limitation of data, for now, this seems like best measure for 0-5 age group.  
10 These imputation procedures have little impact on deprivation scores in these dimensions, including gender gaps.  Specifically, BMI 
information is collected directly for 60 percent of all adults. Among those with direct observations on BMI 22 percent of males females are 
deprived in nutrition. In the overall adult sample, after using our assumptions to impute information on adults for whom BMI was not collected, 
still 22 percent of males and females are deprived in nutrition. The differences in gender bias in nutrition deprivation for children under six for 
whom we have direct measurement of weight and height (for 69 percent of all children below age of 6) and the entire population below six years 
of age (after imputing nutrition status based on their group’s status for children) is very small (1% vs. 0.10%). Our assumptions for imputing 
status of children between 6 and seventeen years of age with no information on nutrition reduces the gender bias (that is in favor of girls) as 
compared to those with direct nutrition information. We have individual nutrition information on 78 percent of all children in 6-17 age group, and 
23 percent of boys and 16 percent of girls are deemed deprived in nutrition. For all children 6 to 17 years of age the corresponding numbers are 
24 percent and 20 percent.   
11 For example, if a household has five adult males, and individual nutritional data is collected for three adult men, then the HH adult male group 
is deprived if two or more of the individuals for whom data is collected are deprived. The two individuals for whom data was not collected get the 





The standard of living dimension partly captures ‘control over one’s environment’ central 
capability. It represents some of the material means necessary to achieve many of the basic 
capabilities. We use the same indicators for our Global household MPI as used by Alkire & 
Foster (2011). As discussed above, several of the goods are public in nature within the 
household. This makes it difficult to determine individual ownership or differential access to 
these goods. Hence for the individual measure we assume living standards as public goods 
accessible equally by everyone within the household, similar to the assumption made by Ramya, 
Lahoti & Swaminathan (2014). At the same time, IHDS collects sex disaggregated time use data 
on some of these indicators and we include those separately in our individual MPI measure. For 
example, if adult women or men as a group spend more than an hour collecting water daily then 
that group is deemed additionally deprived. To maintain the same overall weight on the standard 
of living dimension with the addition of indicators, we lower the weight on the household 
indicator for the same living standard to accommodate the time-use individual indicator. The 
comparable household MPI also includes the household time use indicator for water collection. 
A household is deprived in the indicator if the collective time spent by all household members is 
greater than one hour. 12  
 
Other possible dimensions that could be included are empowerment, physical safety and 
subjective wellbeing among others. In many of these dimensions there is documented gender 
disparity in favor of men, particularly in countries such as India (Ramya, Lahoti & Swaminathan, 
2014; Bessell, 2015) We do not include these so as to maintain comparability with the OPHI 
Global MPI and also most surveys lack data for measuring these dimensions. Excluding these 
will result in understating the gender disparity in poverty.  
4.3.2. Weighting 
We follow the Global MPI in adopting an equal weighting approach across dimensions. Various 
studies have looked into the impact of alternative weighting schemes on multidimensional 
poverty measures (Alkire & Santos, 2014, Decancq, Van Ootegem & Verhofstadt, 2013). But 
since our main goal is to investigate the gender and generational disparity in poverty we adopt 
the most common and simplest weighting scheme. Each of the three dimensions is assigned an 
equal weight of one-third and all indicators within the dimensions are weighted equally, except 
for cases where time-use indicators are used for a standard of living measure. Each standard of 
                                                
12 We also initially included asset ownership indicators (land and residence) in the MPI measures as done by Ramya, Lahoti & Swaminathan 
(2014). But these indicators do not necessarily reflect deprivation but are more correlated with location. Urban households are less likely to own 





living indicator gets a weight of 1/18, but if a time-use indicator is used then the each of the 
indicators for that aspect of standard of living gets a weight of 1/36. For example, the safe water 
indicator gets a weight of 1/18 in the Global Household MPI, but since time use for water 
collection is also used as an indicator in individual and comparative household MPI the weight is 
halved – the safe water indicator gets a weight of 1/36 and the time-use indicator gets a weight of 
1/36. In robustness analysis we vary the weighting structure across the three dimensions to test 
our results to different weights. 
 
Households without eligible population  
 
Dotter and Klasen (2014) discuss the various approaches to deal with so-called ineligible 
populations in the MPI. Several of the indicators used in MPI measure refer to the achievement 
status of a particular group within the household. For example, the child mortality indicator 
refers to death of a child in a household of a woman of reproductive age. But as pointed in Dotter 
and Klasen (2014), if a household never had children then the household cannot suffer from this 
deprivation. In cases with no eligible population for a particular indicator in a household, the 
Global MPI assumes that the household is non-deprived in that indicator. This reduces the 
possibility of a household with missing eligible population from being deemed 
multidimensionally poor. A household which has never had children would be non-deprived by 
definition in children’s enrollment indicator and child mortality indicator, making it less likely to 
be judged as poor even if it is deprived in some other indicators. Based on possible solutions to 
this suggested by Dotter and Klasen (2014) we substitute the missing indicator with an indicator 
from the same dimension, i.e. substitute the nutrition indicator for the child mortality indicator 
for a household that never had any children. This would double the weight on the nutrition 
indicator for those households.13  
4.3.3. Limitations 
With our approach we succeed in at least partly individualizing our multidimensional poverty 
measure.  But we also note that, due to difficult conceptual issues as well as data limitations, we 
face some challenges.  The most serious conceptual challenge is the adequate treatment of 
children in the health and education dimensions where we need to rely on comparisons with 
other groups; we thoroughly investigate the impact of these choices on our individual 
                                                
13 This is not without problems. It assumes that nutrition indicator is substitute for child mortality indicator and also we can no longer decompose 
the MPI measure by indicators. But given the lack of data on any other equivalent indicator for the missing information this is a reasonable 
compromise. We can still decompose MPI by dimensions. In cases where there is no information on any of the indicators within a dimension we 
chose to drop the household from the sample. We find only a small number of instances of this in our data; hence it does not impact the 




multidimensional MPI.  The most serious data limitation relates to the health dimension where 
we need to rely on a household-level mortality indicator and do not have a reliably individual 
health indicator beyond nutrition.  Finally, by mostly relying on the household-level information 
in the standard of living dimension, we may underestimate inequality in access and use of 
household-specific public goods, including particularly also durable goods and assets. 
4.4. Poverty and Inequality Measures 
 
For both household MPI’s, each individual within the household is assigned the deprivation 
status of the household. The multi-dimensional poverty index !! developed by Alkire & Foster 
(2011) is the sum of the weighted deprivations suffered by the poor divided by the maximum 






MPI though simple, has a problem in identification of the poor. Both the usual identification 
methods – union and intersection – are not usable in this approach. According to the union 
approach, an individual is deemed poor if she/he is deprived in at least one indicator. This leads 
to unreasonably high poverty headcounts – on order of more than 85%. As discussed in Dotter & 
Klasen (2014) the headcount ratios are not only difficult ‘political’ sell but also the approach is 
very sensitive to measurement error or cases where indicators do not cover the deprivations well. 
On the other hand, the intersection method deems an individual poor only if she/he is deprived in 
all indicators. This leads to unreasonably low poverty rates.  
 
Alkire & Foster (2011) suggested a compromise between the two methods – the dual-cutoff 
approach. A person is considered poor only if the sum of weighted deprivations for the person 
exceeds an additional cutoff k. In case of OPHI Global MPI the value of k is 0.33. So any person 
whose weighted deprivation count is greater than one third is considered poor. But the choice of 
k is completely arbitrary and the poverty levels and comparisons across regions change for 
different values of k. Also the use of dual-cutoff leads to assumptions about correlation between 
poverty indicators that are difficult to justify. Poverty indicators are perfect substitutes below the 






The MPI measure can be decomposed into the product of (censored) headcount (H) or poverty 
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where q is the number of poor i.e. number of individuals for whom the sum of weighted 
deprivations is above the cutoff k.  
 
As Rippin (2012) notes this decomposition has two issues: first the censored poverty intensity is 
dependent on the arbitrary cutoff k; and second, the MPI measure is not sensitive to changes in 
inequality among the poor. Amartya Sen (1976) defined as one of the properties of good poverty 
measures to be decomposable into three components: poverty incidence, intensity and inequality. 
The MPI measure does not satisfy this property. A regressive transfer between two poor 
individuals that makes the poorer of the two individuals more deprived and the other less 
deprived but still poor will not cause the MPI measure to change. An inequality sensitive poverty 
measure should increase upon such a regressive transfer. There are a few counting-based 
measures which define poverty measures so that they are sensitive to inequality (Bossert, 
Chakravarty & D Ambrosio, 2009, Jayaraj & Subramanian, 2009, Rippin 2012). A critique of 
these measures has been that they appear to lose the property of factor decomposability and are 
difficult to interpret (Seth & Alkire, 2014). 
 
Rippin (2012) proposes a measure that in the identification step assigns different degrees of 
poverty to a household while using the union method to identify the poor. The degree of poverty 
is calculated by taking the square of the weighted share of deprivations suffered by the 
household.  
 





Similar to FGT2 measure in uni-dimensional case, this takes into account inequality in the 
distribution of deprivations. Any regressive transfer among the poor would now result in an 
increase in the poverty measure since the additional deprivation to a highly deprived household 
counts as more than to a less deprived household. The Correlation-Sensitive Poverty Index can 
be decomposed into the three I’s (Jenkins & Lambert, 1997): incidence, intensity and inequality 
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We use a variety of measures in our empirical application. To identify the poor we use two 
different methods –union and dual-cutoff approach. In the union approach an individual is 
deemed poor if she or he is deprived in any one indicator. In the dual-cutoff approach we use a 
cutoff of 33 percent as per the methodology of the Global MPI. We test the robustness of our 
results to changing values of cutoff. The union and dual-cutoff leads to vastly different poverty 
headcount ratios using the two approaches. An individual whose weighted deprivation count is 
0.25 would be deemed poor using the union approach but not considered poor using the dual-
cutoff approach. For our headline measure we use the incidence obtained using the dual-cutoff 
approach. We calculate MPI using the dual cutoff approach and CSPI measure that uses the 
union approach. MPI and CSPI are decomposed into their various components to investigate 
incidence, intensity and inequality among the poor. We also use the variance based inequality 




We first analyze the deprivation levels by sex and age group (Table 1) in the various indicators 
before delving into the poverty and inequality measures. As the schooling indicator used in 
household MPI is defined in an expansive way, we should find that the individual deprivation 
level should be higher than the deprivation level when using household data. Indeed, we find that 
26 percent more individuals are deprived when using the individual data. As hypothesized, adult 
women, who are the worst-off group, are more likely to be misclassified as non-deprived when 
household data is used. Access to schooling for women was very poor in India up until very 
recently, which is reflected in the higher gender differential and also overall higher level of 
deprivation in the adult age group, and particularly high deprivation among the oldest age group 
(50+). There is no gender differential in schooling achievement among children in the age group 
7 to 18 age group. This is likely because of concerted push in the last decade by the government 
to increase school enrollment and the passage of right to education act, which makes education 
compulsory for this age group. The higher level of deprivation among the below 7 age group 
children is because their deprivation status is determined by older members of the household, 




method does not impute a gender gap into the data. We conduct robustness analysis to test the 
sensitiveness of our results to changing deprivation level for this age group. As expected, the 
gender and the age differentials are substantially reduced when using the household measure.  
 
The household nutrition indicator is defined in a restrictive way, with all household members 
considered deprived if any adult or child is undernourished. As predicted, this results in the 
household measure indicating substantially higher overall deprivation levels (25 percentage 
points) than the individual nutrition indicator. There is no significant gender differential in the 
nutrition indicator among adults. Among the age group 6 to 17 years boys are slightly more 
deprived than girls. Across all age groups, between 20 to 25 percent of the individuals are 
undernourished. The level for children below six years of age is lower because we are using the 
weight-for-height indicator (wasting) instead of the more common weight-for-age measure 
(underweight)14. According to NFHS-3 conducted in 2005-06 about 20 percent of children below 
five were undernourished as per the weight-for-height measure, but just over 40 percent were 
undernourished if we use the weight-for-age measure (Table 10.1, Page 270, IIPS 2007)15. But 
there is no substantial gender differential reported for both the measures and hence, even though 
our levels are lower, the conclusion on gender differentials won’t be impacted due to the use of 
weight-for-height measure16.  
 
Several household standard of living indicators have witnessed declines in deprivation rates as 
compared to data reported in National Family Health Survey in 2006 (see Table 1, Alkire and 
Seth (2015) for more details). Electricity deprivation has reduced from 33 percent to 17 percent, 
safe water deprivation from 16 to 10 percent, and sanitation deprivation from 70 to 63 percent 
among the directly comparable indicators. The time use indicators indicate the extra burden on 
women of not having access to basic amenities. 39 percent of adult women below 50 years of age 
are directly impacted due to smoke from unclean cooking stoves, while none of the men of this 
age group suffer directly as a result of unsafe cooking stoves in the household (Ezzati & 
Kammen, 2002). Women are also more likely to spend time collecting water from outside the 
household. Better data on time use and access to household public standard of living resources 
among household members is needed to differentiate their impact on individuals in the 
household. The household-level time use indicator on water collection gives an incorrect picture 
of no gender differential in time spent which can be discerned from the individual time use 
                                                
14 This is due to lack of data on the exact age (in days) of children from IHDS-2.  These data will likely be released later and then this can be 
updated.   
15 These estimates broadly match the estimates from IHDS-1 (Gaiha, R et al., 2010) 
16 20.5% of boys and 19.1% of girls below five years of age have weight-for-height below 2 standard deviations of the median of the reference 




indicator. Even though we do not account for it, lack of access to private toilets is also likely to 
impact women more severely than men. Diane Coffey et al. (2015) find in a survey of Indian 
villages in some northern and central states that women are more likely to use toilets if they have 
access to one than men, indicating the greater need among women for better sanitation facilities.  
 


















Education                   
Household 
Schooling  0.15 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.1 
Individual 
Schooling  0.48 0.5 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.42 0.49 0.77 0.36 
Children 
Enrollment  0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Health                   
HH Nutrition  0.53 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.42 0.47 
Individual 
Nutrition 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 
Child Mortality  0.21 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.19 0.21 
Standard of 
Living                   
Access to 
Electricity 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.17 
Type of House 
Floor 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.4 
Access to 
Sanitation 0.7 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.6 0.63 
Access to Safe 
Water 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
HH Water 
Collection Time 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.15 
Individual Water 
Collection Time 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.04 
Access to Clean 
Cooking Stove 0.66 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.59 
Time with 
unclean Cooking 
Stove 0 0 0 0.05 0 0.39 0.01 0.21 0.12 
Consumer 
Durables 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.22 
 
Table 4.3 presents the multi-dimensional poverty measures for the three different MPI 
definitions. The Global Household MPI measure is directly comparable to the Global MPI 
constructed by OPHI. Comparing our estimates to OPHI estimates based on 2005-06 NFHS 
survey points to substantial reductions in all poverty multi-dimensional measures. The headcount 




comparable household MPI17 measure uses only the schooling indicator for education and adds a 
household water collection time use indicator to make it more comparable with the individual 
MPI measure. There is no change in the MPI between Global and Comparable measures, only 
minor changes in the headcount and the poverty intensity. Headcount and MPI are slightly higher 
for females across age group in these two household-based measures. But using individual data 
the MPI is substantially higher among adult women than men; as intimated in Table 4.2, this is 
mostly related to higher education deprivation among adult women. The higher MPI is mostly 
driven by differences in headcount ratios as poverty intensity varies only slightly across gender 
and age groupings (see also Dotter and Klasen, 2014). There is no gender differential among 
children in the MPI which is a promising development and driven by lack of education 
differentials between boys and girls. The overall levels of poverty are higher when using 
individual as compared to household data. This suggests that the expansive definition used for 
education is more important for the overall MPI than the restrictive definition used for nutrition.  
This is not really surprising given the strong age-dependence of educational deprivation. Even 
households where many people are uneducated will often have one young person with at least 5 
years of education, making the entire household non-deprived in the household-based MPI.  This 
clearly shows the problems associated with such an expansive definition. 
 
Table 4.3: Comparison of various multi-dimensional poverty indicators constructed using 













19-50 Male 50+ 
Female 
50+ Total 
Global Household MPI 
Headcount 0.47 0.49 0.44 0.46 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.4 
Intensity 0.48 0.5 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.48 
MPI 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.2 0.21 0.19 
Comparable Household MPI 
       Headcount 0.46 0.48 0.42 0.43 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.4 0.38 
Intensity 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.49 
MPI 0.24 0.25 0.2 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.2 0.21 0.19 
Individual MPI 
Headcount 0.54 0.56 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.48 0.54 0.78 0.44 
Intensity 0.55 0.56 0.5 0.5 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.53 
MPI 0.3 0.31 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.27 0.3 0.42 0.24 
Note: Headcount is measured as the proportion of population that is deemed poor.  
 
The MPI is sensitive to the arbitrary poverty cutoff `k’, and is not sensitive to inequality among 
the poor. To address this, we present results for CSPI (Table 4.4) that takes inequality into 
account and uses the union method for identification of the poor. The headcount for the union 
                                                




method is above 85 percent, as anyone deprived in one indicator is considered poor. There is 
very little variation in headcount across gender-age groupings but the poverty intensity is higher 
among adult women. Overall inequality in deprivation scores among the poor is higher in the 
individual than in household MPI, but inequality among poor adult women is less than among 
poor adult men. Overall the CSPI among adult women is substantially higher than adult men, 
reflecting the pattern found in MPI analysis.  
 
We calculate absolute inequality measures in deprivation scores across the entire population and 
among the poor using the measures proposed by Seth and Alkire (2014) and described in section 
2 (Table 4.5). Total inequality is decomposed into within and between components for various 
socio-economic groups. For India we find that inequality in deprivation scores is higher by about 
30% when using individual rather than household data. Also of the total inequality 30 percent of 
inequality in individual MPI is due to intra-household disparity. This component of inequality, 
which is the focus of this paper, is totally absent from household MPI by definition.  
 
Table 4.4: Comparison of various multi-dimensional poverty indicators and measures 













19-50 Male 50+ 
Female 
50+ Total 
Global Household MPI 
        Headcount 0.91 0.91 0.9 0.9 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.87 
Intensity 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.27 
Inequality 0.3 0.3 0.31 0.31 0.48 0.45 0.56 0.53 0.42 
CSPI 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.1 0.1 0.13 0.14 0.12 
Comparable Household MPI 
       Headcount 0.91 0.91 0.9 0.9 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.87 
Intensity 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.27 
Inequality 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.5 0.48 0.58 0.54 0.44 
CSPI 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.1 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.12 
Individual MPI 
Headcount 0.9 0.9 0.88 0.88 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.9 0.86 
Intensity 0.35 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.33 0.44 0.3 
Inequality 0.35 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.66 0.5 0.49 0.24 0.49 
CSPI 0.18 0.19 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.15 
Note: Headcount is measured as the proportion of population that is deemed poor.  
 
When considering within/between decompositions between age, age-gender, states, caste, and 
place of residence groups, within group inequality is always much higher than between group 
inequality.  In the individual MPI, the relative contribution of between age-gender groups is 
higher than in the household MPI (7 vs. 2 percent) while the reverse is the case for states, caste-





Inequality among the poor is actually higher in the household than the individual MPI,18 
contradicting our finding from CSPI analysis. The contradiction in results of the two inequality 
measures is likely because the positive-multiple of variance measure is an absolute measure, 
whereas the inequality component in CSPI is a relative measure. Inequality among the poor is 
also dependent on the value of `k’ and might change for different values.  
 
We also calculate Ginis for achievement scores (defined as 1 - deprivation score) for both the 
individual and the household-based MPI. The household MPI Gini is lower than the one 
estimated using individual data (0.16 vs. 0.2). The Gini among women is higher than among men 
for the individual MPI (0.21 vs. 0.18).19  
 








Inequality   Gender 
Age-





Inequality across the entire population          
Household 
MPI 0.171 
Within 100 98 0 82 91 80 
Between 0 2 100 18 9 20 
Individual 
MPI 0.228 
Within 99 93 30 87 91 84 
Between 1 7 70 13 9 16 
Inequality among poor               
Household 
MPI 0.096 
Within 100 98 0 95 98 98 
Between 0 2 100 5 2 2 
Individual 
MPI 0.091 
Within 100 98 35 91 97 92 
Between 0 2 65 9 3 8 
 
We also investigate gender differentials in poverty measures across various socio-economic 
groups (Table 4.6). In all groups females are more likely to be poor and have a higher individual 
MPI than men. The extent of the differentials between them varies by groups but is always larger 
for the individual measure than the comparable household MPI. The difference in the adjusted 
headcount ratio is 0.04 points in metropolitan areas, but doubles to 0.08 points in least developed 
villages. Adivasis (tribals) and dalits (lower caste) are among the poorest groups and Christians, 
Jains and others are the least poor group. Individuals belonging to four member households are 




                                                
18 This is not comparing the same group of individuals as those who are identified as poor by the two measures are not completely the same, even 
though there is a large overlap.  See discussion below on overlap. 




Table 4.6: MPI measure for household and individual indicators by sex and various 
household and individual characteristics 
 
Comparable HH MPI Individual HH MPI  
 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Area 
       Metro urban  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.07 
 Other urban  0.07 0.08 0.08 0.1 0.15 0.13 
 More developed villages 0.19 0.2 0.19 0.21 0.28 0.25 
 Less developed villages  0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.32 
Caste & Religion Groups 
       Brahmin  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.12 
 Forward caste  0.09 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.16 0.13 
 OBC  0.18 0.2 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.24 
 Dalit  0.24 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.3 
 Adivasi  0.29 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.38 0.34 
 Muslim  0.19 0.2 0.2 0.24 0.28 0.26 
 Christian, Sikh, Jain  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 
Regions 
       North 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.14 
 Central 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.32 
 East 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.3 
 North-East 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.16 
 West 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.2 0.17 
 South 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.16 
Consumption Quintiles 
       First 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.38 
 Second 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.29 
 Third 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.27 0.23 
 Fourth 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.17 
 Fifth 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.1 
Household Size 
       Single member HH 0.36 0.52 0.48 0.36 0.52 0.48 
 Two member HH 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.3 0.4 0.35 
 Three member HH 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.28 0.23 
 Four member HH 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.2 
 Five member HH 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.26 0.22 
 Six member HH 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.21 0.28 0.25 
 Seven member HH 0.2 0.21 0.2 0.22 0.29 0.25 
 Eight or more member HH 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.21 0.27 0.24 
Household Head 
       Female-Headed HH 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.3 0.26 





Table 4.7: MPI measure for major states in India by gender 
 
Comparable Household MPI  Individual MPI  
 
Male Female Total Rank Male Female Total Rank 
Kerala  0.01 0.02 0.02 1 0.04 0.07 0.05 1 
Delhi  0.03 0.04 0.04 2 0.06 0.12 0.09 2 
Himachal Pradesh  0.1 0.11 0.1 5 0.1 0.16 0.13 3 
Punjab  0.08 0.07 0.07 3 0.11 0.15 0.13 3 
Tamil Nadu  0.07 0.08 0.07 3 0.1 0.16 0.13 3 
Maharashtra  0.1 0.11 0.11 9 0.12 0.18 0.15 6 
Jammu & Kashmir  0.1 0.1 0.1 5 0.13 0.2 0.16 7 
Haryana  0.11 0.12 0.12 11 0.13 0.21 0.17 8 
Uttarakhand  0.15 0.17 0.16 13 0.14 0.23 0.19 9 
Assam  0.1 0.11 0.1 5 0.16 0.21 0.19 9 
Karnataka  0.1 0.1 0.1 5 0.16 0.22 0.19 9 
Andhra Pradesh  0.11 0.12 0.11 9 0.16 0.24 0.2 12 
Gujarat  0.15 0.16 0.15 12 0.17 0.25 0.21 13 
West Bengal  0.19 0.2 0.2 14 0.24 0.28 0.26 14 
Orissa  0.22 0.24 0.23 15 0.23 0.31 0.27 15 
Jharkhand  0.25 0.26 0.25 17 0.25 0.33 0.29 16 
Chhattisgarh  0.28 0.28 0.28 18 0.25 0.33 0.29 16 
Rajasthan  0.24 0.24 0.24 16 0.25 0.36 0.3 18 
Madhya Pradesh  0.29 0.29 0.29 19 0.27 0.35 0.31 19 
Uttar Pradesh  0.3 0.3 0.3 20 0.29 0.36 0.33 20 
Bihar  0.33 0.36 0.35 21 0.32 0.42 0.37 21 
 
individuals who are widowed or divorced (91%) and are predominantly women (81%). 
Individuals in female-headed households are more likely to be poor as compared to from male-
headed households. The overall rankings of groups do not change much between the household 
and individual MPI, as the intra-household differences would have to be significantly different 
for individual measures to change rankings. 
 
Southern, Northern, and North-Eastern states have the lowest household and individual MPI and 
Central and Eastern states the highest in both. While the individual MPI shows higher levels in 
all regions, the differential between the regions is smaller in the individual measure than in the 
household measure which is likely related to high levels of deprivation among older population 
groups even in states with a low MPI; this shows up in the individual MPI but is masked in the 
household one.  Table 4.7 lists MPI by gender for states for both household and individual 
measures. The ranking of states are very similar across the two measures with a spearman rank 
correlation of greater than 0.97. Kerala with an adjusted headcount ratio 0.05 is the best 
performer and at comparable levels to several middle-income Latin American countries, while 




Nigeria, Tanzania and Sudan.20  The state rankings broadly match the rankings obtained by 
Alkire and Seth (2015) for India for the year 2005-06.  
 
Another way to assess the bias of a household-based measure is to investigate the classifications 
of individuals into poor and non-poor categories using the household and individual MPI to 
ascertain the degree of overlap between the two (Table 4.8). 22 percent of men and 27 percent of 
women are misclassified by the household measure. Men are equally likely to be misclassified as 
poor or non-poor, while women are more likely to be misclassified as non-poor when using 
household data. This confirms our hypothesis that the worse off group is more likely to be 
misclassified as non-poor in the household measure when expansive thresholds are used. Since 
most disparities are in the expansive education dimension (while there are few gender disparities 
in the restrictive nutrition category), the education dimension drives the misclassification among 
women.   
 
In Table 4.9 we decompose MPI to obtain the contribution of each dimension21. The health 
dimension is the biggest contributor to household MPI, while education is the biggest contributor 
to the individual MPI. This is partly because in the household MPI health is defined in the 
restrictive fashion leading to higher deprivation rates than with the individual MPI, while the 
education indicator thresholds are defined in an expansive fashion leading to underestimate of 
deprivation rates in household as compared to individual MPI. Thus the household-level MPI 
overemphasizes the health dimension and underplays the education one, explaining the large 
differences in the decomposition.22 
 
These findings are similar to what Haddad and Kanbur (1990) find when estimating uni-
dimensional poverty rates based on nutritional status for the population of Philippines. They find 
that women are more likely to be poor when using individual nutrition data than when using 
household as the unit of analysis. They also find that intra-household inequality in nutrition is 
between 30 to 40 percent of total inequality.   
 
 
                                                
20 Based on household MPI calculated for 101 countries in 2015 by Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative. Available at 
http://www.dataforall.org/dashboard/ophi/index.php/mpi/country_briefings  
21 We reweight the indicators within the dimension when data is missing for some indicator due to lack of eligible population in the household. 
This has the side-effect that we cannot decompose MPI by indicators, but still can do it by dimensions.  
22 In rural areas standard of living and health are almost equal contributors to the household MPI and it plays a bigger role than health in 
individual MPI. In urban areas standard of living indicators play a smaller role in MPI. This is partly because access to basic services like 
electricity, sanitation, water and cooking fuel are more readily available in urban areas. But some other aspects of standard of living as density of 
housing are not captured in the indicators and likely to be worse in urban areas than rural areas. Using 2005-06 NFHS data Alkire and Seth 
(2015) find standard of living to be highest contributor of household MPI. This seems to have changed with better provision of several public 




Table 4.8: Classification of individuals by household and individual MPI  
 
Individual MPI 
 Comparable HH MPI Non-Poor Poor Total 
Male 
   Non-Poor 0.51 0.11 0.62 
Poor 0.11 0.27 0.38 
Female 
   Non-Poor 0.42 0.19 0.61 
Poor 0.08 0.31 0.39 
Total 
   Non-Poor 0.47 0.15 0.62 
Poor 0.09 0.29 0.38 
4.5.1. Intrahousehold measures  
 
The measures investigated so far are all sample level measures. We have also used some intra-
household measures to better understand the differences in deprivation levels between men and 
women in the same household. Based on Gender Parity Index (GPI) defined by Alkire et. al 
(2013), we have developed measures to determine level of disparity in deprivation scores among 
different groups of men and women in the household. Alkire et. al (2013) define GPI as a 
relative inequality measure that measures inequality in empowerment between the primary adult 
male and female in each household. We extend this further to look at inequality in deprivation 
scores between the primary couple as well as other groups of males and females (all adults, all 
children) in the household.  
 
Table 4.9: Contribution of each dimension to MPI measure (%) (Dual cutoff method with 
k=0.33)  
  Rural Urban All 
  Male  Female  Total Male  Female  Total Male  Female  Total 
Household MPI                   
Education 17 16 17 20 29 17 17 21 17 
Health 42 44 42 60 43 50 44 42 44 
Standard of Living 42 40 42 20 29 33 39 37 39 
Individual MPI                   
Education 46 50 47 67 64 64 50 52 52 
Health 25 21 23 22 21 18 25 22 22 
Standard of Living 29 29 30 11 14 18 25 26 26 
 
For GPI, we construct a new censored deprivation score where all individuals whose deprivation 
score is below the poverty threshold of k, get a deprivation score equal to k. So new censored 
deprivation score !!! =  !!  !" !! ≥ ! !"# !!! =  ! !" !! < !. Each household is classified based 




the measure in the household is above the poverty cutoff (k) and the women’s average 
deprivation score is higher than their male counterpart then the household is deemed to lack 
gender parity. A household has parity if either the average women is non-poor (deprivation score 
below poverty cutoff) or women’s deprivation score is lower than men’s.  
Following Alkire et. al (2013), GPI can be broken up into headcount component and an intensity 
component. The headcount gives us the proportion of households that do not have gender parity 
and the intensity component gives the average deprivation gap between women and men’s group 
in the households that lack gender parity.  
 











where h is the proportion of households that lack gender parity and !!!(!)! and !!!(!)! are the 
censored deprivation scores for the group of women and men living in household j.  
 
GPI is then defined as  
 
!"# = 1− (!!"# ∗  !!"#) 
 
GPI can be improved either by reducing the proportion of households that lack gender parity or 
by decreasing the average difference in deprivation scores in households that lack gender parity.  
 
Table 4.10: Intra-household inequality measures 
 

























Primary Couple in 
the household 54 11 0.075 45 0.23 0.90 
All adult members 
of household 63 15 0.08 44 0.23 0.90 
All children in the 
household 19 18 -0.004 14 0.24 0.97 
All household 
members 61 21 0.06 38 0.21 0.92 
 
In addition to calculating the gender parity index (GPI) that considers only a subset of 
households that lack parity, we also investigate differences in deprivation scores within the 




measures for four groups of men and women: differences between the primary couple of the 
household, between all adult men and adult women in the household, between girls and boys in 
the household and between all males and females in the household. 61 percent of households 
have average female deprivation score that is higher than average male deprivation score, 
underlying the low status of women in the households. When we look at only children in the 
household there does not appear to be a difference in deprivation scores between girls and boys. 
The Gender Parity Index is highest among children, and lowest when only adults or the primary 
couple is included in calculating the index. These findings are similar to sample level analysis 
that pointed to increase in differences in poverty rates by gender as age increases. Table 4.11 
reports the intra-household measures for various socio-demographic groups and these results 
mirror those of sample level analysis.  
 
Table 4.11: Intra-household inequality measures for various socio-economic groupings 
 




























      Rural 69 23 0.07 48 0.22 0.89 
Urban 44 18 0.04 18 0.15 0.97 
Region       North 59 18 0.06 27 0.17 0.95 
Central 68 22 0.07 51 0.24 0.88 
East  67 23 0.06 48 0.21 0.90 
North-East 49 21 0.04 25 0.18 0.96 
West 55 18 0.06 30 0.2 0.94 
South 54 21 0.05 28 0.17 0.95 
Caste-Religion 
Groups      
 SC Households 67 23 0.06 46 0.22 0.90 
ST Households 69 22 0.07 57 0.22 0.87 
Muslim 60 28 0.04 36 0.18 0.94 
OBC 63 21 0.07 40 0.21 0.92 
Others 50 16 0.05 22 0.2 0.96 
Consumption 
Quintiles      
 First 69 28 0.05 57 0.21 0.88 
Second 70 24 0.06 48 0.21 0.90 
Third 66 24 0.06 41 0.22 0.91 
Fourth 60 19 0.06 32 0.21 0.93 
Fifth 45 13 0.05 22 0.18 0.96 
 





To delve into the multivariate correlates of the individual versus the household MPI we run a 
regression of deprivation scores on a range of individual and household characteristics with 
various fixed effects (Table 4.12 and 4.13). The regression model can be expressed as:  
 
!! =  ! +  !! !"#$%" +  !!!"# +  !!!"!! +  !!!"!! +  !" +  ! 
 
where X is a set of individual, household controls and fixed effects (state, PSU or HH).  
 
In all our specifications we find that females have a significantly higher deprivation score than 
males even after controlling for various other parameters. Even with household fixed effects, 
which eliminates all inter-household variation in estimation and controlling for other individual 
characteristics like age, occupation, marital status and relationship to head we find females to be  
 
Table 4.12: Determinants of Household MPI deprivation score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS State FE State FE with Interactions PSU FE 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Female 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.119*** 0.007*** 
 0.001 0.002 0.016 0.001 
Male Headed HH 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.003 
Age -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age # Age .007*10-2*** 0.007*10-2*** 0.007*10-2*** 0.006*10-2*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age # Age # Age -0.002*10-4*** -0.002*10-4*** -0.002*10-4*** -0.002*10-4*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Marital Status (base:Married)     
Married, spouse absent 0.013*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.009*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Unmarried 2 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006*** 
 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.002 
Widowed 3 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004* 
 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 
Separated/Divorced 4 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 
 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 
Married no gauna 5 0.064*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.010 
 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 
Relationship to Head (base: Self)     
Wife/Husband 2 -0.008*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.003*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Son/Daughter 3 -0.058*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.029*** 
 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 
Child-in-Law 4 -0.080*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.042*** 
 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 
Grandchild 5 -0.140*** -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.077*** 




Father/Mother 6 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Other -0.055*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.022*** 
 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.003 
Caste & Religion (base:OBC)     
Brahmin 1 -0.016*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.026*** 
 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.004 
Forward caste 2 -0.041*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.023*** 
 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 
Dalit 4 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 
 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 
Adivasi 5 0.032*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.044*** 
 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.006 
Muslim 6 -0.005*** 0.009 0.007 0.007 
 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.005 
Christian, Sikh, Jain 7 -0.089*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.029*** 
 0.002 0.008 0.010 0.006 
HH-Size (base: One-Member HH) 
Two member HH -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.017 -0.117*** 
 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.007 
Three member HH -0.208*** -0.202*** -0.107*** -0.202*** 
 0.007 0.013 0.015 0.007 
Four member HH -0.221*** -0.214*** -0.117*** -0.212*** 
 0.007 0.013 0.015 0.007 
Five member HH -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.115*** -0.211*** 
 0.007 0.013 0.014 0.007 
Six member HH -0.200*** -0.207*** -0.111*** -0.209*** 
 0.007 0.014 0.016 0.007 
Seven member HH -0.198*** -0.209*** -0.114*** -0.215*** 
 0.007 0.013 0.016 0.007 
Eight or More member HH -0.197*** -0.214*** -0.118*** -0.222*** 
 0.007 0.014 0.015 0.007 
Place of Residence (base: Metropolitan) 
other urban 1 0.047*** 0.036*** 0.033***  
 0.001 0.008 0.008  
more dev vill 2 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.108***  
 0.001 0.010 0.010  
less dev vill 3 0.178*** 0.146*** 0.139***  
 0.001 0.009 0.009  
Female # Age   0.0004  
   0.000  
Female # Age # Age   -0.001*10-2  
   0.000  
Female # Age # Age # Age   0.0009*10-4  
   0.000  
Female # Male Headed HH   0.005***  
   0.002  
Constant 0.590*** 0.549*** 0.463*** 0.587*** 
 0.008 0.017 0.020 0.008 
Education of HH-Head  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Status  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sex # HH-Size  No No Yes No 




Sex # Place of Residence  No No Yes No 
State # Sex  No No Yes No 
R2-Within 0.353 0.319 0.320 0.163 
R2-Between  .423 .456 .484 
R2-Overall  .341 .342 .254 
N 198614 198614 198614 198614 
Number of Groups  33 33 2462 
Dependent variable is deprivation score for Comparative Household MPI. Robust Standard Errors are reported 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
worse off. But this effect in the household MPI deprivation score is driven entirely by differences 
in household composition and not directly due to gender disparities within households. The 
gender effect is also substantially higher for the individual MPI than for household MPI, even 
when controlling for other covariates and fixed effects.  
 
In the absence of individual analysis most gendered poverty analysis have relied on comparison 
of sex of household head to proxy for gender. This is a flawed approach, since even male-headed 
households have female members who might have different level of deprivations than the male 
head. Several studies have claimed that female-headed households are more likely to be poor 
than male-headed households and hence females are poorer than males (e.g. Dreze and 
Srinivasan, 1997; Chant 2004; Klasen, Lechtenfeld and Povel 2015). Our regression analysis 
finds that after controlling for other factors, most importantly the education of head of 
household, female-headed households on average have lower deprivation scores than males.  
This finding holds true for both individual and household MPI measures. Thus while adult 
women are disadvantaged in poverty in India, as demonstrated by our individual MPI, this has 
nothing to do with household headship, but is an intra-household inequality issue. 
 






Age of the individual has a stronger impact on deprivation scores in the individual MPI measure. 
The combined partial effect of age and gender on the household versus individual MPI is 
substantial as shown in Figure 4.1.  While in the household-based measure, the deprivation 
scores fall uniformly with age for  
 
 
Table 4.13: Determinants of Individual MPI deprivation score  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS State FE State FE with Interactions PSU FE HH FE 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Female 0.014*** 0.017*** -0.013 0.017*** 0.014*** 
 0.001 0.003 0.018 0.001 0.001 
Male Headed HH 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.028***  
 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.003  
Age -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.007*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Age # Age 0.025*10-2*** 0.025*10-2*** 0.024*10-2*** 0.024*10-2*** 0.022*10-2*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age # Age # Age -0.015*10-4*** -0.015*10-4*** -0.013*10-4*** -0.016*10-4*** -0.016*10-4*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Marital Status (base: Married) 
Married, spouse 
absent 0.043*** 0.028*** 0.012** 0.024*** 0.031*** 
 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 
Unmarried  0.023*** 0.027*** 0.016** 0.030*** 0.016*** 




Widowed  0.064*** 0.060*** 0.036*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 
 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
Separated/Divorc
ed  0.085*** 0.085*** 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.054*** 
 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 
Married no 
gauna  0.063*** 0.029*** 0.017** 0.010 -0.010 
 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.009 
Relationship to Head (base: Self) 
Wife/Husband  0.066*** 0.072*** 0.035*** 0.071*** 0.074*** 
 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.001 
Son/Daughter  -0.087*** -0.070*** -0.078*** -0.056*** -0.015*** 
 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Child-in-Law  -0.074*** -0.051*** -0.076*** -0.034*** 0.019*** 
 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 
Grandchild  -0.171*** -0.139*** -0.146*** -0.104*** -0.011*** 
 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
Father/Mother  0.090*** 0.094*** 0.076*** 0.086*** 0.056*** 
 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 
Other -0.045*** -0.025*** -0.035*** -0.011*** 0.025*** 
 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.002 
Caste & Religion (base: OBC) 
Brahmin  -0.027*** -0.037*** -0.027*** -0.037***  
 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004  
Forward caste  -0.045*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.029***  
 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.003  
Dalit  0.021*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.034***  
 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003  
Adivasi  0.033*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.044***  
 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.005  
Muslim  0.006*** 0.016** 0.019** 0.011***  
 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.004  
Christian, Sikh, 
Jain  -0.093*** -0.042*** -0.032*** -0.031***  
 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.005  
HH-Size (base: One-Member HH) 
Two member HH -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.015 -0.047***  
 0.006 0.006 0.013 0.006  
Three mem. HH -0.071*** -0.066*** -0.034*** -0.065***  
 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.006  
Four member 
HH -0.077*** -0.070*** -0.038*** -0.068***  
 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.006  
Five member HH -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.039*** -0.068***  
 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.006  
Six member HH -0.056*** -0.065*** -0.038*** -0.067***  
 0.006 0.007 0.014 0.006  
Seven mem. HH -0.053*** -0.067*** -0.040*** -0.072***  
 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.006  
Eight or More 
member HH -0.055*** -0.075*** -0.049*** -0.083***  
 0.006 0.007 0.013 0.006  
Place of Residence (base: Metropolitan) 
other urban  0.033*** 0.026*** 0.020***   




more dev vill  0.088*** 0.095*** 0.075***   
 0.002 0.008 0.008   
less dev vill  0.158*** 0.128*** 0.104***   
 0.002 0.007 0.008   
Female # Age   0.002***   
   0.000   
Female # Age # 
Age   -0.0001*10
-2   
   0.000   
Female # Age # 
Age # Age   -0.002*10
-4*   
   0.000   
Female # Male 
Headed HH   0.001   
   0.003   
Constant 0.514*** 0.473*** 0.499*** 0.495*** 0.272*** 
 0.007 0.015 0.023 0.008 0.004 
Ed. HH-Head  Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Occ. Status  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sex # HH-Size  No No Yes No No 
Sex # Caste & 
Religion Groups  No No Yes No No 
Sex #  Residence  No No Yes No No 
State # Sex  No No Yes No No 
R2-Within 0.433 0.417 0.421 0.307 0.260 
R2-Between  .548 .667 .573 .0617 
R2-Overall  .423 .437 .36 .0941 
N 197942 197942 197942 197942 198236 
N Groups  33 33 2462 40726 
Dependent variable is deprivation score for Individual MPI measure. Robust Standard Errors are reported 
• p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
males and females and there is little gender difference, there is a pronounced U-shape in age for 
both genders in the individual measure, with females being much more deprived in the individual 
measure.23 
 
In addition, widowed women’s deprivation score in the household measure is not significantly 
different from that of married women for most specifications, but in the individual measure they 
have significantly higher deprivation scores. Married women are significantly better off in the 
individual measure than all other women, while that’s not always the case in the household-
based measure. The wife or husband of the head of the household is always significantly worse-
off than the head in individual-based deprivation score, while they are better-off in the 
household-based measure. Muslims are significantly worse-off than OBC’s when comparing 
                                                
23 Note that the high deprivation among young children in both measures is related to the imputation of education scores of adults to children 




their individual deprivation scores, but this does not hold in the household-based measure. 
Single-member households are worst-off than bigger households and metropolitan areas are best-
off in both the individual and household measures. 24  
 
Besides the impact of various individual and household characteristics, the fixed effects 
regression provide useful information on state-specific differences in deprivation scores after 
controlling for other factors.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows the estimate of fixed effects for both household and individual MPI measures 
from these regressions. The pattern across states is similar for both individual and household 
MPI measures, confirming our earlier finding based on summary statistics that ranking of states 
does not change substantially when using either of the measures. Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh have the highest deprivation scores after controlling for other parameters and 
north-eastern on average have the lowest deprivation scores. Even though state per-capita GDP 
and economic growth rates for north-eastern states are lower than in western and southern states, 
they perform better in multi-dimensional poverty measures. In sum, these regressions indicate 
that the individual MPI measure leads us to substantially different conclusions on deprivation by 
age, gender, marital status, relationship to the head of the household, and caste/religion groups.  
4.6. Robustness Analysis 
 
Designing a poverty measure involves a selection of various parameters, and we are interested in 
determining how sensitive our major results of gender differential in poverty are to these 
parameter choices. We investigate the robustness of our results to i) change in deprivation 
thresholds for education dimension for children under seven years of age ii) change in how 
health deprivation status of individuals with missing data on nutrition is determined ii) weights 
assigned to the three dimensions (w) and iii) poverty cutoff (k).   
Figure 4.2: Regression results for state fixed effects for Household and Individual MPI  
                                                
24 We also analyze differential impact of gender across various groups. Gender differences in deprivation scores are significant only among 
adults; they are absent in urban areas and substantial in the rural population; absent in northeastern and several southern states and large among 







Table 4.14 presents the poverty headcount, intensity and MPI for five different individual MPI 
measures constructed by changing the parameters. In our benchmark individual measure children 
under seven years of age are deemed deprived in schooling if half or more members in the 
household above 12 years of age have not completed five years of education. We do not have 
any alternate information on education potential of these children and chose to define the 
deprivation based on other household members. But since access to primary schools is expanding 
rapidly the likelihood of these children completing five years of education is higher than adults 
in the household. One alternative assumption we could make in defining deprivation threshold 
for children below seven would be to assume that they are non-deprived. We do this in our first 
alternate measure and find that even though the level of MPI decreases from our benchmark 




between men and women in MPI remains the same and the relative differential increases 
slightly.25 
 
Next, we consider if our conclusions are robust to how health deprivation status of individuals 
with missing nutrition information is determined. In IHDS survey, we have individual data on 
nutrition for 65 percent of all individuals and infer deprivation status for the remaining 35 
percent of the population based on the status of the demographic group they belong to (as 
explained previously). We are missing data on 26 percent of females and 44 percent of males. 
The missing data is concentrated more among adult males (54 percent). In the benchmark 
version, the deprivation status of these adult males in the household would be determined based 
on information on nutrition status of other adult males for whom data was collected (deprived if 
50 percent of adults males are underweight). If data was not collected on any adult males in the 
household then their deprivation status is determined by status of other adults in the household 
similarly. In this we are making the assumption that deprivation status of individuals with 
missing data can be implied based on the status of the broader demographic group they belong 
to. Instead of this we test if assigning individuals with missing data the same status as they would 
have been assigned when constructing household MPI makes a difference to our results. For 
individuals with missing data we deem them as deprived in nutrition if any one individual in the 
household is under-nourished just as in Household MPI. But this does not change our results 
qualitatively; women are still more likely to be deemed as poor than males.  
 
Next, we ask if our conclusions are robust to a range of weights. To test this, we estimated 
individual MPI using three additional weighting schemes: i) giving 50 percent to education and 
25 percent each to health and standard of living, ii) giving 50 percent to health and 25 percent 
each to education and standard of living, to equalize the weight of the expansive education 
indicator and the restrictive nutrition one to 25% each and iii) giving 50 percent to standard of 
living and 25 percent each to education and health. Within each dimension all indicators got 
equal weights, except aspects that had time use indicators26. We find that the levels of MPI and 
the extent of difference between deprivation scores of men and women changes for the different 
weighting schemes, but women are significantly worse off than men in all the three alternative 
weighting schemes; also poverty rates are larger than in the household measure, demonstrating 
that this is not only related to weights. The differences are larger and overall poverty is higher 
                                                
25 Using the benchmark measure we find a small gender differential in children below seven years of age. 54 percent of boys and 56 percent of 
girls below seven years of age are deemed poor in the benchmark measure (Table 4.3). The corresponding numbers when using the no education 
deprivation assumption are 18 percent and 19 percent respectively. 




when education is given higher weight as the differences in schooling between men and women 
are large.  
Table 4.14: Robustness Analysis 
        Difference between women and men's measure 
  Men Women Total Absolute Relative 
Individual MPI 
Headcount 0.38 0.5 0.44 0.12 32% 
Intensity 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.01 2% 
MPI 0.2 0.27 0.24 0.07 35% 
Individual Alternate MPI (Children under 7 years are assumed to be non-deprived in education) 
Headcount 0.33 0.46 0.4 0.13 39% 
Intensity 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.01 2% 
MPI 0.17 0.24 0.21 0.07 41% 
Individual Alternate MPI (For individuals with missing nutrition information using household nutrition 
status) 
Headcount 0.4 0.51 0.45 0.11 28% 
Intensity 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.01 2% 
MPI 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.06 30% 
Individual Alternate Weights MPI (Education 0.5, Health 0.25 and Standard of Living 0.25) 
Headcount 0.32 0.45 0.38 0.13 41% 
Intensity 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.01 2% 
MPI 0.21 0.3 0.25 0.09 43% 
Individual Alternate Weight MPI (Education 0.25, Health 0.5 and Standard of Living 0.25) 
Headcount 0.36 0.44 0.4 0.08 22% 
Intensity 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.01 2% 
MPI 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.05 28% 
Individual Alternate Weights MPI (Education 0.25, Health 0.25 and Standard of Living 0.5) 
Headcount 0.4 0.49 0.45 0.09 23% 
Intensity 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.02 4% 
MPI 0.2 0.26 0.23 0.06 30% 
 
Finally, we investigate if our findings are robust to changes in the poverty cutoff (k). To do that 
we use the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) – the complement of a 
cumulative distribution function introduced for this analysis by Alkire et al (2015). The CCDF 
tells us the proportion of population above any value b and helps us determine the proportion of 
the population who will be deemed poor if the poverty cutoff is set to b i.e. k=b. Alkire et al 
(2015) show that if we find first order stochastic dominance between CCDF’s for two 
distributions c and c’, then we can claim that distribution c has no lower multidimensional 




Figure 4.3: Multidimensional poverty headcount for various values of deprivation score 
cutoff by gender 
 
 
of k. Figure 4.3 plots the CCDFs for men and women for various values of k and we find that the 
distribution for women dominates that of men. In other words, women’s headcount ratio and 
adjusted headcount are not lower than men’s for all values of k. For values of k between 0.1 and 
0.8 women have a higher poverty headcount than men.  We should also note that the differential 
is particularly pronounced around the cut-off of 0.33 which we chose, following the practice of 
the MPI.  It is slightly smaller at higher and lower cut-offs, and becomes very small as we move 




In this paper we contribute to the literature on multidimensional poverty measurement by 
proposing and applying an individual multidimensional poverty measure for India.  We find that 
existing multidimensional poverty measures use household-based assessments for 




for some dimensions of well-being.  The use of household-based thresholds based on individual 
achievement data lead to biases in multidimensional poverty assessment.  In the Indian case, we 
find that household-based MPIs substantially understate poverty, gender inequality, inequality in 
deprivation across the population, and differentials by age groups.  Such misclassification could 
also affect assessments of poverty trends and targeting.  While targeting based on regions or 
groups other than age or gender would not be very seriously biased when using a household-
based measure, targeting based on gender and age groups would.  And using the incidence of 
female-headship as a sign of gendered poverty would be deeply misleading.     
 
Our analysis can only be seen as a first step in this direction.  We are only able to individualize 
deprivation data in some dimensions where available data allow such disaggregation.  Following 
our findings from India, we are therefore likely to understate inequalities in deprivation, 
particularly in a developing country context.  More data would be required, for example, the 
individualize deprivation in morbidity as well as possession and use of assets.  Moreover, our 
assessment relies on some assumptions about group-based deprivations that are required to create 
individual deprivation measures for everyone in the household.  Clearly here, alternative 
approaches (such as assessment of individual deprivation by groups) are a possible alternative, as 
are different assumptions to create deprivation scores for everyone.   
 
But we have demonstrated that the neglect of intrahousehold inequality is a serious issue and 
actually underestimates in the Indian case poverty and inequality in deprivation by some 30 











Formal education level of leaders has been used as a proxy for quality of leaders. Recently
candidates with low education levels have been disqualified from contesting local elections
in India. But there is no conclusive evidence linking education to effectiveness of leaders,
especially in the Indian context. In this paper, we investigate the linkage between education
of the leader and competence by analyzing if educated political representatives result in bet-
ter education outcomes for children. Using comprehensive data on education in India from
multiple data-sources (Annual Status of Education Report, National Sample Survey data, and
annual census of schools) and education outcomes (learning levels, enrollment, school fund-
ing and infrastructure), we find no evidence that educated political leaders are more competent
at delivering better education outcomes for their constituents than less educated leaders. The
null effect is precisely estimated. The identification strategy is based on a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits quasi-experimental election outcomes of close elec-
tions between college graduate and non-graduate leaders. We extensively test our identification
setup and fuzzy RDD assumptions. We find that our results are robust to the various assump-
tion in baseline model, different specifications and across various groupings of individuals,
households and districts1.
Those who insist on literacy as a test and insist upon making it a condition precedent to
enfranchisement in my opinion, commit two mistakes. Their first mistake consists in their belief
that an illiterate person is necessarily an unintelligent person. . . Their second mistake lies in
supposing that literacy necessarily imports a higher level of intelligence or knowledge than what
the illiterate possesses.
B.R.Ambedkar, Chief Architect of the Indian Constitution, 1928 to Simon Commission.
It is only education which gives a human being the power to discriminate between right and
wrong, good and bad.
Supreme Court of India, 2015 upholding the law mandating minimum education level for
candidates in local elections.
1This chapter is based on joint work with Soham Sahoo. We are grateful to Stephan Klasen, Karl Pauw, Makiko
Omura, Sanjay Reddy, and Miri Stryjan for helpful discussions and to the ASER Centre for sharing the data with us.
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5.1 Introduction
Two states in India - Rajasthan and Haryana - enacted ballot access restrictions for local body
elections in 2014-2015. Both states mandated minimum education requirements for contesting
local body elections2. These requirements disqualify more than 50 percent of women, 68 percent
of Scheduled Caste women and 41 percent of Scheduled Caste men from contesting elections in
Haryana (Bhaskar, 2016). This also led to higher proportion of elections being contested by one
or no candidates and lower electoral competition. These laws were challenged in the Supreme
Court of India which upheld the laws. The Court saw education as a precondition for efficiency
and honesty arguing that education will “enable the candidates to effectively discharge duties of
the panchayat”.3
The education requirement and the Supreme Court judgment have been controversial. Many have
argued in articles and debates that the law and decision are discriminatory, retrograde, disen-
franchising, elitist, unconstitutional and undemocratic (Baxi, 2015; Abdul, 2015; Jaffrelot, 2016;
NDTV, 2016). The argument for imposing education requirements on candidates contesting elec-
tions rests on the premise that formal education makes leaders competent, honest and accountable4.
Formal education is seen as a desirable characteristic which is argued to increase the quality of
politicians. Educated politicians are seen as more effective at designing and implementing policy,
understanding concerns of citizens, dealing with complex policy issues and are considered more
accountable.5 We do not test the impact of this particular policy in this paper, but it serves as one
of the motivations to analyze linkages between formal education of the leader and competency.6
The existing literature has often considered education to be a proxy for the quality of a leader
(Atkinson et al., 2016; Besley et al., 2005). However, there are only a few studies that specifically
analyze the impact of formal education of the leader on outcomes, and they give conflicting results.
Impact of education of the leader on development outcomes has not been studied systematically
2In Haryana the education requirements were - class X (10 years of schooling) for general candidates, Class VIII
(8 years of schooling) for women and Scheduled Caste men and Class V (5 years of schooling)for Scheduled Caste
women.
3The Supreme court judgment follows its earlier ruling in 2003 that upheld the requirement that the citizens who
have more than two children cannot contest elections.
4These arguments were explicitly used as justification by the Rajasthan and Haryana government when intro-
duction the education mandate. https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/10/01/election-disqualifications-and-the-
constituent-assembly-debates/
5The constituent assembly of India debated this topic extensively which is discussed here: https://indconlawphil.
wordpress.com/2015/10/01/election-disqualifications-and-the-constituent-assembly-debates/.
6We do not yet have data on education of local leaders and the policy is too recent to test impact, but we plan to do
so in the future.
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in India, even though various other characteristics of the leader such as gender, religion, caste
and criminality have been extensively studied. Using data on education of national leaders in
a cross-country database and random transitions a few studies have shown that educated leaders
tend to increase economic growth, foreign investment and education attainment of citizens (Besley,
Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Diaz-Serrano and Pérez, 2013; Congleton and Zhang, 2013).
These studies only analyze national leaders across countries where disparities across nations are
difficult to account for and also they do not analyze impact of state or local leaders’ education.
But Carnes and Lupu (2016) investigating impact of education of political leaders at national, state
and local levels in different contexts find educated politicians to perform no better or worse than
less-educated leaders across a range of outcomes.
The aim of the paper is to test the hypothesis that educated politicians are more competent and de-
liver better outcomes for their constituents. We investigate whether state legislative representatives
in India with college degree are better than leaders without college degree for school education
outcomes in the districts from which they are elected. If leaders with more formal education are
competent and utilize this for the benefit of their constituents then one might expect better educa-
tion outcomes as compared to having a less educated leaders. Data on various schooling outcomes
from multiple data sources are combined with education information on state legislatures who
could influence education policy to analyze the impact of educated leaders. We use data on learn-
ing outcomes for rural areas from the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) from 2006 to
2014, enrollment outcome data from various National Sample Survey (NSS) rounds from 2007 to
2014, and annual data on school infrastructure and funding from census of schools (DISE) from
2010 to 2014. Along with these outcomes, we use data on leaders’ education level from Associa-
tion of Democratic Reform (ADR) from 2004 to 2014. The merged dataset allows us to examine
effects of political leaders’ education on education outcomes for 10 years, the entire span of time
for which data on formal education of leaders are available. Our empirical analysis that uses high-
quality data with a large sample size enables us to hold a range of institutional and cultural factors
constant, and yields statistical power to detect even small effects on education outcomes of leaders.
The main identification challenge is that education level of the leader could be correlated with voter
preferences and hence endogenous. To identify the causal impact of educated politicians, we use a
fuzzy regression discontinuity design where the proportion of leaders who have completed college
is instrumented with the proportion of college graduate leaders who won in close elections against
a non-college graduate leader. The validity of the identification strategy relies on the assumption
of quasi-randomness of the outcome of a close election (Eggers et al., 2015) – that the preferences
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of voters who elect an educated politician in a close election can be assumed to be the same as the
preferences of voters who elect a non-college graduate leader. We test these assumptions exten-
sively and show that results of close elections cannot be predicted on any observable characteristics
and are quasi-random. This strategy has been used extensively in the literature to study the impact
of other characteristics of politicians on various outcomes (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014;
Clots-Figueras, 2012).
We chose to analyze outcomes in education because of its importance to development, availability
of disaggregated data and the ability of state level leaders to impact education outcomes. Ensuring
quality education for all is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) and education is a component
of the Human Development Index. Education is one of the basic pillars to equip children to avail
of various opportunities in life, build a productive labor force and could be improved substantially
in India. Given this we expect competent leaders to focus their attention on improving basic educa-
tion outcomes. Also comprehensive and reliable data disaggregated at district and lower levels are
available only for education among the major development outcomes. State-level political lead-
ers have the power to impact education outcomes through lobbying for funds for schools in their
districts7, implementing education schemes, monitoring education policy implementation and in-
fluencing bureaucracy. Clots-Figueras (2012) has shown that female leaders at state level are able
to improve education outcomes more than male leaders using similar identification techniques.
Bhavnani and Jensenius (2015) also study impact of state level leaders from ruling party on liter-
acy over the long term. India is also an important case study to explore this issue due to the recent
education mandate that disqualifies citizens with low formal education levels from contesting local
body elections and the debate around the issue. Besides, enrollment has seen substantial gains over
the last decade across India, but quality of education as measured by learning outcomes is low, de-
clining and varies substantially across the states. Hence we include not only school participation,
but also quality of education as outcome in our analysis.
We find no evidence that educated leaders are more competent and deliver better education out-
comes for their constituents. Having a college graduate leader does not improve learning outcomes
for children, school enrollment or attendance rates. College graduate politicians do not lead to
better school infrastructure or more school grants. The null effect is revealed through statistical
insignificance of the point estimate and the effect size, adjusted for the precision of the point es-
timate, remains negligible across OLS and 2SLS specifications. The results are also robust to a
7An average state in India spends about 16 percent of its total budgetary expenditure on education, with substantial
variation across states from 10 to 23 percent, as revealed by recent statistics released by the Reserve Bank of India.
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number of specifications, alternative definition of key variables and different definitions of close
elections. We also show that the results are not specific to the leader’s education cutoff. In the
baseline model we compare college graduate and non-graduate leaders, but in robustness analysis
we show that even when we compare leaders who have completed secondary or senior-secondary
education with those who have not, the results do not change. Since education outcomes might
take time to change we also examine impact of leaders from multiple years (up to past four years),
but find no significant impact of educated leaders. We also test for heterogeneity of impact across
different sub-samples. We test if districts with different levels of urbanization or adult education
achievement or poverty levels have varying impact, but overall educated politicians in most cases
do not perform any better than less educated politicians. We also test if the impact varies across in-
dividual and household characteristics (gender of the child or mothers education level or economic
status of the household), but again we find no consistent impact of educated politicians.
Why do educated politicians not provide better education outcomes for children in their constituen-
cies than less educated politicians? It might be the case that formal education has little to do with
ability of leader to empathize and address the concerns of people. Also there are avenues other
than formal education to develop leadership qualities - through experience and grass-roots work.
Understanding constituents’ issues and lobbying on behalf of them can be done successfully even
without formal education.
These results should of course be interpreted with caution given a range of caveats with any such
study. We only examine impact of education of leaders on education outcomes, and it maybe
the case that educated politicians use their competence in other spheres like technical education,
attracting investments or improving infrastructure to deliver better outcomes. We only analyze
impact of state leaders but education of the leader might have a different impact at local or national
level. This would not be captured in our analysis. It might be the case that it is difficult for leaders
to impact education outcomes, even though they have role to play in state policy making, directing
funds to schools in their districts and have some control over education bureaucracy. Limitations
of data on education outcomes (which are identified only at the district level) necessitate that we
aggregate the impact of multiple leaders at the district level to measure impact; and cannot measure
impact directly at the individual constituency level for which they are elected. Our results might be
influenced by this averaging at the district level or the other caveats we discuss in the conclusion.
More data and research is required to study if educated leaders perform better in other spheres and
across levels.
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These results, even with all their limitations, suggest that educated leaders are not necessarily
better as assumed by policy makers behind the education mandate or the literature which uses
education as a proxy for quality. Our findings have direct implications for policy makers. Our
results suggest that restricting choice of voters to only leaders who are formally educated might
not lead to higher quality leaders or better development outcomes. More research is required
to conclusively determine if formal education leads to better leaders, but without that restricting
choice of voters might not be advisable. Our findings could serve as inputs if the Supreme Court of
India’s constitutional bench 8 reviews its original decision upholding the restrictions on candidates
or if lawmakers consider a pending bill in the Parliament to overturn the restrictions. It could
also lead to rethinking on part of other state governments and policymakers who are planning to
introduce such restrictions in their states. Going beyond that our results advance the literature on
quality of leaders by being the first to systematically analyze the link between politician’s education
and competency in India.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section provides a background by linking the
current context with the existing literature and providing a conceptual framework for analysis.
Section describes how different data-sets have been collated for the purpose of our analysis. The
empirical model including the method used for identification is illustrated in Section . In Section ,
we report the results of our analysis and also various robustness tests and heterogeneity analysis.
Section concludes and summarizes limitations of our results.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Identity of Political Leader
Educated politicians might have a differential impact on children’s education only if the identity
of the political leader matters for policy making. In a world where candidates can fully commit
to implementation of a specific set of policies when elected and care about getting reelected, then
politicians’ decisions would only reflect the preferences of the electorate (Downs, 1957). In this
setting the characteristics of the individual person who wins elections will not matter. Thus, edu-
cation level, gender, religion, caste, involvement in criminal activities or other aspects of identity
8Original decision to mandate minimum education for candidates was given by a two member bench which can be
reviewed by a full constitutional bench.
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of the politician would not affect development outcomes. But citizen-candidate models (Besley
and Coate, 1997; Levitt, 1996; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) have suggested that complete com-
mitment to policy is not possible and the identity of the politician has an influence on the actual
policies that are implemented. In this model voters take into account both policy preferences and
other relevant characteristics as competency when casting their votes.
Empirical evidence also shows that identity of the politician matters for policies. Jones and Olken
(2009) and Besley et al. (2011) use random leadership transitions at national level to show that indi-
vidual characteristics of the leader matter for economic growth of the country. Extensive literature
on India have shown that gender, religion, caste and other characteristics of the political leader
play an important role in determining policy outcomes in the fields of education, health, economic
growth and public infrastructure (Asher and Novosad, 2013; Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014;
Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, and Iyer, 2013; Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, Cassan, and Iyer, 2014; Burchi,
2013; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011, 2012; Ghani, Mani, and O’Connell,
2013; Halim, Yount, Cunningham, and Pande, 2016; Iyer, Mani, Mishra, and Topalova, 2012;
O’Connell, 2015; Prakash, Rockmore, and Uppal, 2014).
5.2.2 Conceptual Framework
We describe a simple model that formalizes our intuition on the impact of educated leaders and
guides our empirical analysis. We highlight two important mechanisms through which an educated
leader could have an impact. Both of the mechanisms we suggest are unobservable and untestable
directly in our empirical framework. However, we flesh out the implications of the two mechanisms
and test the implications. The model considers only the action of an elected leader and do not
explicitly take into account the actions of voters or other political actors.
We assume that there is a limited amount of resource in terms of influence, effort, or time avail-
able to each leader. A leader can use the resource to act upon n different areas such as public
infrastructure, health, education, extracting revenue to increase one’s own wealth, raising funds for
next campaign etc. The leader has to decide on how to distribute the total amount of resource on
different activities with the goal of maximizing own utility. Leaders differ among each other on
basis of the level of education (G) – which for instance can be whether college graduate or not. If
the leader puts e
i
level of resource in the ith area (where i= {1, ...,n}), then the resulting output is










which can be viewed as an achievement of the leader in the context of this particular area. The
choice of this specific functional form is to keep the illustration simple.  
i
(G) is a parameter that
captures the competency of the leader in improving outcome i, and it depends on leader’s own




(G) > 0. If the outcome of interest is
education, then the achievement might be increasing enrollment rate, learning levels of students
or improving school quality. We observe the achievements but do not observe the actual resource
allocated or effort exerted by the leader across different areas directly.
The leader derives utility from achievement on various items through several channels. Firstly,
achievements reflect a leader’s performance which in turn affects the probability of winning the
next election. Secondly, leaders also get direct utility from achievement on areas that create a
lasting legacy or give them a sense of satisfaction and fulfillment. Therefore the leader’s utility is
a function of his/her achievements on the n different items. For ease of exposition we assume a















i=1 ei = 1
The preference parameter ⇥
i
(G) reflects how much weightage is given to achievement in the ith
area by a leader with G level of education. We assume ⇥
i
(G) > 0 and Pn
i=1⇥i(G) = 1. The
constraint indicates that there is an upper bound to the total resource available and it has been
normalized to 1.
Solving the first order conditions of this problem we find that the leader’s optimal allocation of

















So the optimal achievement on ith item is directly proportional to competency and preference of
the leader towards this particular item. Since both competency and preference parameters are non-





(G)) increases with G. In other words, an educated leader yields better outcome in
an area if he/she has higher competency or higher preference towards that area as compared to a
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non-educated leader.
A competent leader or leader who understands a particular issue might be able to achieve better
outcome in the area i than a less competent or less knowledgeable leader for the same level of
effort. Leaders might also differ in their achievements in sector i because they obtain more utility
from achievements in the sector above the ones obtained by other leaders due to their preferences.
While we cannot empirically separate out preference from competence, we test the claim in our
empirical model that achievements of educated leaders are higher than less-educated leaders.
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) argue that good leaders might differ based on competency and
prefer broad-based policies and advocate public goods and infrastructure that generate wide ben-
efits. They argue that educated leaders are better citizens, have higher talent and higher concern
for social welfare. Elementary education is a basic public good whose widespread provision can
lead to improvement in welfare of citizens. If the arguments made by Besley and Reynal-Querol
(2011) or Atkinson et al. (2016) are valid then educated politicians would lead to better quality
of elementary education as they are more competent and would prefer to invest their resources in
education due to its impact on long term welfare of citizens. Even if educated leaders do not prefer
to invest in education, their higher competency by itself should on average lead to better education
outcomes.
While acknowledging these arguments Carnes and Lupu (2016) argue that the link between for-
mal education, competence and leadership is not as straightforward. It is possible to gain human
capital and skills required for being an effective leader without formal education. Formal educa-
tion does not just reflect human capital but also the privileges of being able to obtain education.
Societal restrictions and economic hardship might hinder a talented person from obtaining formal
education while a less talented person might be able to obtain formal education. There still exists
widespread discrimination, though declining, in obtaining even elementary education by women
and individuals from lower castes in India.
Carnes and Lupu (2016) also argue that human capital obtained through formal education alone
does not necessarily improve quality of leaders. Crucial factors like character, personality, ability
to listen and understand people’s grievances and other leadership qualities are not the focus of
formal education and could be obtained without it. Even basic reading and arithmetic skills could
be obtained outside of formal schooling. In instances where specialized skills are required leaders
could rely on qualified bureaucracy to help formulate solutions. Several studies have also shown
that most qualified and those with highest grades are not necessarily most successful people in the
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society (Gottesman and Morey, 2006; Clotfelter et al., 2007). Several studies in the 1960s and 70s
and recent followups by Carnes (2012, 2013) which studied relationship between education level
of leaders and their attitudes, choices and decisions when in office found no difference in behavior
between more and less educated politicians (see Carnes and Lupu (2016) for details).
The empirical evidence on impact of education level of the leader on policies is thin and mixed.
Dreher et al. (2009) find that professional and highly educated leaders are more likely to imple-
ment market-liberalizing reforms. On the other hand, Carnes and Lupu (2016) show that across
contexts and wide range of outcome indicators politicians with a college degree perform the same
or worse than non-college graduate politicians. Educated leaders at national level in a cross-country
database, legislative leaders in the US and local municipal leaders in Brazil all perform no better
than non-educated leaders. This holds across a range of outcomes including economic growth,
inequality, social unrest, interstate conflict, unemployment, inflation, reelection, legislative pro-
ductivity, and corruption.
Most of the studies which found a positive impact of education qualification of the leader analyze
leaders at the national level but the impact of education of the leader might be different at lower
administrative levels (except a few studies such as Martinez-Bravo (2014)). Leaders at district or
constituency level work more as “fixers” or lobbyists for their constituents and have smaller role
to play in broader policy making (Chopra, 1996). Analyzing the activities of elected state con-
stituency representatives across Indian states, Jensenius and Suryanarayan (2015) find that state
leaders spend most time in their constituencies rather than debating legislation in state assemblies.
The time spent by leaders debating legislation and making policies has also been declining over
time – from 45 days per year in 1967 to about 34 days per year – and most legislation is passed
without much debate. Politicians tend to spend most of their time in their constituencies addressing
their constituents’ complaints, attending social functions, being part of local government bodies,
helping individuals in accessing various government schemes, lobbying the district and state ad-
ministration to implement their favored schemes and use their networks to attract investment to
their constituency (Chopra, 1996; Jensenius, 2015). Formal education might be helpful but is not
essential to gain the skills required for this set of tasks.
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5.2.3 State leaders and education policy
India has a federal structure with significant power devolved to the states and local level. For
elections, states are divided into single- member constituencies in which candidates are elected
in first-past-the-post elections. Constituencies within each state are drawn up so to ensure the
same number of people in each of them, though they vary in size across states. District is the
administrative unit below the state and consists of multiple constituencies, with a district having
an average of nine constituencies.
Education is on the concurrent list in the Indian constitution – where both the federal and state
governments have jurisdiction, but state governments play a major role in education policy at the
primary and secondary level. Legislators can influence state policy by participating in debates,
and influencing other legislatures at the state level. They can also direct funds to the their dis-
tricts’ educational office and influence policy implementation through their participation in local
government bodies (Singh and Cruz, 1997). Legislatures can monitor school infrastructure and
progress, lobby the state government for funds to open new schools or help in accessing exist-
ing grants or programs for schools from state or federal government. State legislatures also have
control over state bureaucracy through role in promotions and job assignments/transfers (Krishnan
and Somanathan, 2013; Nath, 2015; Sukhtankar and Vaishnav, 2015; Asher and Novosad, 2013).
This influence can be used by legislatures to push their specific policy priorities and also demand
results. State legislative representatives can use their discretionary development funds for any de-
velopment work. Empirical evidence also links various characteristics of state legislatures with
differences in policy outcomes in various spheres (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Bhalotra
et al., 2013, 2014). Clots-Figueras (2012) shows that districts with higher proportion of women
state legislative leaders have higher primary school completion rate than other districts. She argues
that women leaders prefer to invest in children’s education and are able to influence district policy
outcomes. If educated leaders are more competent then they can, if desired, presumably improve
education outcomes for their constituents.
In this paper we focus our analysis on determining whether educated political leaders have an im-
pact on the schooling infrastructure and allocation of funds to schools. In addition, we consider
children’s enrollment and learning as other primary indicators of education outcomes. With rapid
expansion of elementary education in the last decade enrollment rates in primary schools have
reached saturation levels (>95 percent enrollment across India), but learning outcomes among
children have stayed low and declined in recent period. According to Annual Status of Education
141
Report (ASER) only 40 percent of children in class III can read a class I level text and only 26
percent of children in class V can do subtraction in 2014. These levels have declined from 49 and
43 percent respectively in 2007 (ASER 2014). Basic knowledge and skills - not enrollment and
years of schooling - are key to empower children to realize their potential in life (Pritchett, 2013).
This has been recognized widely by non-government organizations (NGO) and state governments
across the country 9. Pratham, a large education NGO, which first highlighted these issues has
implemented several initiatives to improve learning outcomes since 2007. Pratham working in col-
laboration with state and local governments has organized short-duration intensive learning camps
to improve basic skills for over 430,000 children in 2014-15. Randomized evaluations of learn-
ing outcome improvement programs implemented by Pratham in collaboration with local govern-
ments in states of Bihar, Uttarakhand, Haryana, Gujarat and Maharashtra have found substantial
improvements in reading and math skills among children (Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, and Linden,
2005; Banerji, Berry, and Shotland, 2013; Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani,
2010). These programs are simple, low cost interventions and usually involve village volunteers
or hired young adult helping teachers 1-2 hours a day or through intensive learning camps to focus
on teaching core competencies which are supposed to be taught in first and second grade. Several
state governments have also implemented their own programs to improve reading and arithmetic
skills. If political leaders wish to improve learning outcomes or are more competent than other
leaders, improving learning outcomes is not a far-fetched goal with the resources they have at their
disposal.
5.3 Data and Summary Statistics
The empirical analysis investigates the causal relationship between being represented by college
graduate politicians versus a non-college graduate politicians and different education outcomes
(learning and enrollment outcomes for individuals of school age and school quality outcomes)
when those politicians were in power in their districts.
9The central government in its 2017 budget acknowledging the importance of learning outcomes has decided to
make quality assessment a central plank in its elementary education policy.
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Education Data
We create a dataset that combines information on politicians standing in state assembly election
in India with different education outcomes. Education outcomes are from different data sources
and both at individual child and school level. The individual child outcomes are learning outcomes
for reading, mathematics and english from Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) and enroll-
ment outcomes from National Sample Survey (NSS). School quality outcomes are obtained from
annual census of schools - District Information System for Education (DISE). We use multiple data
sources as the range of outcomes are not present in any single dataset and it also checks robustness
of our results to source of data.
ASER Data
ASER, an annual district representative survey, documents children’s schooling status and basic
learning levels in all rural districts in India. The survey has been conducted every year from 2005
to 2014 by a group of over 30,000 trained volunteers from over 700 partner organizations under
the leadership of Pratham, an educational NGO. The survey is conducted between September-
November, and covers a random sample of 20 households in 30 villages in each of India’s rural
districts ( 550) totaling about 300,000 households across the country each year and approximately
600,000 children in the age group of 3-16.
ASER tests all children in the household between the ages of 5 and 16 for basic arithmetic and ba-
sic reading proficiency in the vernacular language using rigorously developed testing tools10. The
same test is given to all children across the years. The reading assessment has four levels: letters,
words, a short paragraph (a class 1 level text), and a short story (a class 2 level text). Similarly,
the arithmetic assessment consists of four levels: single-digit number recognition, double-digit
number recognition, two-digit subtraction with carry over, and three digit by one digit division
(corresponding to what students are expected to know in grade 3 or 4). These levels are con-
verted into a continuous scale of 0-4 in our main analysis. The highest level for which children
are comfortable is marked. In years 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2014 children were also tested for
their competency in basic English. In addition to learning outcomes, basic household informa-
tion (household size, parental education and some information on household assets) and village
infrastructure information (existence of electricity, permanent road, ration shop, bank, schools and
10The tools are available at http://www.asercentre.org/p/141.html
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health facilities) is also collected. In 2007 and every year since 2009 ASER has also collected
data on school infrastructure, enrollment, attendance and fund flows from one government primary
school in each surveyed village.
We use data for the years 2006 to 2014 for children between 6 to 16 years of age. We divide our
sample into two groups – children between 6 to 10 years of age which corresponds to primary
school age (grade 1 to 5) in India and children between 11 to 16 of age corresponding to middle
and secondary school age (grade 6 and above) to study impact of educated politicians on their
learning outcomes. Overall our sample includes 1.29 million children between 6-10 years of age
and 1.3 million children between 11-16 years of age. Though enrollment in India has increased
over time learning levels have declined.
NSS Education Data
We use four rounds of National Sample Survey (NSS) data to obtain data on enrollment of children
in both urban and rural areas. The data comes from Education rounds of NSS conducted in 2007-
08 and 2014 and Employment and Unemployment surveys from 2009-10 and 2011-12. All four
surveys record information on enrollment status in education institutions for all members of the
household and we use the same age groups as used in ASER data analysis 11. Overall our sample
from NSS includes 145,000 children aged 6-10 years of age and 170,000 children aged 11-16
years of age. We use NSS surveys for enrollment outcomes as it covers both rural and urban areas,
as opposed to only rural areas in ASER. But NSS surveys do not collect information on learning
outcomes. The outcome variable used in the analysis is a dummy indicating if child is not enrolled
in school. Overall 6.9 percent of 6-10 year old children and 13.5 percent of 11-16 year old children
are not enrolled in school in the NSS sample (Table 5.1).
DISE Data
DISE is a database on all schools in India with information on school infrastructure, funding,
enrollment, teachers and other aspects of schools maintained by the Government of India. This
is updated annually and cross-validated. DISE has data on over 1 million schools across India
11Though the sample size, sampling stratergy and options present in the enrollment question vary to some extent
across surveys, there is enough commonality in the basic question that they could be compared. The pattern in
enrollment rate (of increase across years) is consistent with other secondary data.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics from Child Level Data
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
Variables Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ASER Data
Reading score 1,294,549 2.071 1.388 1,303,674 3.425 1.047
Math score 1,279,657 1.893 1.213 1,295,643 3.123 1.076
English score 567,828 2.678 1.386 576,782 3.959 1.270
Proportion not enrolled in school 1,266,493 0.016 0.124 1,302,898 0.060 0.238
Age of child 1,294,549 8.113 1.428 1,303,674 13.291 1.624
Proportion of female children 1,294,549 0.467 0.499 1,303,674 0.478 0.500
Proportion whose mother went to school 1,250,366 0.534 0.499 1,261,765 0.499 0.500
Household size 1,294,549 6.553 2.858 1,303,674 6.369 2.714
Proportion living in katcha houses 1,214,531 0.368 0.482 1,228,590 0.338 0.473
Proportion living in semi-pucca houses 1,214,531 0.305 0.460 1,228,590 0.306 0.461
Proportion living in pucca houses 1,214,531 0.328 0.469 1,228,590 0.356 0.479
Proportion in households with television 1,203,449 0.466 0.499 1,218,052 0.506 0.500
Proportion in households with mobile phone 1,197,277 0.650 0.477 1,212,061 0.695 0.461
Household’s with electricity 1,022,433 0.645 0.478 1,054,933 0.679 0.467
Proportion in villages with electricity 1,207,515 0.909 0.287 1,221,079 0.927 0.261
Proportion in villages with pucca road 1,202,562 0.746 0.435 1,216,265 0.766 0.423
Proportion in villages with ration shop 1,200,705 0.703 0.457 1,214,089 0.718 0.450
Proportion in villages with a bank 1,199,046 0.240 0.427 1,212,105 0.258 0.438
NSS 2004-05 Data (based on district level aggregates)
Proportion of female population 1,258,269 0.487 0.027 1,271,747 0.488 0.028
Primary completion rate - adult male 1,258,269 0.651 0.150 1,271,747 0.659 0.147
Primary completion rate - adult female 1,258,269 0.374 0.199 1,271,747 0.384 0.198
Proportion of ST 1,258,269 0.156 0.266 1,271,747 0.148 0.254
Proportion of SC 1,258,269 0.197 0.122 1,271,747 0.201 0.122
Proportion of OBC 1,258,269 0.410 0.237 1,271,747 0.411 0.234
Proportion of other caste 1,258,269 0.237 0.204 1,271,747 0.241 0.206
Proportion of urban population 1,260,105 0.179 0.150 1,273,831 0.187 0.151
NSS Education Data (Various rounds 2007 to 2014)
Proportion not enrolled in school 145,297 0.069 0.253 172,682 0.135 0.342
Proportion of female children 146,363 0.464 0.498 174,457 0.464 0.498
Proportion living in urban areas 146,363 0.349 0.476 174,457 0.371 0.483
Household size 146,363 6.145 2.618 174,457 5.893 2.447
Proportion Hindu 146,350 0.732 0.442 174,435 0.733 0.426
Proportion Muslims 146,350 0.164 0.370 174,435 0.153 0.360
Proportion ST 146,319 0.134 0.340 174,397 0.132 0.338
Proportion SC 146,319 0.178 0.382 174,397 0.174 0.379
Proportion OBC 146,319 0.415 0.492 174,397 0.406 0.491
Source: Author’s calculation using ASER and NSS data. The unit of observation is children of different age
groups.
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of District Level Variables from DISE Data
Mean SD Obs
Free Textbooks 0.82 0.15 2611
Furniture for Students 0.67 0.24 2611
Atleast one Girl’s Toilet 0.82 0.21 2611
Electricity Connection 0.53 0.35 2611
Safe Drinking Water 0.76 0.22 2611
Library 0.56 0.28 2611
Playground 0.58 0.22 2611
Computer 0.27 0.23 2611
PCA school facilities 0.02 1.85 2611
Annual average school grants 18793 14092 2695
Notes: The unit of observation is district. The sample corresponds to the full
sample used in DISE regressions.
Source: Authors’ calculation from DISE data.
for each year; and is the most comprehensive source of data on schools in India. We use data
for five years from 2010 to 2014 on school infrastructure and funding outcomes. We aggregate
this data on various outcomes of interest at the district level. Table 5.2 presents the summary
statistics from DISE data. We use Principle component analysis (PCA) to generate an index of
school infrastructure and use it as one of the outcome variables. The index is the first component
of the PCA generated using data on free textbooks, furniture, girl’s toilet, electricity connection,
access to safe drinking water, library, playground and computers. The second outcome variable is
the average grants received by schools in the district in one year. There is substantial variation in
both outcome various across districts.
Political Data
India is a federal republic with parliamentary system of government at the state and the national
level. Several powers are devolved to the state, district and village level government. Each state
has a legislative assembly (state governments) which plays a big role in educational policies and
expenditures, especially at the primary and secondary level. States are divided into districts which
are important administrative units for various decisions and districts in turn are divided into single-
member constituencies in which candidates are elected in first-past-the-post elections. Each as-
sembly constituency is designed so as to have almost the same number of inhabitants within the
state. On average each district has about nine constituencies. The term of each elected state repre-
sentative is five years, unless the assembly is dissolved before end of its term.
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Table 5.3: Education Qualification of Candidates in Elections
Sex of the candidate
Education of the candidate Female Male Total
Num Col % Cum % Num Col % Cum % Num Col % Cum %
Illiterate 7 0.5 0.5 35 0.2 0.2 42 0.3 0.3
Literate 49 3.7 4.2 202 1.4 1.6 251 1.6 1.8
5th Pass 37 2.8 7.0 292 2.0 3.6 329 2.0 3.9
8th Pass 80 6.0 12.9 726 4.9 8.5 806 5.0 8.9
10th Pass 191 14.3 27.2 2147 14.6 23.1 2338 14.5 23.4
12th Pass 184 13.8 41.0 2341 15.9 39.0 2525 15.7 39.1
Graduate 291 21.8 62.8 4011 27.2 66.2 4302 26.8 65.9
Graduate Professional 131 9.8 72.6 2252 15.3 81.4 2383 14.8 80.7
Post Graduate 312 23.3 95.9 2414 16.4 97.8 2726 17.0 97.6
Doctorate 55 4.1 100.0 323 2.2 100.0 378 2.4 100.0
Total 1337 100.0 14743 100.0 16080 100.0
Notes: Table based on information about winner and runner-up candidates. A person who has a Bachelor’s
degree or diploma is considered a Graduate in India. Source: Author’s calculation using ECI-ADR data.
A dataset on politicians contesting state assembly elections in India between 2004 and 2014 was
constructed using information obtained from the Election Commission of India (ECI) and the As-
sociation for Democratic Reforms (ADR). The ECI provides data on the number of votes, gender
and party affiliation of all winner and runner-up candidates for all state assembly elections in In-
dia. Following a 2003 Supreme court judgment all individuals contesting elections have to file an
affidavit with the election commission listing their education level, assets, criminal cases among
other details. The Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) has scanned all these affidavits and
provided the information online for central and state elections from 2004 onwards. We combined
this information from ECI and ADR to construct a detailed portrait of all winner and runner-up
candidates for state assembly elections from 2004 to 2014 . Among winner and runner-up can-
didates about 39 percent have not completed college education (Table 5.3). Table 5.4 presents
summary statistics from the electoral data. About 38 percent of districts had at least one close
election between graduate and a non-graduate and almost equal number of close elections are won
by both types of candidates (49 and 51 percent respectively).
Merged Data
ASER and NSS rounds provide information on residence of a child only at the district level whereas
political leaders are elected at the constituency level, which are below the district level. To merge
the education and political datasets we aggregated the election data at the district level. For each
child in the sample politicians who were in power in the year when the child’s enrollment and
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Table 5.4: Summary Statistics of District Level Variables from Election Data
Variables Obs. Mean SD(1) (2) (3)
Proportion of seats won by graduates 1,127 0.594 0.251
District with at least one graduate leader 1,127 0.953 0.212
Proportion of seats won by graduates in close elections against non-graduates 1,127 0.0394 0.0979
District with at least one graduate leader who won in close election against non 1,127 0.201 0.401
Proportion of seats with close election between graduate and non-graduate 1,127 0.0814 0.138
District with at least one close election between graduate and non-graduate 1,127 0.378 0.485
Proportion of seats with election between graduate and non-graduate 1,127 0.407 0.249
District with at least one election between graduate and non-graduate 1,127 0.876 0.330
Notes: The unit of observation is district in an electoral year. The sample corresponds to the full sample used in
child level regressions. Close election is the one where the winner beat the runner up by less than 3 percent of
votes.
Source: Authors’ calculation from ADR and ECI data combined.
learning levels were recorded and the two years prior to it are identified. ADR has data on can-
didate’s education levels only for state elections conducted after 2004, when the law requiring
candidates to publically report their education level came into force. Since the elections for state
assemblies in different states are conducted in different years, the starting year of our data differs
for each state - the first election year after 2004 for that state. For example, for Maharashtra which
had election in 2004 we have data on politician’s education level for all years from 2004 to 2014,
but for Gujarat our data starts only in 2008 the first election year in Gujarat after 2004. Since we
are using average value of three years for all political variables in our base specification the data
used in the estimation for a state start two years after the start of election data for the state. For
example, for all districts in Maharashtra our base estimation uses ASER data starting from 2006
whereas for districts in Gujarat estimation data starts only in 2010. A child living in rural areas of
Jalna district of Maharashtra surveyed in 2007 will be impacted by politicians elected in the district
from 2005 to 2007.
5.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section we lay out an econometric model to identify the causal effect of having a college ed-
ucated versus non-college educated leader on the educational outcomes of children. As explained
in the previous section, the data on leaders’ education can be merged with the data on outcome
variables only at the district level. Therefore our treatment variable is defined for each district, as
the fraction of constituencies with an educated leader in the district. When the outcome is mea-
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sured at the child level using ASER or NSS data (learning outcomes, enrollment etc.), then our unit
of analysis is a child because we also want to control for child and household specific covariates.
On the other hand, when we use DISE data on schools, the outcomes are measured at the district
level (average school quality, average grants etc.) and hence district itself is the unit of analysis.
However, in both these cases, the treatment variable is defined at the district level for a given year.


























the fraction of assembly constituency seats in the district held by a college-educated politician dur-
ing the last three years.12, 13 District specific time invariant unobserved heterogeneity is taken into
account by including district fixed effects ↵
ds
. Since districts are nested within states, therefore
the district fixed effects also subsume the state fixed effects. The year fixed effects ( 
t
) consider
the overall changes in the economy including the impact of growth and various nationwide edu-
cational policies. Several observable characteristics at the level of child, household and village
are included in the vector X
idst
. Child level covariates are gender and age-cohort specific dummy
variables, and an indicator of whether child’s mother attended school. Household level variables
include household size, square of household size, dummy variables indicating the structure of the
house14, ownership of assets (television and mobile phones), and whether use of electricity was
observed on the date of survey. The village specific variables capture access to electricity, paved
(pucca) road, ration shop and bank. While the district fixed effects control for regional charac-
teristics that do not change over time, there are factors such as demand for education or level of
development that vary over time. Some of these district specific time varying effects are taken
into account by interacting the year fixed effects with measures of baseline characteristics given
by the vector Z
ds
. Using National Sample Survey data of 2004-05, district level sex ratio, adult
primary education completion rates for males and females, caste composition in the population,
and proportion of urban population are included in Z
ds
. Most of the education policies are imple-
12Following Clots-Figueras (2012), the main specification considers the average fraction of seats held by a college
educated politician over the past two years and the current year. In the robustness section, we consider alternative lag
periods to calculate this variable, and our results remain unchanged in those specifications.
13A college educated individual with at least a Bachelor’s degree or diploma is referred to as graduate in the India.
14Depending on the building material, the structure of the house is measured by the following three categories,
arranged in the increasing order of housing quality: katcha, semi-pucca and pucca. Katcha is considered as the base
category in the regression.
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mented by the respective state governments; besides, there is a great deal of heterogeneity across
Indian state economies which are likely to follow very different trajectories of development. We




The main challenge of identifying   from Equation 1 is the possibility that some omitted variable





district fixed effects take care of inherent differences that do not change over time, the presence of
time varying unobservable effects at the district level cannot be ruled out. For instance, in regions
that have experienced higher growth of educated individuals, voters’ preference for education may
be manifested through higher propensity to elect college educated politicians in recent elections
than in past elections. The fraction of seats held by college educated leaders may be endogenously
determined due to the presence of such unobservable factors.
Identification
To tackle the endogeneity problem, we use the fraction of seats won by college educated politicians
in close elections between a college educated and a non-college educated politicians (GC
dst
) as an
instrument for the overall fraction of seats held by college educated leaders (G
dst
). Close elections
are defined as those where the margin of victory is small. For the main specification, we consider
an election to be close when the winner beats the runner-up by less than 3 percent of total votes,
and measure the instrument accordingly.15 Insofar as the vote difference between the top two
candidates in an election is arbitrarily small, the winner will be determined by chance; hence the
use of close election provides a plausible basis for constructing the instrument in this context. We
provide further discussion on the validity of instrument in a subsequent section.
This empirical strategy has been used in the literature to identify impact of other personal charac-
teristics of leaders (e.g. gender, religion) on various development outcomes (Bhalotra and Clots-
Figueras, 2014; Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, Cassan, and Iyer, 2014; Clots-Figueras, 2011, 2012).
Identification in this method relies on the quasi-randomness of the outcome of a close election.
The Indian electoral system follows the first-past-the-post voting system where the candidate who
15The margin of victory is defined as the difference in the share of votes between the winner and the runner-up,
where the total turnout is used as the denominator to calculate the vote shares. In the robustness section, we use
various other levels of margin of victory to define close elections between a college educated and a non-college
educated candidate.
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gets more votes than any other candidate wins the election. The probability that a candidate will
win is a function of the margin of votes between the winner and the runner-up, and this probability
changes discontinuously at the point where the margin of votes is zero. Considering those elections
where the contest takes place between a college educated and a non-college educated politician,
in an arbitrarily small neighborhood around this point of discontinuity, the constituencies which
elect a college educated leader versus those which elect a non-college educated leader are similar
in all characteristics except the education level of the leader.16 Hence this discontinuity at zero
margin of votes is essentially similar to random assignment of treatment. Since the main explana-
tory variable is at the district level, we aggregate over the constituency specific discontinuities in
treatment assignment within district; thus we have a fuzzy regression discontinuity design in our












































































Equation 2 is the second stage and Equation 3 is the first stage. The main explanatory variable G
dst
which is potentially endogenous, is instrumented by the proportion of educated leaders who win in
close elections against a non-college educated candidate GC
dst
. Note that unlike the outcome of a
close election, the existence of close election may not be random: it may depend on the number of
educated candidates or the prevailing political competitiveness in the district. Therefore we control
for the fraction of seats that had close elections between college educated and non-college educated
candidates in the district (TC
dst
). This also captures any direct effect of having close elections,
such as greater effectiveness of leaders due to higher political competitiveness in the region. The
specification also controls for a third order polynomial in the victory margins of every college
16In the empirical analysis educated leader refers to a leader who has completed college and obtained a degree or a
diploma.
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educated versus non-college educated election (close or non-close) in the district. The margin of
victory between a college educated and a non-college educated candidate in election j is M
jdst
.
The polynomials, denoted by F(M
jdst
), are interacted with I
jdst
which indicates the existence of an
election between a college educated versus non-college educated politician j in the district during
the period considered. We also test if the results are robust to varying degrees of the polynomial
function. Our model is based closely on model used to study the impact of women leaders on
health and education outcomes by Clots-Figueras (2012) and Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2014).
The rest of the variables included in the 2SLS analysis are same as in the OLS regression. In
both these models, the standard errors are clustered at the district level to allow for any possible
correlation in the error terms among observations within the same district.
5.5 Results
In this section, we present results of impact of educated politicians on our main outcome variables
of learning levels, enrollment and schools. The dependent variables for learning levels measure
cognitive outcomes in terms of standardized reading and mathematics score17. On enrollment,
we investigate the impact of leaders education on probability of being out of school. The unit of
analysis for learning and enrollment outcomes is the individual child. For schooling outcomes, we
analyze impact on index of school infrastructure and grants received by the school. All dependent
variables for school outcomes from DISE data are averaged at the district level and unit of analysis
is the district-year.
For each of the child-level dependent variables, we present three different specifications where
control variables are gradually added to investigate if the results remain comparable across these
models. The main variable of interest is the fraction of seats in the district held by educated leaders.
The common covariates included in all specifications are district fixed effects and year fixed effects.
Beginning with the most parsimonious specification that excludes any other covariate, control
variables at the level of individual, household,village and district are cumulatively added. The
final model also includes state specific year fixed effects to consider time varying unobservables at
the state level. For school outcomes only two models for each dependent variable are presented as
17We use age-wise standardized test scores as a measure of cognitive outcome. For any given age between 6–16,
we consider children of that age from all the survey years, and calculate the mean and standard deviation of their test
scores in a specific subject, and thus calculate the z-score for that subject. The implication of using these standardized
test scores (z-scores) as outcomes is that the magnitude of effect from the regression can be interpreted in terms of
standard deviation in test scores.
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there are no individual or village level data to use as controls in DISE.
We begin with the results from the OLS specification before discussing the 2SLS results that take
into account the potential problem of endogeneity of the main explanatory variable. Table A1, A2
and A3 present the OLS results for reading score, mathematics score and enrollment respectively.
Considering that children at the primary and post-primary levels may have very different learning
trajectories, separate regressions are estimated for children in the age-group of 6–10 years and
11–16 years.
The OLS regressions show no significant effect of the proportion of college-educated leaders in the
district on children’s reading and mathematics scores or on probability of being out of school. Only
in one of the specifications that does not control for any observable covariates, we find positive
effect on reading score of 11–16 year old children. It shows that a 10 percentage point increase
in the fraction of college graduate leaders in the district leads to 0.006 standard deviation increase
in the reading score of children in this age-group. This effect is significant at 10 percent level.
However, this regression does not control for any observable child, household, village, or district
level characteristics, and once these control variables are included, the effect becomes insignificant
and also reduces in magnitude. Thus, the OLS results do not show any systematic effect of college
graduate leaders on enrollment and learning outcomes of children.
Table A5 presents results from OLS regressions for school outcomes. We find a negative significant
impact of educated leaders on average grants received by schools in the district. On average, having
one additional graduate leader in the district ( 11 percentage points increase in number of educated
leaders in an average district with 9 constituencies) leads to decrease in average grants for schools
by Rs.468. The impact is not significant on school infrastructure.
As discussed earlier, these regressions could suffer from endogeneity problem and not capture the
causal effect of college graduate leaders on the outcomes, hence in the subsequent analysis we
focus on the instrumental variable estimation in a fuzzy regression discontinuity setting.
Validity of Instrument
Before analyzing the effect of graduate leaders on education outcomes, it is imperative to test
whether the instrument is a good predictor of the endogenous variable in the first stage of the 2SLS
estimation. Corresponding to the reading score regressions, Table 5.5 presents the first stage re-
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Figure 5.1: First Stage Illustration: Sample of all Districts with Close Elections
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Table 5.5: First Stage of the 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s Reading Score
Fraction of seats won by a graduate
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate 1.052*** 1.035*** 0.987*** 1.039*** 1.018*** 0.973***
in close elections (0.144) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.125) (0.125)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,262,927 896,820 869,544 1,272,189 928,499 904,149
Number of districts 563 563 545 563 563 545
R-squared 0.387 0.399 0.433 0.392 0.401 0.438
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as
between a graduate and a non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner
up is less than 3 percent. Individual level controls are dummy variables for children’s age cohort and gender,
and whether mother went to school. Household controls are household size, square of household size, type
of building, whether household owns television or mobile phone, and whether use of electricity was observed
in the household. Village controls include indicators of whether village has access to pucca road, electricity,
ration shop, and bank. District controls are baseline characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include
urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school,
caste composition and proportion of females in rural areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
gressions for 6–10 and 11–16 age-groups. The coefficient of the instrumental variable, i.e. fraction
of seats won by a graduate leader in close elections, is found to be statistically significant at 1
percent level in all specifications and for both the age-groups. The first stage F-statistics for the in-
strumental variable ranges between 53 to 60 for 6–10 age-group and 60 to 66 for 11–16 age-group.
The point estimate is also stable. Result from the final model for the sample of 6–10 age-group
shows that holding the fraction of constituencies with close election constant, a 10 percentage
point increase in the fraction of constituencies where a graduate leader won against a non-graduate
leader in a close election leads to 9.87 percentage point increase in the overall fraction of seats held
by college graduate leaders in the district. The equivalent estimate for 11–16 age-group is 9.73.
The results are similar for first stage analysis using NSS education and DISE data (Tables A4 and
A6).
We also provide graphical illustration of the first stage. We plot the overall fraction of college-
educated legislators against the average vote margin between college-educated and non-college
educated candidates across districts. Figure 5.1 uses all the elections in districts with at least one
close election (sample on which our identification is based), while Figure 5.2 restricts sample
155
Figure 5.2: First Stage Illustration: Sample of all Districts with at least one Election
between Educated and Less-Educated Candidates
to districts which have exactly one election between college-educated and non-college graduate
politicians. We use bin size of one percentage point as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008),
and we plot a lowess smoothing line on each side of the discontinuity. A college-educated politican
winning a close election in a district increases the fraction of constituencies in the district won by
a college-educated politicians by about 10 percentage points (Figure 5.1).
Validity of Close Elections Assumption
We conduct several checks to ensure the validity of our assumption that results in close elections
are quasi-random. In summary statistics, we saw that the probability of winning a close election is
the same for graduate and non-graduate candidates. But some recent studies have questioned the
validity of the close election premise by showing that
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Table 5.6: Comparing Candidate and Constituency Characteristics across Close Elections





Proportion of winners who 0.067 0.050 0.017
are women (0.019)
Proportion of winners with 0.33 0.31 0.026
criminal cases (0.038)
Average number of college- 3.55 3.43 0.12
educated candidates (0.21)
Average number of candidates 9.18 8.86 0.32
contesting elections (0.50)
Proportion of winners who 0.11 0.13 -0.019
were incumbents (0.049)
Average votes received 48772.0 48693.7 78.3
by winners (1621.5)
Average total votes in 128010.7 126951.2 1059.4
the constituency (3639.9)
Number of non-college educated
winners in close elections
314
Number of college educated
winner in close elections
279
Total close elections 593
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 5.3: Continuity of Vote Margin between Graduate and Non-Graduate (running
variable)
incumbency status and previous vote share are strongly correlated with winning close elections
in the United States House elections, pointing to the possibility of manipulation (Caughey and
Sekhon, 2011; Grimmer, Hersh, Feinstein, and Carpenter, 2011). However Eggers et al. (2015)
find that such sorting in close elections is unique to U.S. House elections in the post-war period
and does not hold forth in other countries including India. Along these lines, we test for differences
in various constituency and candidate characteristics in close elections. Table 5.6 shows that these
are not significantly different across close elections where graduate or non-graduate candidates
win.
Moreover, we test for the possibility that the outcome of a close election is biased in favour of
the incumbent or a party that has strategic influence over the election process. In particular, we
consider whether the college graduate candidate wins in a close election between college graduate
and non-college graduate candidates, and regress this outcome on the party affiliation dummies
of the candidates who fought in those elections, along with other constituency and district level
characteristics (column 1 of Table 5.7). In another specification we also include the history of close
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elections and the proportion of college graduate winners in the district as additional explanatory
variables in this regression (column 2 of Table 5.7). We find that the outcome of a close election
is not significantly predicted by any of the variables related to political parties or past election
outcomes.
The RD design assumptions might be violated if there is vote manipulation leading to bias in
the outcome of close election. To verify that there is no maniuplation involved we check if the
distribution of the vote margin is continuous around the neighborhood of zero. We plot the density
of vote margin (Figure 5.3) and test if difference in the densities on either side of the zero point
is significant (McCrary, 2008). The estimated difference is 0.099 and is statistically insignificant.
The election commission of India which conducts elections in India is known to be independent
and politically neutral and elections are considered free and fair.
In addition, to satisfy the RD assumptions one must show that districts where more graduates
win in close election are not systematically different than where more non-graudates win. In
Table 5.8 we compare various characteristics in the two types of districts. The districts with more
graduate winners do not differ significantly in any of the characteristics from districts with more
non-graduate winners in close elections.
We have shown that several of RD assumptions are valid for our data, but our RD estimates might
still not have external validity. Though we cannot prove this conclusively, we do provide some
indications that our results have considerable external validity.
First, we show that the identity of constituencies and districts that have close elections between
graduate and non-graduates changes substantially over the elections. The average change in the
proportion of a district’s constituencies that experience close elections over multiple elections is 71
percent. This indicates that we are not picking up some feature of districts that have close elections
and points to external validity. Also the percentange of graduate winners in close elections within
a district changes by 61 percent over election cycles, indicating little correlation between graduates
winning close elections and district characteristics.
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Table 5.7: Probablity that College-Educated Candidate Wins in Close Elections
(Dependent Variable: Dummy indicating whether winner in close election is
college-educated)
(1) (2)
Congress parties contesting election 0.136 -0.491
(0.207) (0.458)
Hindu parties contesting election 0.0410 -0.0312
(0.150) (0.381)
Regional parties contesting election 0.185 0.136
(0.341) (0.404)
Left parties contesting election -0.0726 -0.219
(0.153) (0.321)
Independent or other parties contesting election -0.115 -0.256
(0.191) (0.472)
Reserved constituency -0.174 -0.0310
(0.125) (0.322)
Proportion of urban population in district in 2004-05 -0.223 -0.0436
(0.347) (1.001)








Proportion of ST population in 2004-05 -0.0426 -0.625
(0.187) (0.581)
Proportion of SC population in 2004-05 -0.813 0
(0.611) (.)
Proportion of OBC population in 2004-05 -0.0481 -1.187**
(0.434) (0.585)
Proportion of female population in 2004-05 0 0
(.) (.)
Dummy if district had close elections in past 0.373
(0.378)





*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5.8: Comparing District Specific Characteristics across Districts-Election Years with
Different Number of Educated Politician Winners in Close Elections.








Proportion of urban population 0.22 0.20 0.02
(0.02)








Proportion of rural ST population 0.13 0.14 -0.01
(0.03)
Proportion of rural SC population 0.21 0.20 0.02
(0.01)
Proportion of rural OBC population 0.41 0.42 -0.02
(0.03)
Proportion of rural female 0.49 0.49 -0.00
(0.00)
Proportion of SC/ST seats 0.29 0.31 -0.02
(0.03)
Total seats 8.00 7.71 0.30
(0.48)
Proportion of college educated leaders
win in non-close elections
0.62 0.62 -0.00
(0.03)
Proportion non-college educated leaders
win in non-close elections
0.34 0.35 -0.01
(0.02)
Number of district-election year with
more non-college educated winners in
close elections
220
Number of district-election year with
more college educated winners in close
elections
185
Number of district-election year with
same number of college and non-college
educated winners in close elections
40
Total number of district-election year
with close elections
445
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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5.5.1 Main Results: Impact of educated leaders
Learning outcomes
The second stage estimates for the effect on reading score and maths score are shown in Tables 5.9
and 5.10 respectively. In addition to the variables considered in the OLS specification, the 2SLS
model includes fraction of seats that had close election between a graduate and a non-graduate
in the district, third order polynomials in the vote margins in every graduate and a non-graduate
election as additional covariates. We find that there is no significant effect of having a higher
proportion of graduate leaders in the districts on the learning score of children in either 6–10 or
11–16 years age-group. Even the point estimates suggest that the magnitude of effect is quite low.
For instance, the estimate from the full model for 6–10 year old children’s reading score implies
that a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of college-educated politicians in the district
would lead to a 0.0037 standard deviation increase in the reading score. The corresponding 95
percent confidence interval would be between -0.017 and 0.024. Thus, even if we take the upper
bound of the confidence interval, the effect size remains negligible. Similar conclusions can be
drawn from the findings on other learning outcomes including English scores presented in Table
A11.
Enrollment in schools
The results for second stage of probability of being out of school using NSS data are presented in
Table 5.11. We do not find any significant relationship between fraction of seats won by graduates
in the district and the overall enrollment rate in the district. We repeat this analysis only for rural
and urban areas separately and find no effect (not shown here). We also repeat the analysis with
ASER data for rural areas with similar results (Table A7).
This is in contrast to finding by Clots-Figueras (2012) who using a similar empirical stratergy finds
that female political representation decreases the chances that individual is out of school. Clots
studies impact of female leaders on education and for the period 1971 to 1999, as compared to our
study which studies impact of formal education of the leader for more recent period 2004-2014.
We also consider grade progression as another outcome variable. 18 Unlike current enrollment,
18We construct grade progression as the ratio of actual grade attained to ideal grade for age; hence it is expressed as:
Grade/(Age- 6). The numerator measures the actual grade attained, which is the last grade if a child has dropped
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Table 5.9: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s Reading Score
Reading Score
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.014 0.086 0.037 -0.020 0.085 0.134
(0.123) (0.124) (0.104) (0.096) (0.098) (0.103)
Close election fraction 0.021 0.000 -0.025 -0.069 -0.128** -0.150**
(0.069) (0.065) (0.053) (0.048) (0.055) (0.060)
Female child 0.007* 0.008* -0.009** -0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Child’s mother went to school 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.222*** 0.221***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Household size -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Square of household size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House semi-pucca 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.091***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
House pucca 0.206*** 0.199*** 0.161*** 0.158***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Household owns television 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.103*** 0.102***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Household owns mobile phone 0.120*** 0.129*** 0.144*** 0.150***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Household’s electricity use observed 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.036***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Village has electricity 0.030** 0.046*** 0.025** 0.034***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Village has pucca road 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Village has ration shop 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Village has bank 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,262,927 896,820 869,544 1,272,189 928,499 904,149
Number of districts 563 563 545 563 563 545
First Stage F-stat 53.68 60.36 55.37 60.98 66.03 60.88
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as
between a graduate and a non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner
up is less than 3 percent. District controls are baseline characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include
urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school,
caste composition and proportion of females in rural areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5.10: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s Mathematics Score
Mathematics Score
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.115 0.037 0.014 -0.164 0.007 0.108
(0.150) (0.155) (0.112) (0.168) (0.179) (0.131)
Close election fraction 0.009 -0.057 -0.082 -0.066 -0.141 -0.163**
(0.077) (0.077) (0.055) (0.078) (0.091) (0.063)
Female child -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.084*** -0.082***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Child’s mother went to school 0.251*** 0.253*** 0.258*** 0.259***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Household size -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Square of household size 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House semi-pucca 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.098***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
House pucca 0.209*** 0.202*** 0.196*** 0.190***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Household owns television 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.126*** 0.128***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Household owns mobile phone 0.116*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.137***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Household’s electricity use observed 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Village has electricity 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.026* 0.019
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Village has pucca road 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Village has ration shop 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Village has bank 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.018*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,251,958 892,605 865,509 1,267,391 926,214 901,972
Number of districts 563 563 545 563 563 545
First Stage F-stat 53.68 60.30 55.25 60.94 65.93 60.77
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as
between a graduate and a non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner
up is less than 3 percent. District controls are baseline characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include
urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school,
caste composition and proportion of females in rural areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5.11: 2SLS Estimates of the Impact on Proportion Out of School (NSS Data)
Proportion out of school
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate 0.032 0.028 0.021 0.055 0.056 0.045
(0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 108,521 108,493 108,493 131,693 131,651 131,651
Number of districts 574 574 574 574 574 574
First Stage F-stat 75.65 75.75 75.52 80.17 80.27 82.38
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as
between a graduate and a non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner
up is less than 3 percent. District controls are baseline characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include
urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school,
caste composition and proportion of females in rural areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
attainment of grade commensurate with one’s age, or grade progression, is sensitive to the age
when a child dropped out. School dropout is still a matter of concern especially at the secondary
level of education when opportunity cost of education increases for boys who start entering the
labour market, and girls are often married off or engaged in household work. For children who
are currently enrolled, this variable would capture various other aspects such as whether the child
had late school-starting age or went through grade rentention – which are indicated as important
determinants of human capital in the literature. Even when we consider grade progression as
an alternative dependent variable, we do not find any significant effect of graduate versus non-
graduate leaders on this outcome (Table A9).
out, and zero if a child has never been enrolled in school. The denominator captures the ideal grade for age under the
assumption that a child is supposed to enter the first grade in school at the age of six years. Thereafter, the ideal grade
attainment increases by one for every incremental year.
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School Infrastructure and Funding
We analyze the impact of having educated representatives on a range of school indicators including
school physical infrastructure, financial grants and other outcomes using smaller sample of data
on schools collected by ASER (children’s and teachers’ attendance and midday meal program in
schools). These outcomes could be more directly impacted by leaders as they have a more direct
role to play in deciding and channeling funding to schools. DISE collects data from all recognized
schools in India (> 1 million each year) and we use district averages for outcomes in the regression
analysis. ASER collects school data from one government school in each rural village19 it surveys
( 56-76K across the years). We do separate analysis using both the datasets.
We find no significant impact of having higher proportion of graduate leaders on school infrastruc-
ture using both DISE (Table 5.12) and ASER data20 (Table A14). Similarly, we find no evidence
that graduate politicians result in any change in the extent of grants received by schools using either
DISE (Table 5.12) or ASER21 data (Table A14). We also do not find any impact on prevalence of
midday meals in schools using data from ASER.
Finally, we analyze if graduate politicians improve teachers’ and children’s attendance in schools22
using data from ASER. For children’s attendance we find a small negative but insignificant impact
of having an educated politician, but impact on teacher’s attendance is positive and insignificant
(Table A13).
Overall, educated political representatives do not make significant difference across a range of
schooling outcomes. This finding is in line with our other results that educated leaders are no
better at improving learning outcomes and out-of-school status than non-graduate leaders. Even if
one considers learning outcomes and enrollment as a difficult outcome to be impacted by political
leaders, through funding and lobbying politicians can impact schooling facilities directly. But we
do not find consistent impact of educated politicians on schooling services for their constituents.
19If the village has a government school for class 1 to 7/8 that is preferred over other schools to be visited. If village
does not have school for classes 1 to 7/8 then the primary school (teaching classes 1 to 4/5) with highest enrollment is
visited.
20PCA for school infrastructure for ASER data is created using dummies for presence of blackboard and learning
material in class 2 and class 4, drinking water, toilet and library books in school.
21For ASER we combine three grants (school development, school maintenance and teacher learning material) to
generate a PCA which is used as the dependent variable.
22Children and teachers attendance on the day of the survey is observed by the interviewer and recorded. The
attendance ratio is defined as the ratio of total children attending the school on the day of the survey (teachers present)
to the total number of enrolled students based on the register (appointed teachers).
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Table 5.12: 2SLS Estimates of the Impact on Schools (DISE data)
PCA for school facilites Average school grants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of 0.179 -0.134 1337.4 4412.8
seats won by a graduate (0.240) (0.181) (7041.3) (6343.2)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of districts 2607 2167 2692 2240
First stage F statistics 60 57 60 55
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as between a
graduate and a non-graduate in which the winner beat the runner up by less than 3 percent of votes. District controls are
interacted with year dummies and include data from 2004-05 National Sample Survey on urbanization rate, proportion
of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition and proportion
of females in rural areas. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
5.5.2 Robustness Analysis
We put our results to robustness checks in this section to investigate if varying the specification or
range of political leaders who are supposed to have an impact changes our results.
Different Education Cuttoff
In our baseline analysis we compared college graduate leader’s achievements in education sector
with non-graduate leaders. It might be the case that the our results depend on the education cuttoffs
we have chosen and that other comparisons would yield different results. We test robustness of our
results to this by altering the leader’s education cuttoffs to higher secondary (12th grade) and sec-
ondary education (10th grade). Leaders who have completed higher secondary do not perform any
better at providing education outcomes for their constituents than leaders who have not completed
higher secondary. And similarly leaders who have completed secondary education do not perform
any better than leaders who have not completed secondary education in any of the outcomes we
investigate (Table 5.13).
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Table 5.13: Robustness: Alternative Cutoff of Leader’s Education
Panel B: Impact on reading scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of seats 0.299 0.204
won by 10th pass (0.228) (0.189)
Fraction of seats -0.002 0.062
won by 12th pass (0.104) (0.093)
Observations 869,544 869,544 904,149 904,149
Number of districts 545 545 545 545














Panel B: Impact on mathematics scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of seats 0.199 0.257
won by 10th pass (0.176) (0.244)
Fraction of seats 0.031 0.064
won by 12th pass (0.103) (0.113)
Observations 865,509 865,509 901,972 901,972
Number of districts 545 545 545 545














Panel C: Impact on being out of school (NSS data)
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion of –0.0559 –0.101
seats won by 10th pass (0.0796) (0.0985)
Proportion of –0.0204 0.0189
seats won by 12th pass (0.0441) (0.0488)
Observations 107,391 107,391 130,354 130,354
Number of districts 567 567 567 567














Panel D: Impact on schools (DISE data)
PCA for school facilites Average school grants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of seats 0.557 6266.0
won by 10th pass (0.465) (14984.8)
Fraction of seats 0.155 1605.8
won by 12th pass (0.237) (5225.5)
Observations 2,378 2,378 2,453 2,453
Number of districts 518 518 519 519














Note: The regressions include the full set of controls as reported in Table
5.9. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in paren-
theses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Different Lag Periods
It might be the case that the policies an educated leader implements may take time to show an
effect on the outcomes. A priori it is not clear how long it takes for a policy to show effect after
its implementation, therefore this remains an empirical issue. The main results discussed above
consider the average education level (whether college graduate or not) of leaders in the district
over the last three years (current year and the past two years). This measure is similar to the
one used by Clots-Figueras (2012) who finds a significant positive effect of having female versus
male politicians on education of citizens. As a robustness exercise, we use different lag periods,
in particular the average over the last four years (Lag 3) and two years (Lag 1), to measure the
explanatory variable. Irrespective of the lag period used, the effect of college graduate leaders, in
comparison with non-college graduate leaders, remains statistically insignificant for all outcomes
(Table 5.14).
Alternative Definition of Close Election
We define close elections as those where the margin of victory is less than 3 percent. We test
whether the results are robust to alternative cut-off points of 1, 2, and 4 percent levels, and find that
the results remain qualitatively unchanged (Table 5.15).
Varying Degrees of Polynomials in Vote Margins
Given the fuzzy regression discontinuity design of our empirical model, it is important to control
for polynomials in the vote margins so that any effect of the vote margin itself is controlled in a
flexible way. This ensures that the instrument exploits variation only in the close neighborhood
around the discontinuity to justify a quasi-random assignment of treatment. While the main re-
gressions include third order polynomials, our results (not shown here) are robust to using only
first and second order polynomials as well.
Different Measures of Learning Outcomes
We have so far used the learning outcomes as continuous variable, but learning outcome is an
ordinal variable. Estimating the regressions using ordered probit or ordered logit would be more
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Table 5.14: Robustness: Different Lag Periods
Panel A: Impact on reading scores
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
Lag 1 Lag 3 Lag1 Lag 3
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.003 0.002 0.103 0.117
(0.089) (0.148) (0.085) (0.127)
Observations 998,524 712,455 1,031,315 746,926
Number of districts 549 543 549 543
First Stage F-stat 55.48 50.67 62.35 53.93
Panel B: Impact on mathematics scores
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
Lag 1 Lag 3 Lag1 Lag 3
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.026 -0.018 0.108 0.046
(0.095) (0.154) (0.114) (0.161)
Observations 993,964 709,434 1,028,937 745,292
Number of districts 549 543 549 543
First Stage F-stat 55.50 50.41 62.25 53.80
Panel C: Impact on being out of school (NSS Data)
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
Lag 1 Lag 3 Lag1 Lag 3
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.009 0.054 0.019 0.043
(0.029) (0.046) (0.029) (0.042)
Observations 125,459 82,413 150,035 100,711
Number of districts 578 573 578 573
First Stage F-stat 68.72 56.16 76.76 60.98
Panel D: Impact on schools (DISE data)
PCA for school facilites Average school grants
Lag 1 Lag 3 Lag1 Lag 3
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.130 -0.0915 5913.3 4875.2
(0.171) (0.213) (5967.6) (6980.6)
Observations 2483 2181 2581 2248
Number of districts 520 518 521 519
First stage F statistics 49 49 49 46
Note: The regressions include the full set of controls as reported in Table 5.9. Robust
standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *** Significant at the
1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent
level. ‘Lag 1’ considers the average education of leaders in the district over the past 1
year and the current year (i.e., average over last 2 years). ‘Lag 3’ considers the aver-
age education of leaders over the past 3 years and the current year (i.e. average over
last 4 years).
170
Table 5.15: Robustness: Alternative Definitions of Close Election Margin
Panel A: Impact on reading scores
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
Close election margin Close election margin
1 % 2 % 4 % 1 % 2 % 4 %
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.041 0.069 0.085 0.154 0.110 0.138
(0.182) (0.106) (0.091) (0.129) (0.094) (0.085)
Observations 869,544 869,544 869,544 904,149 904,149 904,149
Number of districts 545 545 545 545 545 545
First Stage F-stat 43.02 83.66 75.16 43.43 88.94 79.56
Panel B: Impact on mathematics scores
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
Close election margin Close election margin
1 % 2 % 4 % 1 % 2 % 4 %
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.022 0.101 0.043 0.126 0.166 0.097
(0.181) (0.109) (0.095) (0.191) (0.124) (0.107)
Observations 865,509 865,509 865,509 901,972 901,972 901,972
Number of districts 545 545 545 545 545 545
First Stage F-stat 42.82 83.25 74.96 43.28 88.68 79.44
Panel C: Impact on being out of school (NSS data)
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
Close election margin Close election margin
1 % 2 % 4 % 1 % 2 % 4 %
Fraction of seats won by a graduate 0.074 0.049 0.037 0.007 0.068* 0.024
(0.056) (0.039) (0.034) (0.047) (0.035) (0.033)
Observations 108,493 108,493 108,493 131,651 131,651 131,651
Number of districts 574 574 574 574 574 574
First Stage F-stat 51.21 81.26 94.63 50.27 85.18 103.9
Panel D: Impact on schools (DISE data)
PCA for school facilites Average school grants
Close election margin Close election margin
1 % 2 % 4 % 1 % 2 % 4 %
Fraction of seats won by a graduate 0.385 0.0697 -0.0108 2271.7 2195.2 -807.2
(0.297) (0.196) (0.170) (7882.2) (6926.9) (6032.8)
Observations 2378 2378 2378 2453 2453 2453
Number of districts 518 518 518 519 519 519
First stage F statistics 48 74 69 46 72 69
Note: The regressions include the full set of controls as reported in Table 5.9. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. **
Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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appropriate but they limit the estimation models we can use. To test the robustness of our results
to ordinal nature of the dependent variable we use binary variables indicating the level of learning
as alternative dependent variable. For reading, these variables reflect whether a child can read
letters, words, short paragraph and short stories. For mathematics, each of them measure one of
the categories from single-digit number recognition, double-digit number recognition, two-digit
subtraction with carry over, and three digit by one digit division. Linear probability models are
estimated using 2SLS method following the same specification as the main regressions presented
above. Table 5.16 shows that there is no differential impact of having a college graduate leader
over a non-college graduate leader on any of these outcomes.
5.5.3 Heterogeneity Analysis
We explore if the effect of educated politician is heterogeneous with respect to various district,
household and child specific characteristics. Although we do not find any significant effect in
the overall sample, it is possible that college graduate leaders are instrumental in implementing
policies that benefit certain sections of the society. For instance, if educated leaders are motivated
towards reducing inequality, it may benefit poorer regions. Such effects may not show up in the
aggregate sample. Therefore, dividing the sample into subsamples, the 2SLS model with full set










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Heterogeneity in poverty, urbanization and education levels in districts
The first analysis in this section tests if the effect varies with the baseline poverty rates in the
districts. Based on estimates from the NSS 2004-05 data, we categorize the districts into high,
medium and low poverty rate groups. High poverty districts are ones where more than 67 percent
of rural population has consumption expenditure below the 40th percentile of the nation-wide
distribution of consumption expenditure. Low poverty districts have less than 31 percent of the
rural population having consumption expenditure below this level. Medium poverty districts are
the ones that have 31-67 percent of rural population in this category. The results are presented in
Table 5.17. Having college graduate leaders does not make any significant difference in math score
irrespective of the district poverty rates. For reading score, we find significant positive effect at 10
percent levels for the 11–16 year old children residing in the high poverty districts. Probability of
being out of school also declines significantly for low poverty districts, but school infrastructure
is worse in low poverty districts if they have more graduate leaders. For all the other cases the
effect is insignificant, we do not find any compelling evidence that college graduate leaders may
be effective in either rich or poor districts.
Next we test if the impact of educated leaders on various outcomes differs by baseline level of
urbanization and initial level of education in the districts. Districts with urbanization rate of 15
percent or less are categorized as low urbanization districts, while others are categorized as high
urbanization. We also group districts below and above median level of primary education com-
pletion rates of adults in 2004-05. From Table 5.18, we find that there except for a few cases for
low education level districts, there is no significant effect of educated leaders across rural/urban or
different urbanization or education levels of districts. There is negative significant effect of grad-
uate leaders in districts with baseline low education levels on learning scores (both reading and
mathematics) for 6–10 age group and enrollment in 11–16 age group.
Heterogeneity in household economic status
Heterogeneity based on households economic status are explored next. From ASER data we use
the type of material used for construction of house based as proxy for economic status of the
household. We classify households into Kutcha House (houses made out of mud, thatch or low
quality materials), Semi Pucca house (houses made of mix of low quality and more permanent
material) and Pucca house (houses made of high quality material). We present the results for these
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Table 5.17: Heterogeneity in Impact - Poverty Level in Districts
Panel A: Impact on reading scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won 0.089 0.074 0.206 0.406* 0.080 0.074
by graduates (0.247) (0.143) (0.168) (0.244) (0.138) (0.179)
Observations 224,090 430,746 214,708 237,137 440,698 226,314
Number of districts 143 267 135 143 267 135
First stage F statistics 14 33 73 15 36 72











Panel B: Impact on mathematics scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won –0.135 0.118 0.202 –0.044 0.190 –0.084
by graduates (0.246) (0.145) (0.219) (0.284) (0.151) (0.265)
Observations 223,166 428,671 213,672 236,598 439,645 225,729
Number of districts 143 267 135 143 267 135
First stage F statistics 14 33 73 15 36 72











Panel C: Impact on proportion out of school (NSS data)
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won 0.050 0.001 –0.147*** 0.025 –0.012 –0.022
by graduates (0.064) (0.057) (0.038) (0.112) (0.060) (0.062)
Observations 22,714 51,515 23,070 28,094 60,858 29,128
Number of districts 131 252 127 131 252 127
First stage F statistics 16 30 46 17 36 51











Panel D: Impact on schools (DISE data)
PCA for school facilites Average school grants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won –0.0676 0.254 –0.857* 283.6 7960.7 2492.5
by graduates (0.641) (0.278) (0.369)(13109.4) (6024.5) (9855.8)
Observations 607 1,163 608 624 1,193 636
Number of districts 132 253 133 132 253 134
First stage F statistics 6 33 39 6 31 38











Note: See notes to Table 5.9. All regressions include the full set of control variables as
reported in Table 5.9. High poverty districts are ones where more than 67% of rural
population is in the bottom 40th national consumption percentile. Rich poverty districts
have less than 31% of the rural population in the bottom 40th percentile by consump-
tion. Medium poverty districts are ones with between 31-67% of rural population in the
bottom 40th consumption percentile.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level
are in parentheses.
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Table 5.18: Heterogenity in Impact - Urbanization and Level of Education in District
Panel A: Impact on reading scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction of seats won 0.004 0.100 –0.244** 0.279 0.066 0.249 –0.020 0.278
by graduates (0.099) (0.181) (0.118) (0.210) (0.116) (0.155) (0.100) (0.193)
Observations 421,583 447,961 432,794 436,750 416,691 487,458 429,495 474,654
Number of districts 258 287 271 274 258 287 271 274
First stage F statistics 44 34 29 31 50 31 32 28




















Panel B: Impact on mathematics scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction of seats won 0.059 –0.049 –0.246* 0.334 0.103 0.147 –0.062 0.344
by graduates (0.108) (0.207) (0.128) (0.219) (0.150) (0.223) (0.139) (0.241)
Observations 419,532 445,977 430,978 434,531 415,631 486,341 428,486 473,486
Number of districts 258 287 271 274 258 287 271 274
First stage F statistics 44 34 29 31 50 31 32 28




















Panel C: Impact on proportion out of school (NSS data)
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction of seats won 0.034 0.024 0.015 –0.069 0.072 –0.007 0.119* –0.024
by graduates (0.060) (0.035) (0.047) (0.068) (0.067) (0.057) (0.067) (0.060)
Observations 43,333 53,966 46,645 50,654 49,282 68,798 53,888 64,192
Number of districts 239 271 254 256 239 271 254 256
First stage F statistics 43 38 36 37 47 38 41 34














Panel D: Impact on schools (DISE data)
PCA for school facilites Average school grants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction of seats won –0.0887 –0.365 –0.243 –0.0197 5100 –6018.5 –540.9 14588.8
by graduates (0.178) (0.398) (0.220) (0.328) (6870.9) (3935.4) (5118.0) (15428.6)
Observations 2,378 2,335 1,168 1,210 2,453 2,419 1,183 1,270
Number of districts 518 510 257 261 519 514 257 262
First stage F statistics 54 57 28 31 51 54 26 30














Note: See notes to Table 5.9. All regressions include the full set of control variables as reported in Table 5.9. Dis-
tricts with urbanization rate of 15 percent or less are categorized as low urbanization districts, while others are
categorized as high urbanization. Districts where 51 or lower percentage of adults have completed primary edu-
cation are low education level districts and other districts are classified as high education level districts. We use
NSS data for proportion of children out of school in both rural and urban areas and ASER for learning levels in
rural areas.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.
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Table 5.19: Heterogenity in Impact - Type of Residence
Panel A: Impact on reading scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won –0.034 –0.027 0.068 0.223 0.155 –0.026
by graduates (0.148) (0.134) (0.096) (0.173) (0.142) (0.072)
Observations 280,040 268,224 321,280 270,405 277,659 356,085
Number of districts 545 545 545 545 545 545
First stage F statistics 36 52 60 39 58 63














Panel B: Impact on mathematics scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won –0.026 0.026 –0.004 0.201 0.195 –0.056
by graduates (0.164) (0.142) (0.110) (0.206) (0.177) (0.105)
Observations 278,575 266,964 319,970 269,624 276,995 355,353
Number of districts 545 545 545 545 545 545
First stage F statistics 36 52 60 39 58 63














Panel C: Impact on proportion out of school (NSS data)
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won 0.004 –0.061* –0.082* 0.011 0.062 0.132***
by graduates (0.064) (0.035) (0.043) (0.080) (0.057) (0.049)
Observations 40,411 38,115 18,766 41,251 47,878 28,946
Number of districts 508 510 506 508 510 507




















Note: See notes to Table 5.9. All regressions include the full set of control vari-
ables as reported in Table 5.9. A pucca house is one whose roof and walls
are made of permanent material (brick, cement etc). A kutcha house is one
whose roof and flooring are made of temporary material (mud, grass etc). A
semi-pucca house is one that has fixed walls but roof is made of temporary
material.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the
district level are in parentheses.
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Table 5.20: Heterogenity in Impact - Gender and Mothers Education
Panel A: Impact on reading scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction of seats won –0.008 0.083 –0.099 0.088 0.156 0.116 0.084 0.117
by graduates (0.104) (0.114) (0.132) (0.108) (0.101) (0.116) (0.140) (0.095)
Observations 462,741 406,803 363,983 505,561 471,751 432,398 416,941 487,208
Number of districts 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 545























Panel B: Impact on mathematics scores
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction of seats won 0.020 0.001 –0.152 0.093 0.178 0.036 –0.009 0.139
by graduates (0.110) (0.125) (0.144) (0.114) (0.121) (0.152) (0.161) (0.124)
Observations 460,608 404,901 362,266 503,243 470,663 431,309 415,837 486,135
Number of districts 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 545























Panel C: Impact on proportion out of school (NSS data)
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction of seats won –0.042 0.029 –0.029 –0.034 –0.022 0.139** 0.133**–0.005
by graduates (0.039) (0.043) (0.075) (0.029) (0.041) (0.062) (0.068) (0.034)
Observations 52,173 45,126 30,810 42,839 63,329 54,751 43,895 55,050
Number of districts 510 510 495 510 510 510 505 510























Note: See notes to Table 5.9. All regressions include the full set of control variables as reported
in Table 5.9.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in
parentheses.
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sub-samples in Table 5.19. College graduate politicians perform the same as non-college graduate
leaders for all kinds of residence.
For NSS data we have information on consumption of households and we use per-capita con-
sumption to divide households into three groups (bottom 30 percent, middle 40 percent and top 30
percent). We find that for 6-10 age group there is a positive impact significant at 10 percent level
of significance for the richer households, but negative impact on enrollment for 11-16 age group
for the richest households.
Heterogeneity in Individual Characteristics
Table 5.20 presents results of heterogeneity analysis based on child level characteristics: gender
and whether mother went to school. If graduate politicians are more aware of gender disparities in
society and want to elevate those then we can expect to see bigger impact in education outcomes on
girls than boys. Mother’s education level is an important indicator of the household environment
and has direct bearing on child’s learning outcomes. Children with mothers who have not gone
to school tend to have lower schooling outcomes and any improvement in schooling environment
might have a differential impact on them as compared to other children. College graduate political
leaders do not perform better than other politicians across these groupings for learning outcomes.
But graduate leaders led to lower enrollment rates for girls and children with mothers who have
not gone to school in 11-16 age group.23
5.6 Conclusion
Formal education of the leader has been used as a proxy for quality of the leader without much
evidence on the efficacy of educated leaders. Recent changes in laws in some states in India have
used this notion to bar less educated citizens from contesting elections. In this paper, we inves-
tigate whether having more-educated state representatives results in better learning and schooling
outcomes. We find that more-educated politicians are no better at improving elementary education
for their constituents than less-educated politicians. Learning outcomes, enrollment, attendance,
school infrastructure and funding are not significantly impacted if the elected representative is
23Since DISE data on schools does not have household or individual level characteristics, those are not included in
this analysis.
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more educated. In the field of elementary education leaders with more formal education are not
found to be more competent or effective.
Our results are subject to several important caveats. First, the results are specific to the outcomes
in education. Even though education is an important development outcome that ought to be a
priority of any good leader, it might be the case the educated leaders have other priorities which
they focus on. Educated leaders might get better outcomes than less educated leaders in other areas
such as economic growth, health or environment which are not analyzed in this paper. Also even
though state leaders have a role to play in education policy and implementation, yet it might be
a hard outcome for leaders to influence. Hence we test the impact of educated leader on a range
of education outcomes including school level outcomes which are arguably more direct and easier
to influence for a policy-maker. Moreover, we link our results to the existing literature which has
found impact of state leaders on education, although we cannot completely rule out the possibility
that education is an outcome on which state leaders may not have an impact.
Second, we only analyze state leaders and the impact of education of leaders might be different at
the national or the local level. National and local leaders might have different set of responsibilities
and roles than state level leaders and it might be the case that education plays a significant role for
them but not for state leaders.
Third, due to limitations of data we analyze leader characteristics only at the district level and not
at individual constituency level for which they are elected. Leaders are elected for constituency
and each district has on average nine constituencies. But the lowest unit of identification in the
data on outcomes is the district, so we aggregate leader characteristics at the district level before
ascertaining the impact. Our results might be sensitive to this averaging of leader characteristics at
the district level.
Fourth, our identification strategy uses close elections to estimate the impact of educated leaders.
Even though we control for the proportion of close elections in the district and provide some
suggestive evidence of external validity of our results, leaders (educated and less-educated) might
behave differently in close elections vis-a-vis non-close elections. Maybe in non-close elections
educated leaders face less political competition and spend resources on education or other issues
which matter for long term development and are not able to do it in constituencies that have close
elections. Our analysis would not capture this; and so in the future we hope to utilize natural
experiments resulting from exogenous shocks like sudden imposition of education mandate to
study the impact of educated leaders.
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Even with all these limitations, our findings advance the literature on quality of leaders. We are
the first, to our knowledge, to analyze the link between politician’s education and competency
in India. The evidence presented here suggests that having leaders with more formal education
does not yield better education outcomes for citizens. Any assessment of the minimum education
mandate on candidates contesting elections ought to take these findings into account. Also the
literature on quality of leaders needs to consider these findings when using formal education as a
proxy for quality of leaders.
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5. Appendix
Table A1: OLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s Reading Score
Reading Score
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate 0.027 0.010 0.034 0.061* 0.023 0.037
(0.045) (0.053) (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.031)
Female child 0.007* 0.008* -0.009** -0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Child’s mother went to school 0.258*** 0.259*** 0.221*** 0.221***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Household size -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Square of household size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House semi-pucca 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.091***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
House pucca 0.206*** 0.200*** 0.160*** 0.158***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Household owns television 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.104*** 0.102***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Household owns mobile phone 0.120*** 0.129*** 0.144*** 0.150***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Household’s electricity use observed 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.036***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Village has electricity 0.030** 0.047*** 0.027** 0.035***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Village has pucca road 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Village has ration shop 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Village has bank 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,262,927 896,820 869,544 1,272,189 928,499 904,149
Number of districts 563 563 545 563 563 545
R-squared (within) 0.005 0.051 0.058 0.002 0.040 0.044
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. District controls are baseline
characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult
female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition and proportion of females in rural
areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant
at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A2: OLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s Mathematics Score
Mathematics Score
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.017 -0.012 0.032 0.012 -0.002 0.044
(0.049) (0.062) (0.041) (0.054) (0.066) (0.039)
Female child -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.084*** -0.083***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Child’s mother went to school 0.251*** 0.254*** 0.258*** 0.259***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Household size -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Square of household size 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House semi-pucca 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.097***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
House pucca 0.211*** 0.202*** 0.196*** 0.189***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Household owns television 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.127*** 0.128***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Household owns mobile phone 0.115*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.136***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Household’s electricity use observed 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Village has electricity 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.029** 0.018
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Village has pucca road 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Village has ration shop 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Village has bank 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.018*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,251,958 892,605 865,509 1,267,391 926,214 901,972
Number of districts 563 563 545 563 563 545
R-squared (within) 0.009 0.059 0.069 0.017 0.065 0.077
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. District controls are baseline
characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult
female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition and proportion of females in rural
areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant
at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A3: OLS Estimates for Impact on Proportion Out of School (NSS Data)
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of 0.00371 0.00508 0.00397 -0.000318 0.00475 -0.00146
seats won by a graduate (0.0128) (0.0124) (0.0113) (0.0168) (0.0160) (0.0150)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 108521 108493 108493 131693 131651 131651
Number of districts 574 574 574 574 574 574
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. District controls are interacted with year
dummies and include data from 2004-05 National Sample Survey on urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and
adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition and proportion of females in rural
areas. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A4: First Stage Results for Impact on Proportion Out of School (NSS Data)
6-10 age-group 11-16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.972*** 0.961*** 0.961*** 0.971***
seats won by a graduate in close elections (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.108) (0.107) (0.107)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 109322 109288 109288 132815 132768 132768
Number of districts 574 574 574 574 574 574
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as between a
graduate and a non-graduate in which the winner beat the runner up by less than 3 percent of votes. District controls are
interacted with year dummies and include data from 2004-05 National Sample Survey on urbanization rate, proportion
of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition and proportion
of females in rural areas. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A5: OLS Estimates for Impact on Schools (DISE data)
PCA for school facilites Annual average school grants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of 0.0677 -0.0145 -3280.9 -4257.0**
seats won by a graduate (0.0880) (0.0763) (2094.4) (1979.9)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2611 2381 2695 2455
Number of districts 575 521 575 521
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. PCA for school facilites is generated using data
on school facilites such as access to free textbooks, furniture for students, girls toilets, safe drinking water, library,
playground and computers. Annual average funds refers to average total funds received by schools in the districts
under School Development Grant, School Maintenance Grant, Teachers Grant and other grants. Close elections are
defined as between a graduate and a non-graduate in which the winner beat the runner up by less than 3 percent of
votes. District controls are interacted with year dummies and include data from 2004-05 National Sample Survey on
urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste
composition and proportion of females in rural areas. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A6: First Stage Results for Impact on Schools (DISE data)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate
(1) (2)
Fraction of 0.952*** 0.965***
seats won by a graduate in close elections (0.123) (0.130)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
District controls Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes
Observations 2696 2242
Number of districts 575 476
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as between a
graduate and a non-graduate in which the winner beat the runner up by less than 3 percent of votes. District controls are
interacted with year dummies and include data from 2004-05 National Sample Survey on urbanization rate, proportion
of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition and proportion
of females in rural areas. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A7: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s Enrollment in Rural Areas (ASER)
Not enrolled in school
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate 0.018 0.004 -0.004 0.023 0.013 0.008
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Close election fraction 0.007 0.012* 0.009 0.012 0.025** 0.013
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Female child 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Child’s mother went to school -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.050*** -0.049***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Square of household size -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House semi-pucca -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
House pucca -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.033*** -0.034***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Household owns television -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.022*** -0.021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Household owns mobile phone -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household’s electricity use observed -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Village has electricity -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Village has pucca road -0.001 -0.001** -0.006*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Village has ration shop -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Village has bank 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,350,258 954,395 925,237 1,437,873 1,042,675 1,015,167
Number of districts 563 563 545 563 563 545
First Stage F-stat 51.33 56.62 52.67 59.68 64.08 59.28
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as
between a graduate and a non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner
up is less than 3 percent. District controls are baseline characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include
urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school,
caste composition and proportion of females in rural areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A8: OLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s Grade Progression (ASER data)
Grade Progression
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.024 -0.009 -0.017 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006
(0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Female child 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Child’s mother went to school 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.046*** 0.047***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Household size -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Square of household size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House semi-pucca 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
House pucca 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Household owns television 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Household owns mobile phone 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Household’s electricity use observed 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Village has electricity 0.055*** 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Village has pucca road 0.005* 0.005 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Village has ration shop 0.004 0.004 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Village has bank -0.002 -0.003 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,098,840 778,444 755,192 1,415,062 1,030,064 1,003,086
Number of districts 563 563 545 563 563 545
R-squared (within) 0.000 0.248 0.251 0.006 0.077 0.082
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. District controls are baseline
characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult
female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition and proportion of females in rural
areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant
at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A9: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s Grade Progression (ASER data)
Grade Progression
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate -0.065 0.006 0.040 -0.024 0.003 0.019
(0.045) (0.043) (0.050) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021)
Close election fraction 0.021 0.012 0.009 -0.015 -0.020 -0.013
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011)
Female child 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Child’s mother went to school 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.046*** 0.047***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Household size -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Square of household size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House semi-pucca 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
House pucca 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Household owns television 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Household owns mobile phone 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Household’s electricity use observed 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Village has electricity 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.032*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Village has pucca road 0.005* 0.005* 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Village has ration shop 0.004 0.005 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Village has bank -0.002 -0.003 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,098,840 778,444 755,192 1,415,062 1,030,064 1,003,086
Number of districts 563 563 545 563 563 545
First Stage F-stat 51.27 56.38 52.32 59.84 64.24 59.34
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as
between a graduate and a non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner
up is less than 3 percent. District controls are baseline characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include
urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school,
caste composition and proportion of females in rural areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A10: OLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s English Score
English Score
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate 0.036 0.067 0.087 0.024 -0.002 0.025
(0.056) (0.075) (0.067) (0.054) (0.067) (0.054)
Female child -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.062*** -0.062***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Child’s mother went to school 0.313*** 0.315*** 0.290*** 0.291***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Household size -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Square of household size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House semi-pucca 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.092*** 0.090***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
House pucca 0.265*** 0.260*** 0.226*** 0.221***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Household owns television 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.146*** 0.144***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Household owns mobile phone 0.142*** 0.149*** 0.158*** 0.167***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Household’s electricity use observed 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.031***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Village has electricity -0.019 0.010 -0.005 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
Village has pucca road 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.044***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Village has ration shop 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.032***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Village has bank 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 554,483 367,406 355,908 563,175 388,105 378,254
Number of districts 563 561 544 563 561 544
R-squared (within) 0.001 0.086 0.093 0.002 0.070 0.078
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. District controls are baseline
characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult
female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition and proportion of females in rural
areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant
at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A11: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect on Children’s English Score
English Score
6–10 age-group 11–16 age-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats won by a graduate 0.040 0.266 0.187 -0.062 0.119 0.175
(0.152) (0.176) (0.157) (0.166) (0.173) (0.136)
Close election fraction 0.099 0.065 0.016 0.058 0.024 -0.024
(0.079) (0.081) (0.071) (0.084) (0.083) (0.079)
Female child -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.062*** -0.061***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Child’s mother went to school 0.312*** 0.313*** 0.290*** 0.290***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Household size -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Square of household size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House semi-pucca 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.090***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
House pucca 0.266*** 0.261*** 0.226*** 0.221***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Household owns television 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.146*** 0.144***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Household owns mobile phone 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.158*** 0.166***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Household’s electricity use observed 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Village has electricity -0.017 0.007 -0.004 -0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
Village has pucca road 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.046***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Village has ration shop 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.033***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Village has bank 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.030*** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child, household & village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 554,483 367,406 355,908 563,175 388,105 378,254
Number of districts 563 561 544 563 561 544
First Stage F-stat 64.76 69.21 63.71 70.49 72.68 66.67
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as
between a graduate and a non-graduate in which the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner
up is less than 3 percent. District controls are baseline characteristics interacted with year dummies; they include
urbanization rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school,
caste composition and proportion of females in rural areas estimated from 2004-05 National Sample Survey data.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A12: Descriptive Statistics for Schooling Outcomes (ASER data)
Mean Std.Dev. Obs
Usable blackboard in class 2 0.94 0.23 40526
Usable blackboard in class 4 0.94 0.24 40526
Learning material in class 2 0.80 0.40 40526
Learning material in class 4 0.77 0.42 40526
Drinking water 0.76 0.42 40526
Usable toilet 0.79 0.41 40526
Usable library books 0.44 0.50 40526
PCA score for physical assets 0.04 1.50 40526
Schoool maintenance grant 0.89 0.31 50184
School development grant 0.82 0.39 50184
Teacher learning material grant 0.72 0.45 50184
PCA score SSA school grants –0.03 1.28 50184
Mid-day meal 0.85 0.36 77692
Children’s attendance 0.72 0.20 76730
Teacher’s attendance 0.85 0.25 61641
Table A13: Impact on School Attendance (ASER data)
Child Attendance Ratio Teacher Attendance Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of -0.0216 -0.0170 0.0527 0.0751
seats won by a graduate (0.0303) (0.0338) (0.0487) (0.0519)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School type controls Yes Yes
Village controls Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 76730 69906 61641 56096
Number of districts 563 544 563 544
First stage F statistics 67 61 71 62
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as between a
graduate and a non-graduate in which the winner beat the runner up by less than 3 percent of votes. Controls at
school level include dummies for if school is upto primary only - upto 4-5 or includes middle school - upto 7-8 or
other. Controls for village include dummies for existence of electricity, permanent road, ration shop and bank. District
controls are interacted with year dummies and include data from 2004-05 National Sample Survey on urbanization
rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition
and proportion of females in rural areas. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A14: Impact on Schooling Inputs (ASER data)
PCA for physical assets PCA for grants Midday meals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of -0.207 -0.0859 -0.550* -0.386 0.0423 0.103
seats won by a graduate (0.303) (0.317) (0.282) (0.240) (0.0739) (0.0738)
Vote margins: third order polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School type controls Yes Yes Yes
Village controls Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 56262 51273 50184 47149 77692 69739
Number of districts 563 542 561 544 563 544
First stage F statistics 73 60 74 70 68 60
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. Close elections are defined as between a
graduate and a non-graduate in which the winner beat the runner up by less than 3 percent of votes. Controls at
school level include dummies for if school is upto primary only - upto 4-5 or includes middle school - upto 7-8 or
other. Controls for village include dummies for existence of electricity, permanent road, ration shop and bank. District
controls are interacted with year dummies and include data from 2004-05 National Sample Survey on urbanization
rate, proportion of adult male and adult female in rural areas who have completed primary school, caste composition
and proportion of females in rural areas. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
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